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ABSTRACT
Iranian society has undergone significant transformations since the 1962 Land Reform and the
modernization plans implemented by its different governments. These transformations include
industrialization, bureaucratization, population explosion, rural-urban migration, increase in the
size of the working class, massive entry of women into the labor force, and the subsequent 1979
Islamic Revolution. Since the Revolution, the class structure and the composition of Iran’s political
elites have changed significantly. Previous research has been particularly less attentive to the
relationship between the structure of classes in Iran and the demographic composition of elected
members of parliament (MPs). This study aims to enhance previous research by studying the nature
and extent of representativeness of members of the Iranian parliament since the Revolution.
Special attention will be paid to the descriptive representation of MPs by calculating the index of
dissimilarity. Utilizing data on the occupational distribution of the general population and
parliamentarians, this study will identify social class representativeness of MPs in each of the ten
parliamentarian elections from 1980 to 2016. It employs a mixed methodology placing emphasis
on the demographic (gender, age, ethnicity, etc.) and socioeconomic (education and occupation)
dimensions of political representation. Using various theoretical models, it will test the extent to
which each of the liberal-pluralist, instrumentalist and structuralist Marxists, or cultural
reproduction theoretical approaches fit the evidence. The current study finds that educational
credential, as a measure of credentialized cultural capital, is an important predictor of being elected
as a member of parliament in Iran, supporting the cultural reproduction theory. Evidence also
supports Marxist theory in that working class is underrepresented in the Majles, and that education
itself is class-based. Finally, this study observes strong representation of professional and
managerial class among the parliamentarians which lends support to liberal-pluralist theory.
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INTRODUCTION

1

Statement and Significance of the Problem
Despite the fact that Iran is prominent in the international media, it has been subject to
misrepresentation and misunderstanding even in academia, let alone the media (Amuzegar
2014). A conventional approach in the West is to attempt to understand Middle Eastern
countries, in general and Iran in particular, through ideological lens. Iranian studies, particularly
those that focus on the postrevolutionary period, are often too concerned with the religious and
political aspects of Iranian society, a form of religious and political reductionism which has
under-analyzed the sociological dimensions of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Moaddel 1991).
While there are scholarly studies on the class apparatus of post-revolution Iran (for example
Nomani and Behdad 2006, and Amir Arjomand 2009b), there are limited studies that focus on
the relationship between class structure and the political system in Iran.
The current study suggests that the societal system, particularly the class structure, is
actually central to explaining and understanding the dynamics of Iranian society. It postulates
that a sociological analysis is necessary to complement the religious and political narratives.
Moreover, following Bill (1972:vii), this study assumes that an understanding of the interaction
between class structure and the political system provides valuable insights into the dynamics of
Iranian society. In order to fill the scholarly void, this current study endeavours to investigate the
parallel shifts in the class structure and the composition of political elites in Iran since the
Islamic Revolution in 1979.
In effect, this study aims to examine the mechanism of exchange and interconnection
between the state and social classes of contemporary Iran. In order to do so, it will seek to
explore the changes in the economic and social structures of Iran, and to explain how they
correspond with the political configuration at the state level. At its core, this research is a
2

theoretical and empirical analysis of how the postrevolutionary socioeconomic structure in Iran
corresponds with the composition of elected political elites as represented in parliamentary
membership. The precise aim of the present study is to determine the extent to which the postrevolution composition of Iran’s parliament reflects the characteristics of the general population
that elected them: in other words, the extent to which the political representatives of the postrevolution Majleses mirror the characteristics of the general Iranian population. Thus, this study
sits within the long tradition of examining the socioeconomic dimensions of political
representation. It seeks to contribute to political sociology by answering the prolonged question
of how the state and social classes relate to one another. This is the first empirical study that
seeks to standardize Iranian members of parliaments’ socioeconomic (education and occupation)
and demographic (age, gender, religion, ethnicity, place of residence) representativeness, over
the time period spanning from the first Majles after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 to the most
recent Majles in 2016.
The current study aims to meet five goals:
1- To describe the significant changes that have occurred in the recent history of Iran,
particularly in terms of class structure and the composition of political elites.
2- To identify the distribution of Iranians by gender, occupation and education.
3- To identify the gender, occupational, and educational composition of Parliament.
4- To create indices of similarity and dissimilarity of members of parliament (MPs) to

be used to evaluate education, occupation, gender, age, and place of residence
representation in Iran.
5- To explain both changes in the Iranian class structure and the composition of political

elites.
3

The significance of this project lies in two factors: the singularity of Iran as a case study;
and the importance of studying political representation in general, and studying political
representation in Iran, in particular. Foucault has argued that the Iranian revolution is an
impressive “attempt to open a spiritual dimension in politics” (Foucault 2005:208). At the same
time, it could be argued that the primary motive of the 1977-9 movement was not religious for
the majority of the participants and sympathizers. One supporting indicator for this assertion is
the fact that the first two rallying cries, even at the outset of the victory of Revolution, were
independence from extra-national states, and political freedom and reform. To look at the picture
from a historical perspective, the heart of the revolutionary zeal was the restoration of ‘Iranian
confidence’ (Rajaee 2007:238), which had been lost under the impacts of modernity and
longstanding foreign intervention. In another sense, as is discussed under the Advent of the
Revolution in chapter 3, the Revolution was a reaction to the conflicts which rapid development
had brought about (Abrahamian 2008, Rafipour 2000). For many of the participants, the
overthrow of the Shah was seen as the cure for all problems through the ‘Islamic Republic’ - the
third rallying point of the Revolution - for it was considered to be a trustworthy vehicle for
fulfilling the people’s demands and dreams.
The political system of the Islamic Republic is an innovative system that incorporated the
presidential political model with the principle of the guardianship of an Islamic Jurist for the first
time in the history of politics. Iran is argued to be the world’s only true Islamic Republic, in
accordance with its blending of Islamic Shari’ah and republicanism (Abootalebi 2009:11). This
fact highlights the importance of closely scrutinizing such a system. As is elaborated under the
chapter entitled the Structure of Power after the Revolution, the president of the Republic,
members of the Iranian Parliament (Majles), and members of the Assembly of Leadership
4

Experts (who are in charge of selecting the ruling jurisconsult) are elected by the Iranian
people’s vote3. The Majles and the Presidency are vanguards of the directly elected pillar, and
the Supreme Leader sits on the top of the indirectly elected pillar of power in Iran. Failing to
realize the distinction between these two powerful pillars of power, which has been termed
political ‘hybridity’, as well as diversity of political power centres in Iran, which does not have
close analogous in the region or elsewhere (see Amir Arjomand 2009b, and Brumberg and Farhi
2016), has been an important source of misleading analysis and observation of the Iranian
political system.
The Islamic state, which is the outcome of the Revolution, has institutionalized specific
kinds of political and economic approaches that are not necessarily analogous to capitalist
democracy in its conventional Western sense, nor to a socialist model. At the same time, the
Islamic Republic of Iran is deemed to be a non-democratic system4. Many discussions in
academia and the media make common assertions about Iran, claiming that republican
governance and religious doctrine are not compatible, that elections in Iran are rigged, that
‘authoritarianism’ or ‘modern sultanate’ are the most fitting descriptions of the Iranian political
system, and that the level of illegitimacy is rising in Iran (for example see Assadi 1996, Chehabi
2001a, Ganji 2008, Totten 2016, Zahedi 2010). Despite such assertions, Iran has established
institutions that are potentially democratic such as a parliament and a variety of political, semiparty factions. At the same time, Iranian society has created a certain kind of public space that,
although not necessarily synonymous with traditional civil society (see Dadgar 2013), it is
vibrant and dense at least by regional standards. This Iranian variant of democracy has arisen

3

However, the candidates of the presidential, Majles and Assembly of Expert’s elections are subject to approval by the Guardian Council
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According to Freedom House 2017, Iran’s freedom rating is 6, when 7 is the worst.
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from one of the most popular movements in world history, the Islamic Revolution, in which
more than 10% of the population took active part in demonstration, street and political
confrontation with the state apparatus and subsequent regime change (Kurzman 2004:vii-viii,
Skocpol 1982).
Theoretically, and regardless of its practical outcome, the formulation of an ‘ideal
human’ as socially responsible individual who is attentive and committed to others is shared by a
number of thinkers in Islamic tradition. These thinkers included: Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, Eghbal
Lahori, Ruhollah Khomeini, Mehdi Bazargan, Mahmoud Taleghani, Morteza Motahari, Hosein
Ali Montazeri, Mohammad Beheshti, Ali Shariati, Mohammad Bagher Sadr (see Adelkhah
2000:5). This conceptualization of human beings could be, arguably, seen as an alternative to the
Hobbesian perception of a self-centered individual. In the Islamic paradigm, the focus is largely
on human dignity, honorability, and otherworldly salvation (see Weber 2005 [1930]) rather than
mere worldly economic and material success.
This conception is then related to the protection of human dignity which is reflected in
the ideology of the Islamic state: “the Islamic Republic is a political system based on faith in rule
of Allah, and eminent dignity and value of human beings, […] and the negation of the
perpetration or the suffering of any injustice or dominance” (2007 [1989]:5). Likewise, the first
assumption of the theory of the state in Islamic jurisprudence is that no human being has
guardianship over another: “the state, from the viewpoint of Islam, is not a product of the class
system or individual or group domination, but, is the crystallization of the political ideal of a
nation that has the same ideology and religion and organizes itself to move through an
ideological evolution towards its final goal, a movement towards Allah” (Islamic Republic
Constitution 2007 [1989]:10). Accordingly, the significance of the current study arises from the
6

novelty and uniqueness of the philosophical and ideological insights6 which gave birth to the
Islamic Republic of Iran. More importantly, studying the way in which this philosophical ideal
has been translated into practice is worthy of systematic analysis.
The importance of the current study is underscored in the light of the fact that the social
sciences are eager to improve their understanding and to obviate their relative shortage of
knowledge about Middle Eastern countries in general and about Iran in particular. The
difficulties in explaining the Iranian 1979 Revolution, and more recently, in understanding and
also predicting the aftermath of what was excitedly named the Green Movement and Arab
Spring, underlines that shortage of knowledge.
A second line of importance is drawn from the salience of the idea of political
representation in the political sociological tradition. Political representation sits at the heart of
democracy (Dahl 1989, WeBels 2007:833, Tormey 2015). Ideal representation would guarantee
that policy makers are representative of, and responsive to, the wishes of the people (Powell
2004), and at the same time safeguard political justice. From a sociological point of view,
however, the point of interest is the implication which class, gender, racial-ethnic and other
societal divisions could have for the analysis of proportional representation. From this
perspective, as is further discussed in the chapter entitled The Study of Proportional
Representation and Social Justice, the underrepresentation of various segments of society has
negative implications for political equality and may challenge the legitimacy of a given political
system.

6

Iran is the only Islamic state that is built on the Shi’i doctrine of Islam.
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Specifically, the significant need for a better understanding of the relationship between
the social class transformation and the corresponding changes in the composition of political
elites will be further highlighted as this study outlines the extent to which existing scholarship
has been relatively inattentive to this relationship: not only in the global setting (see Wauters
2010:183), but particularly with regards to Iran (but see Ashraf 1994, and Amir Arjomand
2009a). This has caused the question of economic representation, or more precisely, the class
representation of political elites, to remain unanswered in the political sociology literature on
Iran.
Finally, Iran is an interesting case from another angle. As will be further analyzed in
chapter 6 under the Place and Role of Majles in the Political Apparatus of Iran, the quest for a
fair and representative parliament has been central in Iranian democratic movements throughout
the 20th century and most obviously during the Islamic Revolution. It is important to analyze the
extent to which political equality and the rule of Mostaz’afan7 as core revolutionary appeals
(Ashraf and Banuazizi 2001:241), has been realized in the three decades since the Revolution.
This study finds that the possession of higher education degrees and the quality of loyalty
to the ideals of the revolution as the most advantageous factors that one can possess when s/he
desires to be recruited into the circle of the political elite in post-revolution Iran - the political
elite here being defined as membership in parliament. Furthermore, the importance of higher
secular education has increased in recent years as that of religious education and seminary
decreased. Given that Bourdieu (1977, 1984) has conceptualized education as ‘credentialized’
cultural capital, the thesis provides strong support for the cultural reproduction theory. The role

7

Oppressed and disinherited strata of the society
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of education can also be conceptualized as supportive of the Marxist theory because education
itself is class-based. However, given that the professional and managerial occupations are
overrepresented in the Majles, the explanatory importance of the liberal-pluralist theory cannot
be overlooked.

Structure of Dissertation
This volume is composed of eight chapters, as well as an introduction and a conclusion. Chapter
1 reviews the extant literature on class and politics. It includes previous research on the
relationship between social classes and political elites. Chapter 2 lays out the study of
representation and proportional representation, as well as its implications for political justice and
the well-being of democracy. A principal distinction in the literature between descriptive and
substantial representation will also be discussed in chapter 2. In chapter 3, after a brief
explanatory narrative of the Islamic Revolution, an analysis of the contemporary structural
transformations of Iranian society is delivered. These transformations are traced along three
lines, including changes in the socio-demographic characteristics of Iranian society, the
expansion of education, and the trend towards secularization. Later, in the same chapter, Iran’s
post-revolution political economy is examined. Chapter 4 offers a description of the structure of
power in the Islamic Republic and sheds lights on difficulties in understanding the political
system of post-revolution Iran. The fifth chapter reviews the existing studies of the class
structure and that of political elites, as well as the recent interplays of the two in Iran. Class
analysis is discussed in relation with the changes in the political economy of post-revolution
governments and development plans (section 3 of chapter three), and the analysis of power elites,
in turn, is formulated in relation to the general structure of power in Iran (chapter 4). Chapter 6
focuses on the history and the role of the Parliament in the political apparatus of Iran. It
9

demonstrates the political orientations of the majority of parliamentarians in different terms of
the Majles since the Revolution. In the latest section of this chapter, the existing studies of the
socioeconomic composition of the Majles’ representatives in pre- and post-revolution are
reviewed. Based on that reviewed literature, a section then follows which presents theoretical
hypothesis and questions. Methodological considerations concerning, e.g., the measurement of
the main research variables, as well as the sources of data and the statistical analysis that have
been utilized in this study, are discussed in chapter 7. Chapter 8 is devoted to statistical analysis
and presents the results of the current study’s analysis in ten sections. A final chapter concludes
and explains the findings, addresses the limitations, discusses policy implications and offers final
remarks.

10

CHAPTER ONE: THEORY OF CLASS AND POLITICS

11

This study will apply the existing explanations of the relationship between state elites and social
classes to the case of Iran. As portrayed in figure 1, two main, interrelated theoretical
constellations can guide this study to answering a core empirical problem: the representation of
Iranian members of parliament. They will be discussed within both Iranian and non-Iranian
contexts. The theoretical constellations are the cluster of class-state relationship theories that are
discussed in this chapter, and a cluster of proportional representation theories that focus on the
class representation of parliamentarians, which will be discussed in chapter two. Although such
distinctions have been made for the sake of analytical purposes, the segregation between these
two collections of theories is certainly far from clear for they are deeply interrelated.

Figure 1: The theoretical constellations and the empirical core of this study

Class -State Relation
Theories

Proportional
Representation
Theories

Socieconomic
Representation of

Iranian MPs

The Study of Class-state Relations
The development of class studies is greatly indebted to the discipline of sociology. Class is of
significant importance to sociological knowledge whether it be ‘class’ as an indicator of material
belongings and interests, or ‘class analysis’ as the study of the impacts of one’s class on the
12

different aspects of one’s social life (Hout, Brooks and Manza 1999). However, the
conceptualization and operationalization of class has always been subject to contestation within
sociology.
The concepts of class and class relations play a central role in Marx’s elaboration of
society. For Marx, class is not merely composed of different income groups. Instead, Marx
defines classes in direct relation to the process of production and also within exchange relations
(Wright 2005b). Class positions, according to Marx, are determined by the lines of ownership of
valuable productive resources or by having control over the process of production. Those who
have ownership of the means of production and who control the production process are able to
extract surplus value from propertyless workers; they have the right to control the production
process, and sit in a position of superiority which makes them able to expropriate others’ surplus
value. The development of capitalism, in Marx’s analysis, tends to polarize the class structure of
society into two antagonistic classes: a dominant capitalist class and a subordinate working class.
Those theoretical approaches to class whose focuses are material capital, common interests, and
economic relations around the means of production are typically inspired by Marx.
Weber’s class theory is considered to be the earliest attempt to critique Marx’s theory of
class (Giddens 2008a:132). Weber extended Marx’s formulation of social class by adding
dimensions of marketable skills and power, and introducing the concept of status. For Weber,
class and status represent different aspects of the distribution of power in a society (Weber
1978), which in turn determine different sources of inequality (Grabb 1997). According to
Weber, people occupy different positions in the class-situation of a society based on the
marketable skills that they can offer to the social market, within which a hierarchical distribution
of power exists. Class-situation, for Weber, is determined by the ownership or non-ownership of
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material goods or of definite skills within a market situation, and those in the same classsituation are referred to as a class (Weber, Mills and Gerth 1946:181-83, also 405). One’s
position in the class system, then, determines his/her ‘life chances’ and the limits of his/her own
and inter-generational social mobility (Breen 2005:32-33). Weber also introduced a ‘status’
based stratification. According to this, people can be classified under same status group if they
adopt similar lifestyles and subjective value systems. In Weber’s class model, four ‘social
classes’ are distinguished: a working class; a petty bourgeoisie; a propertyless intelligentsia and
specialists (which includes technicians, various kinds of white-collar employees, and civil
servants); and, lastly, a privileged class (Weber 1978:305). In a Weberian model of stratification,
difference in the possession of market-relevant assets translate into differences in the distribution
of life-chances, and are the economic basis of inequality, which sits alongside other sources of
social inequality such as ethnic membership, gender and so on (Breen 2005:35 and 49). In
addition, Weber introduces a third form of distribution of power in societies, asides from class
and status. For Weber, while classes sit within the economic order, and status is worked out
within the social order, parties live within the house of power (Weber, Mills and Gerth
1946:194). The main goal of parties, as Weber argues, is influencing communal action. The
means of attaining power in parties varies from the use of naked violence to more subtle forms,
but most commonly consists in struggling to obtain votes using money, force of speech,
suggestion, and social influence. Modern class theorists, who have based their analysis on the
subjective and symbolic systems, lifestyles, power relations, and status location within
stratification apparatus, are indebted to Weber.
Durkheim’s conception of class is built on the basis of the disposition of the division of
labor within a society. If, for Marx, the position of an individual in the class structure is
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determined by his/her access to the means of economic production, for Durkheim, it is the
occupational position one occupies within the division of labor of society that defines social
classes. Those models which emphasize the occupational division of labor as the source of the
class stratification in society lie within a Durkheimian tradition. As Grusky (2005:59) notes, the
practical implication of Durkheimian formulations is their focus on detailed occupations, unlike
models which group occupations within big classes.
After WWII, a novel body of theoretical arguments arose to explain Western society’s
changing class structure, which was then named the ‘post-industrial’ era. Enormous social and
economic changes, such as ever-increasing specialization, advanced technological innovations,
domination of the corporate market economy, the information revolution, and globalization were
taking place (Wright 1997, chapter 3). There were several signs that first signified a change in
the class structure: the differentiation of the capitalist class into owners and financial capitalists;
differentiation among the working class, based upon skill and income; and the proliferation of a
propertyless class of clerical, bureaucratic, and white-collar workers (Dahrendorf 1959). More
recent scholars like Bell (1973) and Giddens (1981a, 2007) identified the replacement of the
manufacturing economy by a new ‘knowledge/service economy.’ Others stressed intensification
of the role of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1977, Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley 1998), the
emergence of the global division of labor (Esping-Andersen 1999), and the process of deindustrialization. What theorists of class who addressed advanced capitalism had in common was
the notion that recent socio-economic transformations brought about a substantial shift in modern
class divisions, which required early formulations of class to be revised. Alongside attempts in
revising class models to be more adaptable to the post-industrial era, an effort has also been
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made to analyze the political importance of social class and to theorize about the dynamics of
class-state relations, as well as the mechanism of exchange between classes and the state.
Within such contexts, there are two discernible approaches: those who see class and class
analysis as out of date and obsolete (for example Clark and Lipset 1991, Nisbet 1959, Pakulski
and Waters 2008), and those who see class as a politically and socially pertinent division (for
example Goldthorpe and Marshall 1992, Goldthorpe 2001, Hout, Brooks and Manza 1999,
Wright 1980, 1985, 2005a). The latter group of theorists believe that class background remains a
significant determinant and predictor of life chances, most notably of access to political power.
This is where Porter (1965), for instance, begins his analysis of the relation between social
classes and state elites in Canada. According to his account, the economic elites who benefited
from extensive corporatization and the concentration of economic power have the greatest
chance of acquiring political power.
In a broader sense, all of this could be translated into the question of the mechanisms of
interplay between social classes and the structure of political elites. Advocates of class
dissolution thesis are more likely to adopt a liberal-pluralist approach rooted in the functionalist
paradigm. According to this approach, best reflected in Davis and Moore (1944) and in Dahl’s
(1967) works, the system of social occupation works on the basis of a functional hierarchy, one
rooted in one’s capacity and skills with which to contribute to society. The concept of functional
hierarchy means that the occupations most valuable to society’s survival are the most prestigious
and most rewarded ones. Thanks to equal access to education, the most competent people of
different class backgrounds have become able to experience intra- and inter-generational
mobility and are more likely to occupy a society’s most important jobs (Dahl 1967, Knuttila
1987, also see Nakhaie 1996:524).
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With regards to the concept of power, the liberal-pluralist paradigm maintains that, within
a society, power is essentially dispersed and distributed among different groups - such as classes
and status groups - and that, potentially, all groups with appropriate skills and capacities have
equal access to power. Political elites, thus, are those who are best fitted to sit in decisionmaking occupations. In a pluralist society, according to Dahl (1961), community interests are
represented through open and democratic political processes. From a liberal-pluralist point of
view, the state is a neutral establishment. Thus, polyarchy, as he terms the ideal form of a state,
is supposed to be a ‘value-free broker’ (see Brym 1985:13); this means that such a state is
supposed to represent the interests and wills of all segments of the population and mirror the
characteristics of the general population.
The liberal-pluralist account of the class-state relationship, however, has not escaped
criticism. Research has shown that free class mobility does not translate into real world
applications (see Goldthorpe 1987). Numerous studies have illustrated that, for example,
education itself is class-based, and that the possession of cultural capital by parents strongly
facilitates educational achievement in their children (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1978, Bourdieu
1977, Bowles 1977, Guppy, Mikicich and Pendakur 1984, Nakhaie 1996). These critiques have
tried to show that, contrary to liberal wisdom, having access to power is more feasible for wellto-do people. It might be reasonably argued then that since upper classes have had better access
to educational credentials, they have better chances to get prestigious occupations, and therefore,
their interests and preferences are more likely to be addressed and considered within the state
apparatus8. Critics also argue that power is not dispersed and that the state is not a neutral broker
and, that, therefore, trusting open and democratic political processes to create an equal political
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For a discussion on the ‘principle of specialization’ and the link between education and political recruitment, see chapter two.
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community, as Dahl 1961 suggests, is unrealistic (see Das 1996, for example). Two sets of
theories rivaling the liberal-pluralist view, have also been developed: instrumentalist and
structuralist. Both approaches are rooted in the Marxist theory of power, which suggests that the
state’s main function is protecting the economic basis of power, i.e., the capitalist system, and
reflecting the interests of the corporate and dominant classes.
Ralph Miliband (1969) presents an instrumentalist approach to class-state relationships.
He maintains that the state serves as an instrument of the wills and interests of the capitalist
class. He tried to show that in advanced capitalist societies, the capitalist elites and economically
superior classes rule the state. This happens because state officials, themselves, largely come
from a capitalist class background. In order to ensure its predominance, according to Miliband
(1969:227-29), the economically dominant class needs not only to control the means and the
flow of material production, but also control and lead the means of mental production. This
includes mass media (press, magazines and book publishing, cinemas, theatres), religion, and all
levels of academia, through which the capitalist elites legitimize capitalist rule. In this view, the
state becomes an instrument in the hand of the capitalist elites to protect their interests.
State intervention in the encounter between conflicting groups and classes, following
Miliband, is always and necessarily partisan: “as a class state, it always intervenes for the
purpose of maintaining the existing system of domination” (1977:91). According to an
instrumentalist approach, since the state’s personnel and policy-makers, or what Miliband (1969)
calls ‘state elites,’ share an upper class background, they also share a bourgeois perception and
ideology that secure the interests of the dominant class (Jessop 1990). Although Miliband rejects
that there is an ‘automatic translation’ (Miliband 1977:67) of economic power into state power,
he argues that:
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In contemporary capitalism, members of the bourgeoisie tend to predominate in the
three main sectors of social life, the economic, the political, and the cultural/ideological
- the political being understood here as referring mainly to the state apparatus. [Where
the state personnel] are not members of the bourgeoisie by social origin, they are later
recruited into it by virtue of their education, connections, and way of life (Miliband
1977:68-69).

The instrumentalist approach emphasizes the physical presence of economically upper
class people within the state apparatus, which according to this approach ensures that their
interests are reflected in policy-making. However, this claim has been questioned on the basis
that having a common upper class origin does not necessarily translate into having the same or
even similar view or ideology among the state personnel (see Giddens 1981b:chapter 9). Others
also underline the ‘growing globalization of capital’ which makes the link between a national
state with national capital quite unclear (see Das 1996:30). In all, as Poulantzas (1976:74) notes,
the state is not simply a passive tool in the hand of a specific class or faction.
As an alternative to the instrumentalist thesis, a structuralist view rooted in works of
Nicos Poulantzas (1975) emphasizes the structures that limit the state’s action and policy-making
in a way that secures the capitalist class’s interests (see Brym 1985). Poulantzas deems there to
be a ‘relative autonomy’ of the state from the dominant classes. He argues that “on a terrain of
political domination occupied by several classes and class fractions and divided by internal
contradictions, the capitalist state, while predominantly representing the interests of the
hegemonic class or fraction (itself variable), enjoys a relative autonomy with respect to that class
and fraction as well as to the other classes and fractions of the power bloc” (Poulantzas 1975:97).
This relative autonomy is considered to be embedded in the structure of capitalist states by the
separation of their political and economic dimensions, and is a “necessary condition for the role
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of the capitalist state in class representation and in the political organization of hegemony”
(Poulantzas 1975:98). By relative autonomy, Poulantzas also means “the state’s relation to the
field of the class struggle, in particular its relative autonomy vis-à-vis the classes and fractions of
the power bloc, and by extension vis-à-vis its allies or supports” (Poulantzas 1975:256).
The idea of relative autonomy stands opposed the instrumentalist thesis of ‘fusion and the
single mechanism’ (Poulantzas 1975: 161). According to a structuralist perspective, although the
state enjoys relative autonomy from the dominant class in this instance, it takes responsibility for
the interests of a monopoly’s capital (Poulantzas 1975:158). With this shift in focus, the question
is no longer who controls the state. Instead, the question is one of the structural constraints that
the capitalist class imposes on the state which make the capitalist state represent the interest of
their class while simultaneously leaving the state to exercise relative autonomy. This relative
autonomy, according to Poulantzas is necessary for the state to handle its political functions
properly and to ensure the smooth operation of a capitalist economy. In another words, this
autonomy is essentially due to a spatial separation of the juridico-political level from the
economic level (Albo and Jenson 1989:182) of society. The importance of relative autonomy for
class representation lies in the recognition of the fact that no state simply belongs to a specific
monopoly group. Rather, there are structural forces that channel policy-making in a way that
ensures the reproduction of capitalist relations and the benefit of the bourgeoisies. A relative
autonomy of the state from classes is necessary in order to control conflict between antagonistic
social forces in a capitalist society. It is also necessary for maintaining the well-being of
capitalist relations of production. While a structuralist approach accepts the relative autonomy of
the state from the capitalist class, critics such as Block (1987) and Das (1996) demonstrate that
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the mechanism through which the upper classes constrain the state’s action is unclear in the
structuralist approach.
To summarize, there are two ideal types of understanding and explaining the mechanism
of relationships between social classes and power elites. The first is ‘state-centred’ (Moaddel
1989) or liberal-pluralism, which sees the state’s behavior as independent and autonomous from
the interests of social classes, and holds that political elites are fair representatives of classes.
The second is a ‘class-centred’ or Marxist approach (translated to instrumentalist and
structuralist theories) which emphasizes the centrality of class interests by highlighting that a
state’s political elites represent and safeguard the specific interests of capitalist elites.
Above and beyond the liberal-pluralist and Marxist distinctions, several empirical
analyses have been conducted to scrutinize the class-state relations in different settings. In The
Power Elite (1973 [1956]), C. Wright Mills holds that America was dominated by a small group
of big industrialists and businessmen, high-ranked politicians, and military leaders. Mills reasons
that this group of elites, who are predominantly men and have both mutual interests and a shared
agenda, had come to threaten the American democracy more than ever. Most crucial decisions in
different spheres, according to Mills, are made by this group of elites. Through the mediation of
a middle level of power, the power elites sit on top of an atomized mass society. Mills argues
that power elites have similar social backgrounds and that the majority of them come from the
upper class; that they attend Ivy League colleges; and that they mix with one another on the golf
course, in gentlemen's clubs, etc. These commonalities and associations, as Mills argues, cement
what power elites feel they have in common and provoke a sense of unity and, more importantly,
help create ties among them. In addition, Mills observes an interchange of personnel among
power elites, which, in turn, enhances the closeness of government, military and business. Mills
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concludes that the psychological affinity, as well as high level of association between power
elites, makes them a whole in such a way that nowhere in America is there as great a 'class
consciousness' as among the elite (Mills 1973[1956]: 283, also see chapter 12 and 13).
Porter’s (1965) analysis of census data from 1931, 1951, and 1961 finds a pattern of
ethnic inequality in Canada in which the British were at the top of the occupational structure and,
at the same time, were overrepresented in elite positions. Porter argues that in a ‘mosaic’ setting,
which is composed of different socioeconomic, cultural and ethnic groups, one’s chance of
acquiring a position in the structure of power is assigned more or less based on his/her position
within those vectors of division. The task of the sociology of power, he continues (1965:207), is
to study people who fill those roles and also the channels through which elites are recruited.
Porter observes a ‘concentration of economic power,’ or an extensive
corporationalization: “a process by which a large part of a nation’s economy comes into the
hands of a relatively few large firms which become linked together and to the main financial
institutions” (22). Later investigations revealed that “the concentration of economic power was
still on the rise, with a shrinking group of large, often interconnected, and mainly private sector
corporations,” most prominently in the financial sectors, which includes banks, insurance
companies, and financial institutions, “at the centre of Canada’s ownership structure” (Grabb
1999:5). Such economic concentration according to Porter, has translated into the centralization
of political power in such a way that Canadian political elites9 are not representative of the
general population in terms of education, occupations, ethnic affiliation, and class origins
(1965:388-394). According to Porter, a quarter of the political elites come from the upper strata
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Including federal cabinet ministers, the provincial primers, justices of the Supreme Court, presidents of the Exchequer Court, and the
provincial chief justices
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while the working class has been greatly underrepresented among political leaders. Porter
(1965:395) finds that the majority of Canadian political leaders came from the middle class.
For Porter, those groups who have better income and education reproduce their privileged
positions via hardening the patterns of selection (patterns of preference and exclusion), as well as
kinship links (they marry within their own group), which bring them class continuity and prolong
their elite status (Porter 1965: 264-266; also 526). Porter goes on to say that prominent families
have their own social life, which is promoted in their clubs, associations, and extensive
interlocking networks, and help them to notice their high status. These networks of grouping and
cross-membership are important means through which the elite elect each other, reproduce their
privileged position, and generate solidarity.
Olsen (1980) argues that Canadian political elites between 1953 and 1973 have been
exclusive in occupational background. Guppy et al. (1987) shows that during 1965-1984,
Canadian MPs have come increasingly from high-status occupational backgrounds. Nakhaie
(1997) emphasizes that the pattern of under-representation of French and other ethnic groups
amongst Canadian elites is still persistent. Wauters (2010), in his case study of the structure of
the Belgian political representation since WWII, concludes that the working classes are not well
represented in parliament, and that their share in parliament has always been rather low.
With regard to the relation between society and the state, thus, the liberal approach
predicts that the most qualified individuals (the best-fitted persons regardless of their
socioeconomic origin) serve at the highest level of the power hierarchy. Seeing things in this
way, one would predict that the more educated and expert individuals occupy the higher-ranking
elected and non-elected positions in the state. Alternatively, instrumentalist and structuralist
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theses predict that the state guarantees the economic and political interests of the capitalist class,
either through the actual domination of their representatives in the body of the state, or through
such structural constrains as benefit the dominant classes. Thus, from a liberal-pluralist point of
view, if the working class is underrepresented, the cause would be assigned to their lesser
personal capacities in acquiring the requirements for upward mobility. By contrast, in the
Marxist paradigm, the causes of the underrepresentation of workers would be assigned to the fact
that the upper class has secured its presence, as well as its preferences, within the apparatus of
the state by the physical or structural exclusion of the working class. As will be discussed in the
next chapter, having unequal access to education, as a class-based asset, is another explanation
for the underrepresentation of working classes from a Marxist perspective.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE STUDY OF PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
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Political equality is a fundamental premise of a well-established representative democracy (Dahl
2006). The systematic study of the concept and implementation of ‘representative democracy’,
since Pitkin (1967), has been concerned with the idea of proportionality and political justice
(Anderson and Goodyear-Grant 2005, Callenbach and Phillips 1985, Dahl 2006, Phillips 1995).
Although the aura of the ‘official representative’ politics seemed to be fading away recently in
liberal democracies (see Tormey 2015), proportional representation still continues to have strong
theoretical implications for democracy and justice. A proportionate representation, in the sense
that all segments of society are able to have a voice in the political apparatus, is a necessary
condition for an ideal democracy, as well as a just representative political system.
There is no doubt that modern societies are ‘diverse’ entities in terms of gender, racial,
ethnic, religious, etc., and socioeconomic characteristics. Sociological diversities determine
differences in the life chances of individuals, and bear upon both their unequal access to
positions of power and their unequal possibility to be represented in the apparatuses of public
decision-making. Thus, the extent to which a society’s political representation, as the most basic
principle of a modern democratic system, is a correct, balanced and proportional reflection of the
diversity of social settings is a substantive factor, when justice and socio-political equality are
considered.
Totally equal representation, however, is not a realistic prospect. As Dahl (2006:8)
implies, perfect political equality is simply a desirable and ideal goal “as a standard to which we
ought to aspire, and against which we can measure the good or value of what has been
achieved”. Alternately, high levels of underrepresentation of specific groups could challenge the
legitimacy of a democratic system. With respect to female representation, for instance, concerns
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are raised about how a democratic system can be considered equal and legitimate if it fails to
represent up to half of population (Tremblay, Arscott and Trimble 2013:9).
Within this context, the following section explores important factors that influence
political representation and class-political relations. These include sociological categories such
as class, gender, ethno-racial divisions and the implications that they may carry with regards to
the analysis of equal and proportional representation. It is likewise important to discuss the
effects that these social divisions may have under the title of ‘intersectionality.’ In addition, it is
important to evaluate the theoretical controversies around a well-known distinction of
‘descriptive’ from ‘substantive’ representation, and discuss the importance of the ‘politics of
presence’ for political equality. This section also contests liberal-pluralist claims which view
‘education’ as a neutral opportunity to reduce inequality in access to power.
According to Dahl (1989:29), representation is the concept that “transformed democracy
from a doctrine suitable only for small and rapidly vanishing city-states to one applicable to the
large nation-states of the modern age”. These then provide us with two ideal types: while in
‘direct’ or assembly democracy, people personally participate in political decision through their
direct presence, in a ‘representative’ or delegative democracy, citizens give power to elected
representatives through free, fair and regular elections, who then in turn govern on behalf of
those citizens. In a representative democracy, holding ‘regular elections’ is the most pivotal
principle. As Rawls (1999:195) insists, “Sporadic and unpredictable tests of public sentiment by
plebiscite or other means” do not suffice for a regime to be dubbed representative.
In an ‘ideal’ assembly democracy “every member must have an equal and effective
opportunity to vote and all votes must be counted as equal” (Dahl, 2006:9). Moreover, all
members of society should have equal and effective opportunities, to not only learn and search
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for knowledge about the proposals and policies, but to exercise control over the political agenda.
In an ‘actual’ or representative democracy, these rights are translated to the entitlement to free
participation in fair elections and to run and serve in elective offices (Dahl, 2006:12). Moreover,
in actual democracies, the government must be responsive to “the preferences of its citizens,
considered as political equals” (Dahl, 1971:2). Central to the articulation of the political equality
within democratic theory is that people in society must be treated as ‘political equals.’
The idea of justice is an essential and irreplaceable component, embedded in the very
definitions of representative democracy. The focus of this review is on the fairness and
universality of the process of electing representatives. A conventional perception defines
democracy as “regular, free and fair election of representatives on the basis of universal
suffrage” (Huber and Stephens 1999:761). In the beginning of her book, The Concept of
Representation, Pitkin (1967), one of the first scholars who endeavor to define and explain the
concept of representation in the context of modern democracy, argues that the popularity of
representation is due to its link with the ideas of democracy and justice. For Phillips (1995),
political justice is considered one of the key principles of democracy, in so far as it is held that
all interests should be adequately addressed and representatives are meant to be typical samples
of various interests spread across society (also see Callenbach and Phillips 1985). As Anderson
and Goodyear-Grant (2005:1031) argue, free, fair, and regular elections, for which all segments
of society are eligible to stand and equally participate, ensures the ‘expression of popular values
and policy goals’ by the hands of a democratic government.
The demand for political equality in representative democracy, has, over time, been
expanded to the “demand for equal representation of women with men; demands for a more
even-handed balance between the different ethnic groups that make up each society; and
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demands for the political inclusion of groups that have come to see themselves as marginalized
or silenced or excluded” (Phillips 1995:5). From the point of view of representational justice, all
segments of society should have equal rights and the access needed to engage in political
decision-making. As a result, representational justice might be defined as a mechanism that
warrants all social groups and their interests to be proportionally represented in the legislative
and executive bodies of the state.
Theoretical debates that address the problem of ‘disproportional representation’ in recent
democracies, however, are too concerned with the political dimensions of the problem, while
justice, as a dimension of representation, has remained relatively under-explored. The majority
of such research is carried out by political scientists who largely focus on the crisis of democracy
in general, defective electoral laws and rules (Luna and Zechmeister 2005, Norris 2006, Powell
2004), trust in government (Williams 1998), trust in politicians (Dalton 2004), and the lack of
political participation (Macedo et al. 2005, Verba and Nie 1972). Although one may argue that
the issue of political inequality has always been discussed within the context of exploring the
democratic deficits, the idea of justice seems to merit further exploration in the domain of
political representation studies.
In exploring the justness of representation, three main areas are distinguishable: class or
socioeconomic representation, gender-sexual representation, and ethno-racial representation.
Before discussing these areas, an established distinction between two forms, or more precisely,
two dimensions of representation is worthy of brief discussion.
A separation between ‘who’ or ‘what’ is to be represented has been the root of a
distinction between two bases for representation: a descriptive versus a substantive base.
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Although the distinction is far from neat, it has been used since its introduction by Hanna Pitkin
(1967) in political analysis to distinguish the ‘composition’ of politicians and their ‘activities.’
From the point of view of descriptive representation, the composition of representative
bodies is scrutinized to discover whether it corresponds with the composition of society in terms
of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. A member of parliament, as Wauters (2010)
puts it, descriptively represents someone in the general population by matching him or her with
respect to a relevant attribute, such as gender, ethnic origin, religion or class. This form of
representation is also termed the ‘politics of presence’ (Phillips 1995), or has been translated to
‘vote-seat’ or procedural representation in a party representative systems (Powell 2004). The
focus in a descriptive paradigm of representation is on who politicians are, rather than their
behavior.
In contrast, a substantive study of representation addresses the correspondence between
citizens’ viewpoints and the policy preferences of their representatives. Therefore, from this
perspective, what policy makers do and what policy preferences they represent, rather than who
they are, is important (Wauters 2010). Substantive approaches begin with representatives’
preferences and interests. Substantive representation is also termed ‘politics of idea’ (Phillips
1995), a term that refers to the relationship between the general population’s preferences and that
of their political delegates. Put simply, a black man representative ‘descriptively’ represents
black men in society, while a white women who may defend black men’s rights ‘substantively’
represents black men.
One may remark that there are similarities between the descriptive approach and the
instrumentalist approach to the relationship between state and classes, in so far as they both

30

emphasize the physical presence of specific population groups in power. Likewise, there are
similarities between the substantive dimension of representation and the structuralist approach, in
so far as the focus is on the policies and the processes which guarantee the interests and
preferences of a specific group of people. However, one should bear in mind that descriptive and
substantive theories of representation are concerned with class, gender, ethnic-racial, age, and all
other divisions in a society; whereas the instrumentalist and structuralist views specifically focus
on the representation of advantaged and privileged economic classes.
In another domain, a controversy exists over the question of the interrelationship between
descriptive and substantive divisions as two generic bases of representation. Some are skeptical
of the benefits which descriptive representation may have for the representation of ideas. From
such a perspective, the behaviors and activities of representatives, and whether they defend
voters’ interests, rather than merely their demographic similarity, is what really matters (Pitkin
1967). Other theorists see a trade-off between descriptive and substantive representation (Sawer,
Tremblay and Trimble 2006, Swain 1993), in the sense that increasing the former will not
necessarily promote the latter, if not undermines it.
In contrast to this view, others observe a correlation between a politics of presence and a
politics of ideas. Scholars have shown that minority representatives are likely to pay more
attention to the issues and problems of groups they descriptively belong to (Owens 2005,
Wauters 2010). It is also assumed that descriptive representation occurs prior to substantive
representation, meaning that the physical presence of women, racial minorities, and lower class
representatives is the necessary, not sufficient, condition for their preferences to be considered.
As Porter elaborately puts it, if “a person’s beliefs about social reality are shaped by the social
milieu to which he has been exposed, we can see that the definitions of reality which provide the
31

framework for making political decisions depend much on the social background and life
experiences of politicians”. Porter concludes that “the predominance of some occupational
groups and people of one class background means that limited perspectives are brought to bear
on public issues” (Porter 1965:390-91). Others (see Phillips 1995, and Wauters 2010 for
example) argue that a common life experience, a common structural position, and having
suffered from shared deficiencies in society motivates politicians to devote more attention to the
people with social characteristics similar to their own. For example, Vakili-Zad (1994) found a
strong correlation between the socio-economic background of the deputies of Iranian Majleses
and their political orientation. Carnes and Lupu (2015) provided evidence from Latin American
parliaments to show that lawmakers from different class backgrounds bring different economic
attitudes into the legislation process.
Along these lines, other research suggests a positive association between descriptive
representation and the political empowerment of minority groups. By having descriptive
representation, minority groups start to increase their participation and their electoral turnout
(Bobo and Gilliam 1990). It is also shown that descriptive representation enhances minority
representation by affecting their group pride, trust in government, and also via the mechanism of
‘communicative advantages’ (see Banducci, Donovan and Karp 2004:538-40). Moreover, Sawer
et al. (2006:15-20) demonstrates that the physical presence of women in the legislative body of
state, for instance, brings new perspectives and new experiences into the political process,
thereby improving the functioning of deliberation in a democracy.
In the light of this description, it is clear that descriptive representation has significant
implications for political equality and justice. As Trimble et al. (2013) argue, although
descriptive representation is an insufficient condition for substantive representation, it is ‘crucial
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marker of equality’ in representative politics. Proportional existence of diverse sociological
categories in the parliament, cabinet, and other elective institutions could increase the likelihood
of the fact that lower class and minority groups have a voice in democratic institutions, which in
turn has an important implication with respect to political justice.
The following paragraphs shall address equality in representation with respect to class,
gender, and ethno-racial divisions, and its importance for a sociological analysis of political
representation.
Socioeconomic and class representation in the political system has been the last
empirically-developed factor in the literature on representation (but see Phillips 1995, Wauters
2010). Wauters (2010:185-88) attributes this underdevelopment to three causes: a waning
relevance of class in contemporary society, the increasing non-class tendencies among political
parties, and the methodological problems of class politics analysis. It has been controversially
argued that due to the increase of education and meritocracy in post-industrial situations, class
background has lost its decisive impact on the life chances and identities of individuals (see for
example Pakulski and Waters 2008). Wauters also refers to a direction of ‘catch-all parties,’
through which political parties aim to attract a broader range of interests, not necessarily those
interests that are limited to one class cleavage. Lastly, it is argued that class analysis is grappling
with some methodological issues, like disputes over the classification of occupational and class
categories. Nevertheless, as discussed in the study of class-state section, many researchers still
maintain that the political significance of class is still strong (Goldthorpe 2001, Wright 1985),
and that equal class representation plays an important role both in the quality of representation
and the requirements of justice in a democracy, and, thus, merits more attention.
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One of the areas of focus in the study of economic proportional representation is the
representation of poor and impoverished groups. It has been shown that people who live in
poverty participate less than wealthy people in political activities (Macedo et al. 2005). As a
consequence of lower rates of participation, impoverished people are the least likely to gain
political representation (Hickey and Bracking 2005, Jusko 2008, Verba, Schlozman and Brady
1995). Bartels (2002), for example, finds that representatives and politicians in the United States
are ‘vastly’ more responsive to the upper third of the income distribution, and that views of the
lower third of income distribution receive the least weight and attention in the policy making
process.
One may therefore conclude that economic inequality contributes significantly to political
inequality and exclusion. This comes about by different mechanisms. The political participation
mechanism is one of the most discussed ones. As was mentioned, electoral turnout is reported to
be lower among poor people. In another words, lower income groups are less likely to vote and
have lower incentive to participate in political elections. In addition, it is believed that they are
politically less knowledgeable and less informed, which in turn makes them less capable of
formulating their preferences and to monitor their representatives (Bartels 2002:25). Moreover, it
is assumed that poor people have fewer opportunities and resources to contact, communicate,
and lobby their representatives. Other studies refer to the ‘electoral rules,’ notably singlemember district (SMD) and multi-member district (MMD), which may limit or diminish the
electoral power of lower classes and strata (see Jusko 2008).
Another cluster of studies emphasizes occupational groups that are more likely to be
recruited into the political elites. For Weber (as cited in Guppy, Freeman and Buchan 1987:418),
since the French Revolution, modern democracy ‘belongs to lawyers.’ Porter (1965:396)
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likewise finds that “all the significant differentiations in Canadian society seem to be represented
by lawyers and businessmen with university degrees”. Different studies in a Canadian context
showed that the composition of parliamentarians and representatives has become increasingly
homogeneous in terms of occupational background (Guppy, Freeman and Buchan 1987, see also
Young 1998). This has been partly explained by the ‘principle of specialization,’ which justifies
decision-making positions being filled by professionals and highly trained individuals. It, in turn,
highlights the position of education in advanced capitalist societies and calls into question the
role of education in the context of a socioeconomic match between the general population and
their representatives. In another words, it is important to determine how education contributes to
provoking or mitigating unequal and disproportionate representation.
It is often proclaimed that education, as a form of human capital, can play an equalizing
role in advanced capitalist societies in the way that having equal access to educational
opportunities will realize the rule of the most competent. In such a situation, all individuals,
regardless of their socioeconomic status, will potentially find equal chances to experience
upward mobility and to be recruited into positions of power. Thus, a short look at the relevant
theoretical debates in this field seems to be called for.
From a liberal-pluralist point of view, by expanding the division of labor in advanced
capitalism, during which the rigidity of the class structure has been significantly decreased, those
who gain access to the privileged positions at the top of the institutional hierarchies are
competent because they were successful in the equal competition of superiority and excellence
(see Nakhaie 1996). In such a perspective, thus, what matters in recruitment into political elites,
a status which entails decision-making and the exercise of power, is one’s achieved
competencies. It is also argued that knowledge and skills have become important assets in
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modern societies, most especially when they contribute to the redistribution of economic
resources and the reduction of inequality (see Bowles and Gintis 2001). According to this thesis,
equal access to educational opportunities creates a situation in which people of different class
backgrounds become able to experience intra- and inter-generational mobility.
On the other hand, a considerable amount of literature has been aimed at debunking the
liberal-pluralist tradition, showing that ascriptive status is still central to determining one’s class
of destination in contemporary society (Bourdieu, 1978, Bourdieu, 1977, Bowles 1972, Bowles
1977, Guppy 1984, Guppy, Mikicich and Pendakur 1984, Nakhaie 1996). This body of literature
demonstrates that education may serve as a double-edged sword. If individuals have unequal
access to education based on their socioeconomic status, education may amplify inequality by
way of the fact that well-to-do families can provide better opportunities for their children, which
leads to the reproduction of their class advantages and their superior access to the power
positions. As Porter (1965:195) puts it, “where parents have high occupational status they will
also have more education, higher income, and smaller families. Their children will have a greater
chance to complete their education and inherit parental status than children with parents of lower
occupational status.”
In the United States, Bowles and Gintis showed that parental economic status is passed
on to their offspring by providing unequal access to educational opportunities (Bowles and
Gintis 1976, 2002). In their analysis, one’s level of schooling is an important mechanism of
intergenerational status transmission. Schooling, for Bowles and Gintis does much more than
enhance individuals’ cognitive skills and help them to succeed in the labor market; it develops
motivational and behavioral traits and qualities such as self-reliance, leadership, and
industriousness, which determines subsequent occupational status, attainment and earnings
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(Bowles 1972, Bowles and Gintis 2002). They argue that schooling, can thus, promote traits that
are advantageous to groups which themselves determine the structure of schooling.
In his theory of cultural reproduction, Bourdieu emphasizes the role of education in
linking one’s class of origin and of destination (Bourdieu 1977, also see Nakhaie and Curtis
1998). In Bourdieu’s theory, educational credentials are considered an instrument which
reproduces the structure of power relations and the structure of the distribution of cultural
capital. This is so, because parents who possess cultural capital facilitate and even guarantee the
educational achievement and success of their children.
Cultural capital, in Bourdieu’s tradition, is “the ensemble of high-status culture and
cultivated dispositions which manifest themselves in such things as appreciation of higher
education and the best schools, attendance at museums, art galleries, theatres and concerts,
appreciation of classical music and knowledge of composers, and strong language and literary
skills.” (cited in Nakhaie and Curtis 1998:486). Bourdieu argues that since possession of cultural
capital, which is indispensable to the success of pedagogic communication, is unequally
distributed among children from different social classes, education finally legitimizes the
patterns of inequality (Bourdieu 1977:494).
Bourdieu, then, refers to the ‘system of strategies of reproduction’ whereby each
generation tries to transmit the capital and advantages it has at its disposal. Whereas heredity and
inheritance has been a traditional strategy for transmitting economic capital and ownership of the
means of production, in specialized economies, dominant classes transmit their advantageous
class positions to their children by equipping them with access to higher education (Bourdieu and
Boltanski 1978). As Bourdieu (1977) argues, this new strategy of transmitting advantages via
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educational credentials legitimates ‘the transmission of power and privileges’ among ruling
classes.
Other studies also affirm the relationship between educational attainment and one’s class
background. Bowles, for example, seriously questions the efficiency of education as an equalizer
of income, and asserts that the previous view of the relationship between social class and
schooling, which maintained that education is responsible for the equalization of economic
opportunity and income, has gradually been discredited (Bowles 1972:220). He finds that social
class background determines ‘both educational attainment and economic success’ and is more
important that what has been imagined (Bowles 1972:222). He insists that the children of upperclass families are more likely to receive more years of schooling and enjoy enrolment in higher
quality schools, both in terms of the internal structure of the schools and the content of
schooling. The ‘amount’ of schooling and the ‘content’ of education “greatly facilitates their
movement into positions similar to their parents” (Bowles 1977:141). He also highlights that the
‘child’s personality attributes’ - e.g., self-reliance vs. obedience attributes - which generally
characterize the forms of socialization focused upon in upper- and lower-class families, in turn
help to explain an individual’s success in gaining a higher income, rather than the ‘apparent’
contribution of schooling (Bowles 1972:226). Bowles concludes that the education system
reinforces the inequalities generated by the capitalist system, breeds concentration of capital,
reproduces the structure of social classes from generation to generation, and contributes in the
intergenerational perpetuation of inequality.
With respect to the chances for access to higher education in Canada, Guppy finds that
“chances for obtaining a university degree have been consistently better for middle and upper
class English-Canadian males.” (Guppy 1984:89). Moreover, in the relationship between
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educational attainment and the socioeconomic background, Guppy et al. (1984) concludes that
while this relation has weakened over time, the influence of one’s social origin in the level of
one’s schooling is still ‘strong’. Porter’s (1965) description may be the best to summarize this
issue when he states that “Because going to university is largely a result of class position, those
who receive this training are not always the most intelligent” (195).
Thus, there is evidence confirming that there is not as much class fluidity in advanced
capitalist societies as is usually claimed by the pluralist view; that class mobility is contingent
upon anindividual’s class of origin (Goldthorpe 1987); that access to and the quality of education
is not equally distributed among classes; that cultural capital can be largely translated into
economic advantage; and that ascriptive status is still a strong determinant of individuals’
destiny. As discussed, evidence suggest that there is a vigorous association between one’s social
class origin and one’s access to valuable assets: particularly education. The mechanism of the
effect is as such: because valuable assets increase the chance of one’s social mobility, they
therefore facilitate one’s ability to enter positions of power. Stated differently, if the mechanisms
of class reproduction are strongly established, the children of the upper classes have the greatest
chance to be recruited into the political elite. This has negative implications for political justice
and for proportional class representation. When the majority of representatives in different
political institutions come from higher socioeconomic backgrounds, the political system faces
the problem of disproportional class or occupational representation. In such a situation, not only
do some demographic and socioeconomic groups remain underrepresented, a situation
considered to be a deficiency from the point of view of descriptive representation, but also
several parts of society are left without enough legislators to support their interests and to defend
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their point of view, which is considered to be a deficiency from the perspective of substantive
representation.
However, as discussed earlier, the study of representation is not confined to class and
socioeconomic representation. Representation is also extended to gender-sexual categories and
those of ethno-racial minorities. If there is a lack of gender or ethnic representation among the
elites, this can call into question equal access to power positions for these groups.
Ethno-racial minority representation is the subject of another cluster of research. Porter’s
study, one of first systematic accounts of the issue in Canada, demonstrates the
overrepresentation of British Charter groups in the economic elite. Porter states that “economic
power belongs almost exclusively to those of British origin, even though this ethnic group made
up less than half of the population in 1951” (Porter 1965:286). It is also found that white men are
overrepresented in Canada’s parliament (Young 1998:12). Although Porter’s ‘vertical mosaic’
thesis is objected to by some research which points to a recent decline in the British proportion
and the increase in the French and other ethnic groups’ proportion in all categories of elites since
1935 (Ogmundson and McLaughlin 1992 for example), it has still remained pertinent, especially
with regards to the underrepresentation of minorities (for instance see Nakhaie 1997).
With respects to women’s representation perspective, the main concern, both for justice
and women studies, is women’s engagement and participation in legislative politics. In this
paradigm, the goal is ‘gender balance’ via recruiting more diverse women into representative
institutions. Tremblay et al. (2013) identify three periods of research on women’s political
representation. An early research cluster in 1970s and 80s compared female legislators and male
legislators with an emphasis on their numbers, socio-economic, and demographic characteristics,
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including their age, marital status, occupation, and education. A second generation of study
concerned the ‘obstacles’ which women encountered in their route to political office. The third
phase of research focused on the ‘opportunities for enhancing women’s representation in
political life,’ underrepresentation of marginalized and racialized women, and the actual
achievements which women made in politics with respect to the goal of creating a better life for
women (Tremblay, Arscott and Trimble 2013:3-9). As Norris (2006:198) suggests, the “underrepresentation of women in parliament may have important consequences for the public policy
agenda and for the articulation of women's interests, as well as for the legitimacy of democratic
bodies.”
Campo (2005:1719) finds that women are underrepresented in the different spheres of
power in Latin America. According to her, women in Latin American countries confront cultural,
institutional, structural, and even psychological difficulties when trying to gain access to political
positions. Borthwick et al. (1991) found that the representation of women in the British House of
Commons has always been small. According to their study, the share of women in the British
parliament was 3.8% between 1945 and 1970 and, after a drop in 1979 entry to 3%, the
proportion of women amongst both Conservative and Labor parties has increased to 6% of all
MPs respectively in 1987 entry (Borthwick et al. 1991:715-16). Women’s representation is
reported to have improved significantly in subsequent years in which women made up 9% of
MPs in 1997, 20% in 2010 (Hunter and Holden 2015:3), and 29% of all members of the British
parliament in 2015 (Audickas 2016).
Another cluster of studies addressed the representation of sexual minorities. Studies have
focused on issues such as mass attitudes regarding this minority group (Lewis and Rogers 1999),
the political elite’s attitudes against them (Schroedel 1999), the policies that impact their life
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(Klawitter and Hammer 1999), and also people’s attitudes regarding minority politicians
(Herrick and Thomas 1999). The latest research, for example finds that students in American
government courses affirm that minority candidates are ‘less electable’ than straight candidates.
The researchers also find that religious respondents are less likely to vote for them to be their
representatives. Another study, which has been conducted with a view to the descriptive
dimension of representation, shows that the actual presence of minority elected officials in
political offices is essential in the process of antidiscrimination minorities policy-making
(Haider-Markel, Joslyn and Kniss 2000). Haider-Markel, Joslyn and Kniss found that the
presence of minority officials significantly increases the likelihood of the adoption of domestic
partner policies and increases the chances of domestic partner registration (2000:573-575). These
findings are in line with the positive correlation between descriptive and substantive
representation of lower classes, women, black and other minority groups.
With regards to the matter of sexual minorities in Iran, the Iranian Railroad for Queer
Refugees (IRQR)11 claims that Iran does not recognize sexual orientation and gender identity as
human rights. IRQR claims that this has forced Iranian sexual minorities to flee Iran and seek
asylum. According to their website that claims provides support and counselling to minorities,
the majority of Iranian minorities refugees flee to Turkey and file claims for asylum with the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR): “the UNHCR assesses each claim
and if a claim is determined to be valid, the UNHCR identifies a new country for the refugee.
Often that country is Canada and the United States of America”. Despite these claims, as has
been discussed later, the right of Trans people has been recognized by Iranian law.

11

http://irqr.ca/2016/?page_id=163
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Other studies devoted attention to broader patterns of inequality among those who are
categorized as a ‘double minority’ or are doubly disadvantaged. For instance, in his examination
of the level of ease or difficulty of successfully entering the political elite by minority women,
Black (2000) finds significant inequities in the process of political recruitment for women of
colour. In a double minority situation, an individual is the possible subject of two simultaneous
disadvantages because of, for example, her gender and ethnic characteristics (Black 2000), or
because of her ethnic category and class status (Anthiyas and Yuval- Davis 1992). The study of
double minority (or double-jeopardy) groups was actually born when academics, especially those
in women’s studies, found some ‘neglected points’ in the study of the lived experiences of
women. Understanding a black woman, for instance, was impossible by referring to gender or
race studies since the former was designed to study white women and the latter focused on black
men (McCall 2005:1780).
The interlocking nature of identity, or what has been largely termed as ‘intersectionality’,
refers to the “interaction between gender, race, and other categories of difference in individual
lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of
these interactions in terms of power” (Davis 2008:68). This term, originally coined by feminist
theorists who were studying the interaction of gender and race through the experience of women
of colour, has expanded to refer also to the experience of poor women of colour, which outlines
the intersectionality of class, gender, and race. This calls into question how categories of race,
class, and gender intersect (Davis 2008:71).
Historically, intersectionality was introduced into sociology within the context of general
critique which found that women have remained invisible in most sociological analysis and
theories (Denis 2008:677). In the 1980s, feminist scholars had started to integrate gender into the
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analysis of class, ethnic and racial subordination. Socialist feminism challenged notions of a
‘genderless’ class relation which was postulated by many of the Marxist and socialist theories,
and the notion of ‘classless’ gender relations which was assumed by many feminist theorists
(Stasiulis 1999). At the same time, the axis of race was added to the focus of studies of
domination and oppression. This new paradigm in sociological analysis began to take into
account the interaction of various social locations and their interlocking mechanisms.
To put it another way, intersectionality studies address the differences among human
beings and highlights those differences which engender inequality and create structures of
domination and subordination, exclusion, and marginalization. As Denis (2008) argues,
intersectionality consists in “analyses of multiple, intersecting sources of
subordination/oppression, and is based on the premise that the impact of a particular source of
subordination may vary, depending on its combination with other potential sources of
subordination” (677). The study of intersectionality addresses the added difficulties which
different social categories face in entering into the political elite and highlights substantial
deficiencies in justice in the patterns of representation of women and ethnic groups.
To conclude this section, the literature demonstrates that the representational justice of
lower socio-economic groups, women, and ethno-racial minorities in politics is improved with
the physical presence of legislators belonging to the same category. Moreover, the literature
acknowledges that the descriptive representation of these groups is strongly predicted to be a
prerequisite for substantive representation. Representation of poor people, accordingly, makes a
contribution to the development of anti-poverty policies and has encouraged welfare state
policies. Moreover, it is shown that the representation of women brings new insights and
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experiences into the legislation process and that the presence of ethno-racial groups empowers
minorities and motivates their political participation.
In the light of the literature reviewed in the previous two chapters, the current study will
go on to its core issue: the proportional representation of members of the Islamic Consultative
Assembly of Iran (Majles) since the Islamic Revolution. This empirical core is situated within
two broad theoretical constellations: class-state relations theories, and proportional
representation theories.
With regards to the dynamics of relations between state and classes, a class-centred
approach suggests that certain classes are in better positions to maintain their hegemonic
authority over lower social classes by representing the interests of dominant classes. A liberalpluralist approach, by contrast, typically considers the state and its branches to be neutral entities
that tend to represent people based on meritocratic and functional imperatives. Empirical studies
that have been conducted from within the class-centred paradigm generally show that political
elites are not representative of the general population. A pluralist paradigm, in contrast, suggests
that those who are most meritorious and most talented would naturally be recruited into the elite
stratum.
A proportional representation paradigm also directs researchers’ attention towards the
notion of the political justice. For the purpose of this study, such a normative paradigm helps to
test the extent to which political representation in post-revolution Iran has fulfilled the ideal of
equal representation, which was one of the goals of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. A
descriptive approach, similar to an instrumentalist notion to class-state relations, assumes that the
physical presence of representatives of different segments of a society suffices to ensure that the
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interests of those specific groups are considered during policy-making. On the other hand, the
substantive dimension of representation, much like a structuralist thesis, places emphasis on
‘what’ rather than ‘who’ is to be represented, and admits that not merely the physical presence,
but the actual preferences of political elites should be taken into consideration.
The aforementioned theoretical frameworks are utilized here to explain the dynamics of
exchange between society and the elected political elites in Iran. Any evidence of
overrepresentation of specific segments of Iranian society among the elected political elites,
specifically those segments that are in advantageous positions, or underrepresentation of
subordinate groups (particularly the working class) provides support for the class-centered
paradigm of class-state relations, and conversely challenges the pluralist notion of such relations.
From the viewpoint of the liberal-pluralist assumption that the most meritorious and skilled
people will naturally occupy upper-level positions in society, and the related principle of equality
of opportunity (most importantly to education credentials), it would be predictable to see
meaningful representation of Iranian citizens by skilled and educated political representatives
from different social backgrounds. The proportional representation of Iranian citizens in the
Majles also provides a sign of the measure of success of the Islamic Revolution in fulfilling its
promises: political justice and the rule of disadvantaged peoples. An intersectionality analysis
can also be used to examine the disadvantaged situation of double- or triple-minority groups
among Iranian MPs. In the case of this study, as will be discussed in chapter seven, the
interaction between class, ethnicity, and gender is matter of further investigation that has been
neglected in the literature on the political elites in Iran.
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In the next two chapters, a brief description of the social transformation that Iranian
society has undergone during the past three decades, and the structure of political power in postrevolution Iran, will be discussed.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION
OF IRAN
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The Advent of the Revolution
During a dinner ceremony on New Year’s Eve, 1978, which was hosted by Mohammad Reza
Shah Pahlavi in the Niavaran palace in Tehran, Jimmy Carter, the president of the United States,
claimed that under the leadership of Shah, Iran has been “an island of stability in one of the
more troubled areas of the world” (Public Papers of the President of the United States 1978).
Ironically, just a few days later, on January 9th, 1978, a sequence of riots, strikes, and mass
demonstrations were triggered in different cities throughout Iran (See Appendix B for a
sequence of incidents). There are debates among scholars over the moment that the
Revolution wagon started moving. Some designate the publishing of an anti Ayatollah Khomeini
article in Ettela`at newspaper on January 7th, 1978, which angered his followers, as the nominal
starting point of the Revolution. Others suggest that it began in 1977 on the last night of tennights of lectures and poetry readings held between October 10th and 19th in the Iran-German
Cultural Institute12 when a great number of intellectuals and university students went to the
streets chanting against the Shah (Karimi-Hakkak 1985; also see the Goethe Institute entry in
the Encyclopædia Iranica). Other scholars (see Keddie 2006:25) highlight the death of Ali
Shariati in June 1977; the death of Mostafa Khomeini, the son of Ayatollah Khomeini, in
October 1977; or the Cinema Rex fire that happened on August 19th of the same year. These
events were considered mysterious by anti-Shah protesters and were largely seen to have been
precipitated by SAVAK13.

12

Goethe Institute

13

A Persian abbreviation of the Organization of National Intelligence and Security
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Other scholars observe the situation as being much more complex and emphasize the
downsides of the Shah’s White Revolution in the 1960s (Ashraf 1994). They denote the
prolonged accumulation of discontent among different segments of society during these years
as the root of conflict (Abrahamian 2008, Keddie 2006, Zibakalaam 1996), or even date it back
to the American-British sponsored coup against the democratically elected prime minister
Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953 (Kinzer 2003, Rajaee 1999). Whatever the starting point, the
result was decisive: the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in February of 1979 and the
establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Studies that contributed to understanding of the Islamic Revolution have mainly tried to
explain two general questions: what caused the fall of the Pahlavi regime, and what accounts
for the religious groups - among other forces and cooperators in the overthrown of the
monarchy - coming to power? As Rajaee (2007) formulates the latter, it would be good to know
how, in the new political regime, ‘Islamic-minded’ groups instead of other participants, such as
secular intellectuals, nationalists, liberals, Islamic liberals, Marxists, Sovietists, and Maoists,
each of who had a significant role in overthrown of the Shah, rose to power.
Extensive literature has investigated the causes of the Revolution, and the roots of
success of the religious groups’ domination (Abrahamian 1980, 1982, 2008, Ashraf 1994,
Bashiriyeh 1984, Enayat 2005, Foran 1993, Halliday 1979b, 1982, Kamrava 1990, Katouzian
1981, 2007, Keddie 1981, 2006, 2015, Kurzman 1995, Milani 1994, Moaddel 1993, Rafipour
2000, Rajaee 2007, Skocpol 1982, Zibakalaam 1996). By drawing on this broad literature, an
explanation can be offered here. Because discussion of the causes of the Revolution (the first
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question) and the reasons for the coming to power of Islamist groups (the second question) are
not within the aims of this study, a brief explanation will need to suffice.
Rising Expectation Model

The continuing increase of Iranian oil revenues during 1960s and 70s and the quick price boom,
which started in 1973, enabled Mohammad Reza Shah to pursue an ambitious and speedy
Western-style modernization through his so-called White Revolution (1963-1972) and the three
subsequent Socioeconomic Development Plans (1962-1978). The ‘oil-induced growth’ suddenly
congealed and turned into an unexpected stagflation when the global oil price dropped in 1975
(see figure 2), which fueled mass discontent and grievances. According to the J-curve model
(Davies 1962), revolutions occur when a period of progress, that raises expectations, is followed
by a period of sharp reversal and decline.
Figure 2: Iran’s Oil Revenues; percentage of GDP
Source: World Bank Web14 (2014)

14

Available: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS?locations=IR25 [Accessed 25 September 2016]
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Modernization Model

The implementation of state driven modernization, also known as modernization from above,
and particularly the national Land Reform project15, which was largely funded by petrodollars,
created far-reaching socioeconomic and structural changes. The Shah’s modernization in the
economic and, to some extent, the societal arenas, however, did not permeate into the political
domain. While economic development had created large, demanding and participatory middle
and working classes, the political system was increasingly moving toward a repressive one-party
state following the establishment of the Rastakhiz, or Resurgence Party, in the early 1970s. For
this reason, scholars used labels such as ‘imbalanced development’ (Lerner 1958), ‘lopsided
modernization’(Keddie 1977), ‘disproportionate development’ (Lipset 1959), ‘malformed
economic expansion’ (Halliday 1979a), or ‘uneven development’ (Abrahamian 1982), to
highlight the conflicts and tensions that it generated within Iranian society. According to
proponents of the modernization explanation of revolution, rapid modernization created great
discontentment, particularly among religious and traditional segments of society which saw the
Shah’s modernization efforts as incompatible with their values and beliefs (see Zibakalaam
1996:32-37).
Moreover, due to this form of modernization, the size of the state expanded and its
importance as the largest economic entity in the country, increased. At the end of the third
Development Plan in the late 1970s, more than one third of the active work force was
employed by the government, the average share of state consumption had become threefold,

15

The enforcement of Land Reform was one of the conditions that the International Monetary Fund and US government established for
granting the emergency fund to Iran. The Shah’s government had sought international financial aid to cope with the economic crises of the
last years of the 1950s. Other conditions were adoption of austerity policies and appointing liberal members in the cabinet (see Abrahamian
1982:422).
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and the average share of the public sector in capital formation (GDP) had increased by about
20% from the mid-1950s (Ashraf 1994). Terms like ‘rentier capitalist state’ or ‘state capitalism’
have been largely used among analysts to refer to the form of the Iranian state under the
second Pahlavi, in order to describe the version of capitalist modernization in Iran.
Shah (dictatorial) Control

Because oil revenues had freed the state from tax collection, the state remained largely
independent from Iranian society and became capable of standing over and against it. Shah,
who saw himself as the architect of one of the rapidest bursts of economic growth in the world
and was quite jubilant at having the most powerful military power in the region16, began to
repress human rights, enforce interventionist policies, shut off political reform mechanisms,
and block the safety valve. He suppressed different, discontented segments of society, with
which he might have consolidated his legitimacy. Most importantly, at the moment of the crisis,
his passivity and inaction in peaceful managing the conflicts (Huntington 1984:202) led to the
quick and unexpected downfall of his regime.
A Class Analysis of the Revolution

During the years of Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign, the powerful state deliberately weakened
the internal cohesion of Iranian social classes, particularly the upper class, which he felt
seriously threatened by (Bill 1972). This disrupted the natural process of formation of a
functional and autonomous upper class, which could effectively support the Shah’s regime at
the time of crisis. In terms of the class origin of the participants of the movement, different

16

Shah rhetorically called Iran the ‘gendarme of the region’ (Marschall 2003:9)
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forces have been recognized. An alliance between traditional middle classes - Ulama and
bazaar19 classes - and modern middle classes - professionals and intelligentsia - constituted the
foundations of the movement. Urban marginal and poor classes soon joined the middle class
mobilization (Milani 1994). The industrial working class was among the last groups to join, and
whose massive strike struck disorder in the very functioning of the Bakhtiar government and
played a significant role in the success of the revolution (see Ashraf and Banuazizi 1985).
The expansion of the modern middle and working classes was a direct outcome of stateled modernization and the development of the state bureaucracy. From one side, the
Development Plans implemented by Mohammad Reza Shah industrialized Iranian society and
consequently increased the size of the industrial working force at the expense of peasants and
employees of the agriculture sector. The Shah’s investment in human development projects,
which led to the striking increase in the urban population and also the development of
education and specialization, and the expanding bureaucratization, helped the explosive
growth of a ‘modern’ middle class in Iran (Liaghat 1980). The evidence indicates a dramatic
increase in the number of secondary school and college students, teachers and authors, college
professors, and also professionals, administrators and bureaucrats during 1960s and 1970s
(Milani 1994). By blocking political reforms as well as repressing the modern middle class, the
Shah dissatisfied this important, up-and-coming social force (Abrahamian 1982:496-510), which
otherwise could have supported the Shah’s welfare state and might have been his ally in
breaking the back of traditional class powers.

19

Merchants, artisans, and market traders who were mostly self-employed
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A robust class explanation of the Revolution emphasizes the ongoing conflict of interests
between a newly formed ‘dependent bourgeoisie’ and the old ‘bazaar classes,’ including petty
bourgeoisie and merchants (Moaddel 1991, also see Akhavi 1987:202-203 and Amir Arjomand
1986:400-402). This class antagonism represented the basis20 for revolutionary struggle. The
latter group was the big loser of the state’s economic policies. Before the Revolution, economic
policies had benefited a group of less than one thousand Iranian capitalists which was consisted
of “the Pahlavi family; aristocratic families engaged in urban ventures; enterprising aristocrats
who survived land reform by setting up agribusiness, banks, trading companies, and industrial
firms; elder politicians, senior civil servants, and high-ranking military officers who prospered by
sitting on managerial boards and facilitating lucrative government contracts; old-time
entrepreneurs, and a half-dozen new entrepreneurs” (Moaddel 1991:317). As scholars like
Nomani and Behdad (2006) argue, this group should be referred to as the nascent capitalist
class, which was forming in accordance with state capitalism under the Shah. However, partly
due to the fact that it was in early stages of its formation, the nascent capitalist class could not
defend its position and interests in the battle with the well-established petty bourgeoisie. The
petty bourgeoisie also enjoyed a historic alliance with Ulama, which, thanks to its religious
authority, had significant leverage for mobilizing the masses. As Amir Arjomand (1981) argues,
the tie between urban petty bourgeoisie and clergy created an enduring alliance against a
common enemy which had always been the monarchical state in pre-revolution Iran.
The Islamic Revolution, though, was a consequence of a series of factors, and cannot
simply be attributed to one. As was discussed above, while economic problems created

20

To use Marx’s terminology
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discontent among the public, underdevelopment of the political system and the use of power
to suppress human rights angered many people and made them come to the conclusion that
the Shah’s regime was not ‘reformable’ (see Zibakalaam 1996:86). Moreover, as discussed
under a class analysis of the Revolution, the Shah failed to gain support from specific classbased sources. Instead, the repressed modern middle class and the loser petty bourgeois class
united to create a strong class base for overthrowing the Shah. What Zibakalaam adds to the
existing explanations of the Revolution is the requirement to understand the Revolution from
within the contemporary social and historical context of Iran (Zibakalaam 1996:104). What he
finds to be the deepest root of the Revolution, is an intense conflict between a developing
economic system and an unchanged and outdated political structure that never was resolved
during the Shah’s reign (for a similar explanation see Abrahamian 1980, 1982, and 2008). At the
core of this explanation, it is argued that if one cleans the frills from the statue of modern Iran
under the Shah, the political articulation of the country was not very different from its
premodern period (Zibakalaam 1996:113). This political underdevelopment is the most
important reason for the chronic opposition to the Shah’s regime that finally led to his
overthrown. This recalls what Marx (1904:2) referred to as the contradiction between the mode
of production of material life (its economic foundation) and the political superstructure which
takes place at a certain stage of development and finally leads to the transformation of the
superstructure.
In what follows, the reasons for the coming to power of the Islamist anti-Shah group
(the second question) is discussed. Ideologically, at least three main anti-Shah discourses had
independently formed in the political culture of Iranian society and had gained their supporters
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from different segments of the population (see Ashraf 1994; Maloney 2015). Together, they
were fundamental in establishing a massive anti-Shah and anti-imperialist movement. The first
was a people-centric21 Islamic discourse that mainly called attention to inequality, poverty, and
the suffering of disadvantages, and sought to restore human dignity and social justice. The
second discourse was that of leftist groups, either secular (Tudeh and Fadaee’s) or Islamic
socialists (Mojahedin) whose appeal were basically anti-imperialism and egalitarianism. The
third discourse was the nationalist, either secular (Mellat Party of Iran) or Islamic (Nehzat-e
Azadi), that focused on emancipation from domestic autocracy, and foreign dependency and
intervention. These three discourses shared much ground in common and therefore formed a
significant coalition against the Pahlavi regime. In a sense, Ulama, Leftists, and nationalists
united to topple the Shah.
To understand the level of influence of Islamist leaders and to understand the reasons
for the success of Islamist groups in attaining power after the Revolution, it can be helpful to
explore the importance of Shi’i tradition in Iranian history. Following the victory of the Usuli
School over the Akhbari School23 in their long controversy in the early 19th century, Muslims
were required to follow a living marj’a in their religious affairs (Enayat 2005). A definite political
implication of this event was that the penetration and significance of Ulama increased. It also
had dramatically enhanced the economic power of Shi’i Ulama in Iran inasmuch as they gained
the undisputed authority to collect religious taxes.
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I intentionally opted this term to avoid negative connotation of the term ‘populist’
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In contrast to Akhbaris, Usulis believe in reasoning and consensus in Islamic rule-making in modern world and believed in following or
imitation (taghlid) of the source of emulation (marja’e taghlid).
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Ayatollah Khomeini, later named Imam Khomeini, as a progressive clergyman, had
written his Kashf Al-Asraar (1980 [1941] ) in the early 1940s and had sewn the idea of the
participation of Ulama in political affairs (not yet the formation of an Islamic state) when he
mildly criticized the wrongdoings of Reza Shah and his son. In this stage of the development of
his discourse, Ayatollah Khomeini did not yet challenge the principles of the monarchical
political system (Mahdavi 2014:28). Under his exile in Najaf (1965-1978), Ayatollah Khomeini
developed his theory of Velayat-e Faghih24 in his book under same title ([1971] 1994) and
escalated his criticism of the monarchy. This was the inception of the discourse that was further
developed in subsequent years and led to the establishment of the Islamic state in 1979.
On the other hand, during the years of his reign, Mohammad Reza Shah always
encouraged a Western-like and secular life style. One may argue that the Shah had perhaps
some reasons to do so: to stimulate consumerism in order to accelerate state-centered
capitalism, and to divert the public’s attention from the underdevelopment of the political
sphere, in other words, to ‘depoliticize’ Iranian society. Whatever was his motivation, this policy
had a detrimental aftermath: it largely alienated the religious strata of society, motivated
religious leaders, mobilized the religious masses against the Shah, and made Iran a fertile
ground for the acceptance of Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideology and leadership (see Abrahamian
1982). The establishment of a national secular and modern educational system and the
implantation of the Pahlavi’s judicial reforms, as Amir Arjomand (1981:300) notes, had eroded
clerical control over those institutions, and was considered to be the state’s encroachment
upon clerical prerogatives.
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But how, one might ask, could this religious group obtain public support? During the
1960s, the White Revolution in general and the Land Reform national project in particular
brought about several structural transformations. However, this state-sponsored
modernization, which included a six-point reform program, did not lead to political
development in the way that modernization theory predicts. Rather, it brought about
socioeconomic and cultural transformations which were largely manifest in the expansion of
the urban sector (Abrahamian 1982, Amir Arjomand 2009). This took place as a result of freeing
a large number of peasants from their vassalage obligations, as a result of the Land Reform,
which was amplified by the problem of aridity that the agricultural system was grappling with,
and creating a corps of urban poor immigrants. These urban immigrants, who had lower
socioeconomic status and potentially were more likely to be attracted and mobilized by
religious beliefs (see Zibakalaam 1996), later formed the foot-soldiers of the movement and
played a significant role in the victory of the Revolution.
Economic development also had an indirect impact on strengthening religious figures
and communities. The clerical stratum always had a strong relation with the traditional bazaar
class. For many years, the bazaar class supplied funds for the religious organizations and
supported the seminaries. According to Shi’i jurisprudence, Khoms, which was a 20% religious
tax on the annual wealth of every person in an Islamic society, was owed to Imams or to leading
religious authorities25 (Al-Sadr 2003:179). Whenever the bazaar class benefited from economic
prosperity, more funds became available to sponsor religious affairs and establishments.
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Another element that contributed to the reinforcement of the role of religious group
was the Shah’s fear of communism. The Shah was warned by his Western confederates,
especially by the United States, about the threat of communism (see Rafipour 2000, and
Zibakalaam 1996). Although he repeatedly attacked both communists and fanatical clergy by
labeling them the red and black reactionaries respectively, part of the Shah’s anti-communism
tactic, at least up to 1975, was granting relative freedom to religious establishments to train
clerics, collect funds, and expand their domain and influence. The Shah, perhaps, saw the
moderate religious leaders as influential allies in his struggle with communist ideology. In the
absence of a vibrant and dense civil society, mosques and other religious gatherings were vital
organizational tools that helped to mobilize the masses.
During the last years of the 1970s, the Shah was under international pressure from
human right institutions and the Carter government to mitigate political surveillance. While the
Shah began to open the political atmosphere and to mitigate censorship and other pressures
upon the civil society, the opposition groups used the opportunity to challenge the regime
(Ashraf and Banuazizi 1985:20). In this new situation, different groups of intellectuals and
human right activists began to write open-letters to the Shah, religious groups were gaining
important power and organizational integration. Although other opposition groups, such as
liberals, nationalist, Marxists, radicals, guerrillas, and other nonreligious parties had their own
resources, organizations, mobilization lever, and advocates, in the last months of the
movement, they mostly cooperated with and supported Ayatollah Khomeini’s strategies to
combat the Shah’s regime (Ashraf 1994). In sum, the presence of massive rural-urban migration
of traditional and religious poor peasantry, the destruction of the civil society by the Shah, and
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religious groups' organizational abilities were collectively instrumental in the success of the
religious groups. Thus, after overthrowing of the Pahlavi dynasty, it was the religious group that
came to power and played a prominent role in the forthcoming state.
Due to their involvement in the previous political system, royalists and the older
generation of political elites either had to leave Iran, or else face being purged or isolated.
Furthermore, a sizable number of non-political but notable professional and Western-educated
fellows, who could potentially have been future politicians, left Iran too. Some of them found
nothing in common with the religious style of life that dominated after the Revolution, and
others fled the dangerous and devastating Iran-Iraq War. The immigration data illustrates that
shortly before and after the Revolution, large numbers of high ranked military personnel,
bureaucratic officials, entrepreneurs, bankers, leftist and liberal intellectuals, and highly skilled
professionals such as engineers, dentists, physicians, lawyers, and other academics fled Iran
(Hakimzadeh 2006). This immigration trend generated a void in the area of political affairs for
educated and skilled elites. This gap was firmly filled by the clergy.
To understand the rise of Islamist groups, the ‘charisma’ of the Ayatollah Khomeini26
cannot be dismissed. It is evident from the composition of the participants in the movement
that, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, education, and socioeconomic characters, a huge
number of Iranians considered Ayatollah Khomeini to be a unique, mysterious, and
extraordinary person who could be trusted to lead the movement (Abrahamian 2008,
Zibakalaam 1996:90). His intrinsic strength, self-mastery, tranquility, high-ranking position in
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the seminary hierarchy27, and his white beard, altogether, brought him widespread legitimacy
and authority, even among non-religious anti-Shah activists. After the triumph of the Islamic
Revolution, as Ashraf (1994, Zibakalaam 1996) notes, Imam Khomeini ascended to the
‘theocratic position of the national political leadership’ as supreme leader, or what was
initiated and introduced by him known as Vali-ye Faqih.
All in all, the Islamic Republic of Iran emerged out of a multi-force movement in which
almost all the participants united and shared the goal of overthrowing the Shah, and accepted
the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The joint collaboration of different classes and social
segments, each of which had their own resources for mobilization, synergized their power and
made the triumph of the Revolution feasible.

Iran’s Postrevolutionary Structural Changes
Today, Iran is dramatically different from the Iran of the last years of the Pahlavi regime or even
from the Iran of the first decade of the Revolution. Iranian society has undergone a significant
transformation in different levels and dimensions. The following section presents a discussion
on the structural changes that have taken place since the Revolution in Iran. This discussion is
classified into four sections: socio-demographic transformations, the expansion of education,
secularization, and post-revolution political economy.
In a general sense, unlike political revolutions, social revolutions are phenomena that
cause drastic social changes and violently disrupt the entire organization of a society. They
challenge the old ‘order’ to establish a new one. Revolutions also break down the previous
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‘relations of production’ that have been in place in order to guarantee the interests of
dominant and superordinate classes. In another words, social revolutions free a society from its
restrictive ties, unbinding the dominant groups’ hegemonic restraints. In a postrevolutionary
situation, geographic dislocation, which is best illustrated by rapid urbanization, speeds up. In
addition, access to education, which is often limited to specific strata and specific families,
becomes universalized. These changes bring about profound structural transformations which
in turn alter the face of a postrevolutionary society. This section provides a picture of the
existing Iranian society, a society that has experienced not a superficial ‘political’ but a fullfledged ‘social’ revolution.
Socio-demographic Transformations

The number of people who live in a designated social setting is a structural factor determining
the framework of the social relations of production and for the formation of social classes. Age
and gender distributions not only draw the contours of societal divisions, but determine the
portion of the economically active population in a society. Thus, as will be further discussed in
this chapter, the actual population pyramid and the rate of a society’s population growth have
important political and policy implications. Moreover, we will see that the changes in the age
structure of Iran’s population are important to the purpose of the current research, and its aim in
examining the level of match between political elites and the general population. It also shows
how population dislocation and migration trends changed the pattern of urbanization since the
Islamic Revolution.
The annual population growth of Iran leapt from 2.7% in the decade of 1966-1976 to
3.9% in the subsequent decade. After the Revolution, the family planning policies pursued by the
Shah’s regime since the early 1970s, which were aimed controlling the size of families, were
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abandoned. Ideological conditions after the Revolution encouraged motherhood for women, and
the circumstances of the war with Iraq also encouraged society to form larger families (Afary
2009:265). However, by the end of the war in 1988 and after the Iranian government confronted
the devastation and economic difficulties, a series of new policies were implemented to persuade
families to confine themselves to two children (Karamouzian, Sharifi and Haghdoost 2014). This
reduced the annual population growth from 3.9% in 1986, to 1.2% in 2003. During the same
period of time, the fertility rate shrank from 7 children per woman to just 3. This success was
admired by the UN as “the most successful population control program in the whole world”
(Abrahamian 2008:184). In 2012, however, when the fertility rate (1.6) fell below the
replacement level28, the Iranian government shifted its family planning policy once again toward
having more babies per family. The Iranian population has more than doubled since the
Revolution, from 37 million in 1979, to 78 million in 2016. The recent population pyramid
shows a shift from a young population to a middle-aged population, where the largest proportion
of the population is in the middle age groups (Hosseini-Chavoshi and Abbasi-Shavazi 2012).
Over one third of the population in 2011 was still young, between 20 to 34 years old (Statistical
Center of Iran 2011). Figure 3 illustrates this shift by comparing the population of both sexes in
1986 and 2011 censuses. Figure 4 also portrays the prospects of the population growth in Iran.
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Figure 3: Age distribution of the Iranian Population (both sexes) by Census (1000’)
Source: UN Demographic Profile (2015): 385-387
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As scholars emphasize, setting aside the family planning policies, structural factors such
as the age structure of the population, the number of females in the population, and, more
importantly, cultural-behavioral factors such as changes in the pattern of age at marriage, which
for women increased by 5 years after the Revolution, have been significant contributors to the
population structure of Iran in recent times. The age structure of the population has important
implications for the political economy of the country. It not only determines the size of the
economically active population and demands certain investment in job creation, but predicts and
affects the future composition of social classes. As Nomani and Behdad (2006: 73-77) argue, one
of the most important effects of the age composition of a population is on the labor force supply
in general, and the supply of specific groups of workers based on the population growth rate of
those groups, in particular. As an example, members of the Iranian baby-boom generation (those
who were born in the 1980s) started to enter the job market in the 2000s and have pushed the
government to create more jobs.
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Figure 4: Iran’s Population Pyramids from 1950 to 2050
Source: UN Population Division Web (2017)

At the moment of the revolution, the Iranian population was equally divided between
urban and rural areas. However, by the fourth decade after the Revolution, the rural areas held
less than 30% of the population, though the rural decline was slower after 2006. Table 1
represents the rate of urbanization since 1976 census, a period of rapid urbanization.
Table 1: Population of urban and rural areas

1976

1986

1996

2006

2011

2016

Total

33708744

49445010

60055488

70495782

75149669

79926270

Urban population

15854680

26844561

36817789

48259964

53646661

59146847

Rural population

17854064

22600449

23237699

22235818

21446783

20730625

47%

54.3%

61.3%

68.5%

71.4%

74%

Rate of urbanization

Source: Statistical Center of Iran: Migration (2014): 15-19

While in the last years of the old regime and the first decade of the Revolution (1976-1986) there
was a high level of migration from rural to urban centres, this trend decreased after the
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Revolution in favour of city to city migration (Statistical Center of Iran 2006, 2011). Rural to
rural migration was 28% in 1985 and reduced to 13% in 2011, while the rate of city to city
migration increased to 65% (see table 2 and figure 5). This trend had a significant impact on the
increase in the size and number of small towns29 and larger cities30.
Table 2: Migration by type and year
Type of migration

1976-1986

1986-1996

1996-2006

2006-2011

Rural to rural

690218
(14.1%)

943095
(11.1)

1064043
(9.0)

368706
(7.2)

Urban to rural

678717
(13.8)

1540694
(18.2)

2004011
(17.0)

755546
(14.8)

Rural to urban

1535527
(31.4)

1889905
(22.4)

2330054
(19.8)

655251
(12.8)

Urban to urban

1912240
(39.0)

4062171
(48.1)

6385665
(54.1)

3259040
(64.0)

Total

4892647

8435865

11783772

5089354

Source: Statistical Center of Iran: Migration (2014)

Both the Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War created large dislocations and forced
internal migration, which accelerated the processes of urbanization in Iran. At the same time, the
development of cities and their incorporation into the national economy further helped drive
rapid urbanization. People in less developed areas left their homes in order to find better
economic opportunities in larger towns or cities. The influx of Afghani and Iraqi refugees to Iran
due to the Afghanistan war and the suppression of the Shi’i minority in Iraq by Saddam Hussein

29

with a population of less than one million

30

Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz and other metropolitans with population over one million
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in the 1990s is another factor that must be considered when one analyzes urbanization and
migration in post-revolution Iran.
Figure 5: Types of Migration
Source: Statistical Center of Iran: Migration (2014)
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This section provided a general picture of the age composition of post-revolution Iran, as
well as the flows in the population. In the light of this description, the current study will be able
to answer the question of the extent to which the age distribution of the elected political elites is
proportionate to the age structure of the general population. The answer to this question will help
this study to identify the extent to which different age groups are well represented in the Iranian
Majles, and also the extent to which the rural-urban status of the members of parliament matches
the urbanization trends.
Expansion of Education
Two further characteristics of postrevolutionary Iran are the remarkable decrease in illiteracy and
the expansion of pre-university and higher education. The youth literacy rate was 99% in 2012
(UNESCO 2012). As table 3 shows, the enrolment in primary and secondary school as a percent
of the total population almost doubled from the 1970s to the 1980s and increased a further 37%
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from the 1980s to the 1990s. The growth of enrolment continued from 1995 to 2005, but then
started to decrease in recent years. According to Paivandi (2012), from 1979 to 2005, the number
of students who enrolled in primary and secondary schools increased by more than 30% on
average. In higher education, the figures are even more remarkable. According to the Institute for
Research and Planning in Higher Education (IRPHE), total enrolment showed a more than
fivefold increase from 1979 to 2004, and the number of university students in the 2000s is more
than six times greater than in the 1980s (Zohoor 2005:9). The decrease of the school-age group
in the general population and the contrasting increase in the number of university students in the
same age group can be explained by the change in the age pyramid of Iranian population. The
population growth rate started to decrease significantly beginning in 1986 and showed its effect
in the following decade, leading to a decrease in the school-age population. Given that the
population increased more than two-fold, the rate of growth is somewhere around 2.5 times.
Although overall male participation in higher education is slightly higher than that of women, in
some disciplines the number of women surpasses that of men.
The expansion of education in both secondary and higher levels is a result of
implementation of egalitarian education policies, namely free national primary education, by
post-revolution governments. Education is recognized as a civil right in Iran and higher
education is sponsored by the public purse. This contributed to the development of educational
opportunities for both the lower classes and women, and brought about remarkable progress in
scientific activity in Iran (Khosrokhavar 2009). Semi-private universities also played a
significant role in increasing the rate of access to higher education, thus making educational
attainment widespread.
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The expansion of education has significant implications for the composition of political
elites in Iran. As is discussed in chapter 8, the remarkable shift in the composition of the
members of the Iranian parliament in terms of the level of modern education they have received,
and the increased minimum educational requirement for political nomination reflect this
expansion in education among the general population. In light of this description, the current
study expects that we will observe an increase in the level of education of the members of the
Iranian parliament. In other words, it is expected that we will see a leap in the chances of being
elected and reelected by those Majles candidates who have received a greater number of years of
education.
Table 3: Educational Distribution by Gender and the Level of Education

Men

Primary and
Secondary School

19761985*

19861995*

19962005*

20062013***

63%

60%

55%

52%

51%

Women

37%

40%

45%

48%

49%

Total N

3077979

7784935

14704105

17046108

13115015

(% of same age group)

(23%)

(42%)

(60%)

(81%)

(84%)

13179916

18621396

24678068

20944412

15555200

Men

NA

NA

69%

52%

51%

Women

NA

NA

31%

48%

49%

Total N

NA

NA

463524

1639842

3891965

(5%)

(10%)

(22%)

16236374

17087151

Total population in same
age-group (5-19 age group)

Higher
Education

19661975*

(% of population in 20-34 age
group)
Total population in same agegroup **

-

-

9931136

Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of Iran (2010-2014) *, National Census Data **, and UN statistical Yearbook (2016):45 ***

Secularization
In the postrevolutionary period, a strong wave of ‘Islamization,’ based on Shi’i doctrine, was
promoted and supported by Iranian governments. From the perspective of the Islamic
70

government, the application of Islam in politics would create a more humanistic, moral, and
secure society. From such a perspective, Islam would provide the answer to most modern
dilemmas. It was argued by the Islamist thinkers31 that Islam, in contrast to Christianity, is a
sociopolitical religion and therefore is capable of serving as the means of emancipation of the
masses. Accordingly, Islamic faith was the inspiration for the constitution and the criminal law
in Iran after the Revolution. Moreover, the education system became Islamized, and the
observation of religious norms, such as wearing the hejab for women and the prohibition of
selling, buying, and consuming of alcohol were enforced in the post revolution era.
In contrast to the flow of Islamization, the requirements of running a modern state,
which is subjected to growth of rationalization, ‘disenchantment’ (to use Weber’s term),
bureaucratization, expansion of education, institutional differentiation, and specialization have
been underway in Iran since the early twentieth century and were continued after the
Revolution. From a sociological point of view, these trends of modernization paved the way for
secularization and are in contradiction with the Islamization measures that were adopted by
the Iranian government. As is argued by Abazari et al. (2008), the flow of rationalization and
bureaucratization are even extended to religious establishments and organizations, such as
seminaries in postrevolutionary Iran, when they reorganized their bureaucratic structure and
adopted rational programming.
For the analysis of the nature and the extent of secularization in Iran, two distinct
approaches have been developed. One approach (for example see Vakili-Zad 1994 and Kian-

31

For example, Ali Shariati was one of the prominent theorists of an emancipatory Islam. This thesis was later developed by religious elites
and advocators of the Islamic state (see Adelkhah 2000).
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Thiebaut 1998) argues that the expansion of the pro-secularization process of modernization
will inevitably secularize Iranian society. Advocates of such a perspective argue that:
Contrary to the widely held belief, the Islamic Republic of Iran is far from a theocratic
state. In fact, it has been continually moving toward secularism, capitalism and
separation between the state and the church. […] The Iranian Islamic state is moving
constantly toward consolidating the state power and moving away from religion as the
basis for its economy and the polity […] Although high ranking clergies among the
membership of powerful Guardian Council have remained faithful to the [idea of a
theocratic state,] they have been gradually replaced […] by a younger generation
clergy/technocrat with a desire to improve the economy (Vakili-Zad 1994:620-21).
Referring to the conventional distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’
secularization, this body of argument postulates a positive correlation between these two
processes of secularization. Seen in this way, secularization in the institutional sphere
(objective) inevitably entails secularization at an individual level (subjective). Another line of
argument within this approach addresses the creation of a large middle class as a definite
outcome of modernization, in turn playing an important role in the direction of secularization in
Iran (Kian-Thiebaut 1998). Kian-Thiebaut argues that secularization will come, and that despite
its present failure, it will be in place sooner or later. In contrast, but still within the same
general approach, Moaddel (2009) argues that although the institutionalization of secular
values and the process of value change among Iranians in post-revolution Iran is far from an
inevitable outcome of the modernization and development of modern social classes, however,
Iranians today are less religious and tend toward individualism and other values of liberal
democracy. For Moaddel, this shift in the public’s value orientations is best explained by
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considering the politics of resistance and opposition to the dominant discourse promoted by
the government.
The theme of ‘inevitable secularization’ is further strengthened by evidence of ‘postIslamism’ discourse (see Bayat 1996, also Mahdavi 2011). The notion of a post-Islamism is
rooted in the prolonged question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy (Bayat 2007:13).
As not only a conscious ‘attempt’ to reconcile Islam and modernity, post-Islamism is also
considered to be a ‘condition’ by which the legitimacy of the project of Islamism is both being
exhausted, and thus, compelled to criticize and reform itself (Bayat 2007: 18-19). Although one
may argue that this process is not necessarily synonymous with secularism, it has strong secular
connotations.
Conversely, one group of scholars (for example see Rajaee 2007, Kazemipur and Rezaei
2003, and Abazari et al. 2008) takes a more contextual approach toward the specific
characteristics of Iranian society. This body of scholars points to the strong historical
interweaving of religion with the life-style of Iranians. They underline the special hallmark of
Islam as a social religion, as well as the geopolitical coordinates of Shi’ism, to argue that unlike
what has taken place in Western societies, religion is too central in the life of Iranians to be
easily removed from their hearts. Rajaee (2007, 2013), for example, remarks that religion has
become an important component of the ‘Iranian identity’ and had always played a leading role in
the public sphere and more importantly within Islamic movements throughout twentieth century.
To question the postulated positive correlation between objective and subjective secularization,
Kazemipur and Rezaei (2003) reason that despite the secularization projects that were
implemented in prerevolutionary Iran, the degree of religious sentiment, or religiosity, on a
personal level remains strong. However, they maintain that a gradual decline is evident in the
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degree of engagement in the collective religious practices in recent years, contrary to the ‘desecularization’ policies of Islamic Republic of Iran. Kazemipur and Rezaei observe a process
through which religiosity in Iran is becoming ‘personalized’. Abazari et al. (2008) argue that on
an individual level, Iranians still respect the ‘sacred symbols’, religion is still highly valued by
many, and religious beliefs remain important in the lives of Iranians. According to the World
Value Survey (2008), more than 80% of Iranians see themselves as a ‘religious person’ and
about the same proportion of people believe that God is very important in their lives. These
findings obviously support the position of the second approach in analyzing the trend of
secularization in Iran, at least on a subjective level.
From a sociological perspective, although the Islamic Revolution aimed to restore the
Golden Age, the reign of Prophet Mohammad, and led to the ‘sacralization’ of politics (Amir
Arjomand 1988:131 and 181), secularization remained robust in post-revolution Iran and was
supported by different segments of society. When the main social supporter of the Islamic
Republic, the traditional and lower middle classes, adopted the ethico-political structure of the
new state and gained a new sense of identity (Afary 2009), other segments of Iranian society,
specifically modern educated middle classes adopted a less religious and more Westernized lifestyle. These trends were accompanied by the need for educated professionals to administer the
government, as well as by the expansion of the internet and new communication technologies.
As Moaddel (2009) argues, the rise of secular values in recent Iran cannot be seen as an
inevitable outcome of modernization; rather, it has been dependent upon the existence of social
support and the effort of secular intellectuals and policy makers.
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Having an understanding of the trends of sacralization and secularization will help to
shed light on the manner by which this study explains the change in the composition of members
of parliament since the Revolution, particularly in terms of the number of clerical MPs.

Iranian Postrevolutionary Political Economy
From the commencement of the Revolution, one of the most controversial topics was the
economic model that the Islamic Revolution should pursue. With the exception of the Nehzat
Azadi - Liberation Movement - almost all the various groups and political fronts, including
members of the Revolution Council32, had leftist tendencies and were advocates of socialist and
anti-capitalist economic models (Ahmadi-Amuii 2004). However, throughout the years
following the Revolution, different economic orientations were adopted by different
governments. Through the lens of political economy, we can see and identify three separate
periods: the Revolutionary honeymoon, the state-centric economy, and a zig-zag economic
liberalization.
The honeymoon of the Revolution lasted for only a few months (Ashraf 1994). It began
with the establishment of the ‘provisional government’ headed by Mehdi Bazargan in February
1979, and ended with its resignation in November of the same year. During this period, the first
stages of the power transfer were taking place and many groups that were involved in the
Revolution were still recognized as ‘insiders’. The government tried to stabilize the country’s
affairs as well as its economic processes, and took a moderate stance in its decision-making and
foreign policy. Their moderate position, however, discounted many militant and revolutionary
forces who expected to see sharp and quick changes in the style of governance. Bazargan and his
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A group of high-ranked clergies and lay persons who were selected one month before the triumph of the Revolution by Ayatollah Khomeini
to manage the revolutionary affairs. The clergy members were Ayatolleah Motahari, Beheshti, Musavi Ardabili, Rafsanjani, Taleghani,
Khamenei, Bahonar, Mahdavi Kani etc.
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cabinet resigned following the takeover of the United States embassy in Tehran by Khat-e Imam
students (Imam Khomeini’s line) on 4th of November 197933.
The second period began with the election of Bani-Sadr as the first president of the
Islamic Republic on January 25, 1980. Disorganization, insecurity, and destabilization intensified
after the resignation of the provisional government. This was accompanied by the unrest of the
workers and led to the closure of factories and stoppage of production in the country. Workers
disobeyed the factories and industries’ regulations in order to put pressure on the managers to
increase their income. In some cases, workers arrested industrial or company’s owners or
managers and handed them over as Taghouti34 to the revolutionary tribunals. For this reason,
many owners or managers of industries did not show themselves, and many firms were left
without supervision. To manage this situation and resume production, the Revolution Council,
within which an ‘interventionist’ economic approach was dominant, decided to mandate the
nationalization of industries. To prevent the flight of capital from the half-dead body of industry
to non-productive but profitable sectors such as speculation or brokerage, the Council also
ordered the nationalization of banks and insurance companies as well as foreign trade (Sahaabi
2004:10-32).
Simultaneously, the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980 brought about the
destruction of Iran’s infrastructures and disrupted both the production and the export of oil. This
led to an intense reduction in Iranian revenues. This came about during a situation in which Iran
was already under sanctions and more than $10 billion of its assets and properties were being
blocked by the United States on account of the hostage crisis. The dismissal of Bani-Sadr and the
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The embassy take-over happened as a reaction to the decision of the Carter’s administration that let the Shah go to the United States.

34

the remnants of the Shah's regime
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assassination of several members of high-ranking political elites from both the government and
the leaders of the Islamic Republic Party further complicated the situation. In the presidential
election of October 1981, the Iranian people elected Ayatollah Khamenei as president and he
appointed Mir Hosein Mousavi as the prime minister. The commitment of the Iranian
government to supply the necessities of life to all Iranians during the war, sanctions, and internal
disorganization, forced it to adopt highly state-centric economic policies, wherein the state
owned the majority of industries and resources and intervened in the functions of the free market.
The political economy that was adopted during the first decade of the Islamic Republic
was not far from the ideals and promises of the Revolution: antagonism to the private ownership
of capital, support for the subordinate and oppressed segments of the society, the Islamic idea of
the class equilibrium, and hostility to foreign capital and investment - inspired from Marxist and
dependency paradigms - were always popular among the anti-Shah combatants (Nomani and
Behdad 2006). The implementation of state-centric policies also had an unintended consequence:
the over-enlargement of Bonyads (foundations) such as Bonyad-e Mostaz’afan (Disinherited
Foundation), Bonyad-e Shahid va Janbazan (Martyr and Veterans Foundation), and Bonyad-e 15
khordad (15th of Khordad Foundation). By taking over the confiscated wealth, properties, estates,
and tenements of the royal family and Pahlavi functionaries, as well as the confiscated Pahlavi
state properties, these Bonyads became large economic entities35.
The pursuit of a state-centric economy, however, debilitated the capitalist relations and
market institutions that had formed during Pahlavi’s capitalist modernization. During the first
decade of the Islamic Republic, the percentage of public sector employees sharply increased

35

For example, by 1991, the Disinherited Foundation had a holding of $12 billion which had made it as the largest economic entity in the
Middle East (Maloney 2015).
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from one-third of the total urban work force in 1976 to around one-half in 1986. The economy
also witnessed a jump in the ratio of public to private industrial establishments, during which the
state-owned industries with 100 or more workers; the ratio increased by 75% from 1976 to 1982
(Ashraf 1994:120). Consequently, the shrinkage of private capital caused economic growth to
fall to only half of its 1977 level in 1988, though the Iranian GDP had grown by 6.6 percent
annually between 1960-1977 (Salehi-Isfahani 2009). Due to the Iran-Iraq war and the dominance
of politicians who advocated state-centrism, a five-year postrevolutionary ‘Development Plan’,
which was prepared in August 1979 and had liberal and pro-market tendencies, was neither
ratified nor implemented.
A period of rationing of basic goods, price controls, and coupon distribution for the
necessities of life lasted until the end of the war in 1988 and the passing of Ayatollah Khomeini
in June 1989, who himself supported pro-dispossessed economic policies. At this time, there was
an intensification of the economic crisis due to the devastations of war and the collapse of the
global oil price in 1986. At the same time, the position of advocates of state-centric policies
weakened in government and the Majles. The economy after the war was in free-fall: oil prices
fell again after the cease-fire, Iran’s exports collapsed, the per capita income shrank by 45%,
inflation was about 29%, and the war caused an estimated $1 trillion in damages (Maloney
2015:194). In this situation, Ayatollah Khamenei was appointed as successor of Imam Khomeini,
and Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected as the new president in the spring of 1989. Hashemi favored
the elimination of the position of ‘prime minister’ via the amendment of the 1979 Constitution,
which strengthened the role of the president. He shifted the economic orientation towards
economic liberalization. Hashemi’s administration started to seek foreign capital, and to apply
economic development plans recommended by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank
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for developing countries. This was followed by the normalization of economic activities, the
revival of capitalist market relations, the promotion and protection of foreign investments,
liberalization of prices, floating the Rial exchange rate, the lowering of trade barriers, the
privatization of state institutions and holdings, and the downsizing of the government
bureaucracy (see Maloney 2015, chapter 5). It was also accompanied by a normalization of
relations with the international community within the diplomatic realm, which was done to
promote the bargaining power of the government which sought international financial support.
Hashemi’s government (1989-1997), labeled as the ‘construction government,’ actually
transformed the discourse of the Islamic Republic political economy from a justice-oriented to a
growth-oriented one. Although the implementation of the economic liberalization policies were
accompanied with some mismanagement, and thus, confronted opposition and resistance36, the
Iranian economy during the 1990s recovered much of the ground it had lost in 1980s (SalehiIsfahani 2009). This was mainly the result of having well-organized, though somewhat
ambitious, economic development plans. As Amuzegar puts it, the:
Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1989–93) adopted a multi-pronged strategy
aimed at reconstructing war-torn areas, expanding basic infrastructure neglected during
the war, and reviving the private sector under a structural adjustment programme
called ta’deel eqtesadi. The Plan promised to transform the war economy into a marketoriented, investment driven and more efficient system through trade liberalization,
wage-price deregulation, privatization of state enterprises, and other economic reforms
(Amuzegar 2014:8).
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The liberalization policies caused one of the highest levels of inflation in the history of the Iranian economy.
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Through the five subsequent Economic Development Plans (1995-2016), the liberal
economic policies were continued under the later presidential terms of Khatami (1997-2005),
Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), and the existing government of Rouhani (2013-now). The swing of
the Islamic Republic governments between justice and growth approaches, however, has given a
zig-zag character to the nature of the economic liberalization in postrevolutionary Iran (Nomani
and Behdad 2006). Though the Khatami and Ahmadinejad governments adopted diverse
strategies, they promised to satisfy strong demand for a more equal distribution of wealth within
society. President Khatami had a robust line of leftist supporters in his presidential campaign and
President Ahmadinejad owed his election to an anti-Hashemi atmosphere, which brought him to
power largely through the support of those who suffered on account of economic liberalization.
Oil has always played an indisputable role in contemporary Iran’s political economy, and
the well-being and progress of development plans have been linked to the global oil price
(Amuzegar 2014, Salehi-Isfahani, Mohaddes and Pesaran 2013). Thus, exploring its booms and
busts during the last four decades offers important insights when attempting to analyze the
economic policies that different governments have adopted, or in understanding their successes
or failures. The first price boom started from 1973 and lasted until 1977. It enabled the Shah to
accelerate his ambitious economic development. Then a brief oil boom happened in 1990 to
1992, during the first years of Hashemi’s first term as president. It helped him to heal the
postwar deficiency. The next period of oil price increases took place from 1999 to 2002. This
time, Iranian revenue, which doubled within this period, helped President Khatami deal with
foreign debt. A third oil boom in 2003-2005 doubled Iranian’s oil revenues again while Khatami
was leaving office. President Ahmadinejad also enjoyed the last oil boom from 2007 to 2011,
which ended with international sanctions being imposed on Iranian oil exports in 2012. Negative
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oil shocks (see Amuzegar 2014, Dreger and Rahmani 2014) also adversely affected the economy
and created periods of recession from 1979-1980, 1986-1989, 1993-1999, and finally 2011-2014.
Analysts and observers disagree about the effect that postrevolutionary economic policies
have had on the reduction of poverty and inequality in Iranian society. Some question whether or
not the state-managed economy of the ‘structural involution’ or the pro-market reforms of the
‘Thermidor’ period could realize one of the most popular demands of the Revolution: poverty
and inequality reduction (see for example Amuzegar 2014, Nomani and Behdad 2006, and Salehi
Isfahani 2007). According to Salehi-Isfahani (2009), the ‘social policies’ that were implemented
during the state-centrist economy of the first decade of Islamic Republic, which continued during
subsequent governments, as well as growth-favoured economic policies which were established
in the reconstruction period and pursued under later presidential terms, both contributed to a
reduction in poverty. He argues that, consistent with the global evidence that confirms that
growth reduces poverty, the economic policies in postrevolutionary Iran made the poverty rate
fall significantly, into the single digits. At the same time, the social policies,
Improved the lives of the poor by building infrastructure and by providing social
protection. After the Revolution, electricity, safe water, health and education services
were extended to most rural and poor urban areas. Similar increases had taken place in
poorer urban areas. An ambitious health and family planning program, started in 1989,
brought basic family health to most rural families. By 2005, about 90% of the rural
population was served by rural Health Houses. Schooling was extended to nearly all
rural areas raising educational attainment of the rural families. Considerable social
protection was also offered through a vast system of subsidies and the labor market
(minimum wage legislation and job security legislation). Vast subsidies for food, fuel,
and medicine, though poorly targeted, greatly benefited the poor. Semi-public charities
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that had sprang up after the Revolution, most notably Komiteh Emdad Imam Khomeini,
provided direct assistance to the very poor (Salehi-Isfahani 2009:17-18)
The UN Human Development Reports acknowledges this claim, indicating that Iran’s human
development index has increased from 0.44 in 1980 to 0.74 in 2012 (cited in Amuzegar
2014:17). With regard to inequality, however, the Islamic Government has not been so
successful. While postrevolutionary income inequality, illustrated by the Gini coefficient,
receded to its pre-oil boom of 1970s level, meaning 0.42-0.45, it has stayed stable in its relatively
high level, excepting a decline in 2006 when Ahmadinejad’s redistribution policies were taking
effect (see Salehi-Isfahani 2009, 2016). All in all, the evidence indicates a decline in both
poverty and inequality immediately after the Revolution, while the former continued to decline
but the latter remained relatively stable in subsequent years. This can be restated thusly: Iran’s
poor “are better off than before but they are also more similar to each other” (Salehi-Isfahani
2009:25).
The structural changes discussed in this section illuminate the context within which the
transformation of classes and the composition of political elites have taken place in Iran. The
trends in population growth basically determine the supply of the labor force in society, which in
turn affects the extent and the shape of change in the configuration of social classes during
corresponding decades, as reflected in censuses. This effect has been referred to as the
‘employment effect’ (Nomani and Behdad 2006:219), and represents the change in the size of
the labor force. The population trends are also central to understanding and predicting the
sociopolitical attitude of a society. The Second of Khordad, called as a political reform
movement, which came into existence in 1997 is an example of the progressive demands of the
youngest generation of Iranians since the Revolution (Bayat 2010:244). The transformation of
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the structure of Iran’s age distribution has been accompanied by the post-revolution
modernization programs, the increase of urbanization, as well as the post-war development of
infrastructure, which for instance, broadened access to the Internet, and in turn, facilitated the
transfer of knowledge and information. These trends, which paralleled the waves of
secularization, have changed the values of Iranians regarding competent political representatives.
In addition, the expansion of education changed society’s attitudes towards the priority of
merit (takhassos) over religious commitment (ta’ahod), and in turn, improved the level of public
trust toward well-educated politicians and representatives. The universality of public education
also helped the enlargement of the professional middle class (Kian-Thiebaut 1998).
The economic policies that were adopted during the decades of post-revolution Iran have
defined the economic opportunities for different segments of Iranian society to empower their
position as well as to improve their political representation in the political arena. The structural
economic changes during the first decade of the Revolution created a pause in the capitalist
development of social classes in Iran, but was revived in the second decade of the Islamic
Republic. The economic liberalization of the second Republic, as will be further analyzed in
chapter 5 under the Study of Class in Iran, helped the enlargement of the capitalist and
professional middle class. The size of the working class first decreased as a result of the
deproletarianization of the first decade and then slightly increased in the 1990s and 2000s.
In light of the descriptions that were presented in this chapter, this study has several
expectations: that the average age of the elected representatives will have increased since the
Revolution, that the mean years of education that representatives received will have increased
over time, and that the size of certain social segments, particularly the middle class, which have
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benefited from and have been enlarged by the development of a service economy since the
second decade of the Revolution will have increased within the composition of the elected
political elites.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE STRUCTURE OF POWER AFTER
THE REVOLUTION
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The Structure of Power
Having a thorough understanding of the structure of power in postrevolutionary Iran is necessary
to explore the interplay between its social and political systems. There are other reasons that
make such an understanding even more indispensable. First, not many scholarly accounts have
been written to delineate a picture of the structure of power in postrevolutionary Iran (but see
Buchta 2000, Rakel 2008 and 2009); Iran’s political structure has usually been misunderstood
(Takeyh 2006), as many assume it resembles the single-party or autocratic system of the
neighboring regimes. Iran’s post-revolution political system is not analogous to despotic
autocracies, nor to Western democracies. Rather it has a distinctive character, which thus makes
it somewhat difficult for non-Iranian observers to understand its political system. This section
underscores some of the main characteristics of the post-revolution political structure. Under the
Study of Political Elites section in chapter 5, a more exhaustive analysis of the factionalism
within the Iranian political system will be presented.
Discerning the ‘two-layer’ nature of the power structure in Iran is critical to
understanding it. Unlike the ideal-type representative democracy in which control over
government decisions about policy is constitutionally and exclusively vested in officials elected
by citizens (Dahl 2005:189), and also unlike autocratic political systems in which power is
concentrated in the hands of and exerted by one person who is not subject to the popular
control, the Islamic Republic has been labeled as a ‘hybrid’ political system (Amir Arjomand
2009b, Brumberg and Farhi 2016). It sits somewhere between these two models. Scholars have
used concepts of dual sovereignty (Curtis and Hooglund 2008), overlapping authorities (Thaler
et al. 2010), and bifurcated authority (Maloney 2015) to distinguish two layers of political
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authority which I have opted to use the ‘directly elected’ and ‘indirectly elected’ organs of the
Iranian political structure.
According to the Islamic Republic’s Constitution, which was ratified in 1979 and
amended in 1989 (2007 [1989]), Iran is a ‘republic’ rooted in three independent branches: the
executive, legislative, and judicial. According to the Constitution, the head of the executive
branch (the president); members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, also known as the
parliament or Majles; members of the Assembly of Leadership Experts; and the members of
City and Village Councils are elected by direct public vote. However, except for the City and
Village Council nominees, other candidates are required to pass a vetting process as carried out
by the Guardian Council.
The president, as the highest-ranked executive official in the country, is responsible for
the implementation of the constitution and exercises executive power (Article 113). Ministers
are appointed by the president and presented to the Majles for a vote of confidence (Article
133). As the legislative branch of the state, the Majles consists of 290 representatives, and may
enact laws on all matters within the limits of the Constitution (Articles 64 and 71). The Majles is
also responsible for appointing six lawyers to the Guardian Council who are suggested to the
Majlis by the head of the judiciary. The Assembly of Leadership Experts has 88 members and is
in charge of appointing and dismissing the leader of the Islamic Republic (Article 107 and 111).
City Councils are responsible for the appointment of mayors and attending to municipal affairs
(Article 102). These institutions collectively form the directly elected pillar of the power
structure of the Islamic Republic.
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As a Shari’ah-driven document, Iran’s Constitution has an indirectly elected pillar
consisting of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, and the
National Security High Council. According to Article 110 of the Islamic Republic Constitution, the
Leader is responsible for determining the general policies of the system after consulting with
the Expediency Council, for supervising the performance of the system, for decreeing
referenda, for holding the supreme command of the armed forces, for resolving disputes and
coordinating relations between the three branches of the republic, for signing the order of
appointment of the president, for dismissing the president in such case of his/her violation of
the constitution, for declaring war or peace, and for appointing, dismissing, or accepting the
resignations of several officials37. The Guardian Council consists of six jurisconsults and six
lawyers who are appointed for a period of six years. The Council’s main duties are approving
the candidates for electoral posts, supervising elections, and ensuring the conformity of
legislation passed by the Majles with the principles of Islam and the Constitution (Articles 91, 92
and 94).
The primary reason for establishing the Guardian Council can be understood by
reviewing the detailed discussions that were carried out in the Assembly of Constitution Experts
which were held in August 1979. At that time, the Council was named the ‘Guardian Council of
the Constitution’ and was designed to protect the Constitution by both ensuring that future
decision-making does not contradict the Constitution, and in doing so preventing the influence
of power centers and authorities on the legislative process (Assembly of Constitution Experts
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Jurisconsults of the Guardian Council, head of the judiciary, members of the Expediency Council, the head of Broadcasting Corporation,
chief commanders of the armed forces, and two representatives of the Leader in the National Security High Council, Friday Prayers, and
Leader’s representatives in all offices in the country.
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1985:944-55). Moreover, according to Article 67 of the Constitution, a member of parliament
should be ‘righteous’38, such that s/he can protect the ‘sanctity’ of Islam, and should safeguard
the tenets and achievements of the Islamic Revolution. MPs should furthermore be able to
uphold the trust placed in them by the nation, always remain faithful to the independence and
dignity of the country, and defend the Constitution (Islamic Republic Constitution 2007
[1989]:24) during their entire professional life as a Majles representative. Accordingly, from the
view point of the Guardian Council, which is in charge of supervising elections, allowing
individuals to enter the Majles who are not committed to the principles of the Islamic
Revolution, are not loyal to the tenets of Islam, and are not righteous would be regarded as in
contravention to the Constitution. It has even been argued that the Guardian Council must
perform the role of a filter in order to prevent ‘impurities’ from entering the country’s political
system (Khamenei 2005). In addition to formal nomination requirements, such as age
restrictions, educational requirements, being an Iranian citizen, not being a convicted in an
Iranian court, etc., there are substantive qualifications required for parliamentary candidates,
such as theoretical and practical observation of Islam, and loyalty to the Constitution of the
Constitution and to the principle of the Velayat-e Faghih (Guardianship of the Jurist). During the
process of vetting presidential, Majles, and Assembly of Experts candidates, the Guardian
Council holds meetings, discusses the competency of the candidates, and then votes on each
candidate. Each of the 12 members of the Council have one vote, and a minimum of seven
votes (half plus one) is required for a candidate to be confirmed. According to the law, the
Guardian Council should explain in writing the reasons upon which the qualification of a
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candidate has been denied or rejected (Rezaee Zadeh and Daavari 2016). In the case of
presidential elections, the Council decisions are final, except in the exceptional case that the
Supreme Leader requests a reexamination of a candidate39. In the case of election of MPs for
the Majles, candidates who have been deemed ‘incompetent’ have a right to appeal the
Council’s decision twice. Therefore, it can be argued, as is discussed in the concluding chapter
of this study (see three mechanisms of reproduction) and elsewhere, that the candidate vetting
process is not an arbitrary mandate in the hands of the Guardian Council. Instead, it is a
medium for safeguarding and reproducing the discourse of the Islamic Revolution discourse,
which is the principle resource for governing the state of the Islamic Republic. Moreover, the
vetting process is considered a vital means of preventing individuals who do not believe in said
discourse from entering into the central core of power of Iran. This line of argumentation often
points to similar institutions and processes which are in place to safeguard the constitutions
and national covenants in a variety of other political systems, for instance the Constitutional
Court of Belgium, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, and the Constitutional
Council of France (Fereshtian 2003, Nemati 2013).
As a counter argument, one may argue that, from a political viewpoint, the Guardian
Council undermines the principles of free election, as well as the power of the Iranian Majles,
for its members are themselves only appointed. Moreover, it is not clear if the seletion process
is based on strict standards applied to all Canadidates. For example, when candidates meet all
the above-mentioned criteria, it is not obvious how and why some are approved and others
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This happened once in the history of the Islamic Republic when Ayatollah Khamenei requested reexamination of two reformist candidate
in 2005.
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rejected. Accordingly, it could be argued that, as a conseqence of substantial power embeded
in the Council, the MPs in the Majles may not represent the population and/or reflect the
interests of the people. Nevertheless, while the Guardian Council affects the process of the
representation of Iranians in the Majles, the current study prefers to somewhat bracket the
role of the Council, and analytically minimalizes its effects, not because the ‘political’ aspects of
the situation are unimportnt, but because overemphasing them prevents us from focusing on
other dimensions of representation in Iran. Since there is no imminent prospect of a political
system without the Guardian Council, a researcher may not want to deprive him/herself from
being involved in the effort to provide a picture of the ‘social’ aspects of parliamentary
representation in post-revolution Iran. In fact, the very nature of MPs socioeconomic or
demographic representation can tell us something about the potential bias of the Guardian
Council. Eitherway, the findings of this study have been duly informed by the important
implications which the existence of the Council has for Iran’s political system.
The Expediency Council was created in the 1989 amendment as the advisory and
supervisory arm of the supreme leader and is in charge of solving disputes among state
organizations (Article 112). The National Security High Council is headed by the president and is
meant to safeguard national interests, and protect the principles of the Islamic Revolution, its
territorial integrity, and national sovereignty. This council consists of the heads of the three
branches, the chief of the armed forces, several ministers, the chief of the Plan and Budget
organization, and two representatives nominated by the Leader (Article 176). Figure 6 portrays
the constitutional structure of power in postrevolutionary Iran.
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Figure 6: The constitutional structure of power in postrevolutionary Iran
Based on the Islamic Republic Constitution ([1989] 2007)

The concept and position of Vali-e Faghih, or ruling jurisconsult, is pivotal in the novel
constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Under the ‘Rule by the Just Faghih,’ the 1989
Constitution remarks that “the Constitution will lay the ground for the realization of leadership
by the fully qualified Faghih recognized by the people as their leader so that the Faghih may
safeguard against any deviations by various organs of state from their true Islamic function”
(Islamic Republic Constitution 2007 [1989]:6). However, the first Constitution of the Islamic
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Republic, ratified in 1979, required the Leader to be the source of emulation41. It was primarily
due to the fact that the leadership in the first Constitution of the Islamic Republic’s life was
designed as a spiritual position that suited the rule of Imam Khomeini. In other words, the
garment of Valayat-e Faghih in the Constitution was designed to fit his stature. Imam Khomeini
had, at the same time, two high authorities: religious authority as the source of emulation and
political authority by possessing the position of ruling jurisconsult. His role as founder of the
Islamic Republic and his personal and charismatic characteristics brought him the influence of
an undisputed leader. Accordingly, Ayatollah Khomeini had more than enough legitimacy,
popularity, and confidence, provided by the overwhelming majority of Iranian society, to sit at
the supervisory position of the supreme leader. As Weber remarks (1978:1121-25), although
charisma may be transferred to a second leader or to an inheriting institution (i.e.,
depersonalization of the original charisma), the loss of the original charismatic leader will
inevitably lead to a ‘waning’ of the pure form of charisma via the process of the ‘routinization’
of authority. Through this process, charismatic authority is transformed into other types of
authority: traditional, or else rational-legal authority. The designation of a successor, for
Weber, is necessary not only for the continuity of domination, but also for ensuring the
cohesion of the charismatic community. In this particular situation, the charismatic authority of
Ayatollah Khomeini transferred to the institution of Velayat-e Faghih.
In April 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini had suggested the formation of the council for the
revision of the Constitution to decide on several issues, most importantly, eliminating the
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Marj’a-e Taghlid, in the Shi’i tradition is a high-ranked clergy whose ability in Ejtehaad and the interpretation of the Islamic law is
approved. Shi’as are required to choose and emulate a Marj’a-e Taghlid.
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condition of the source of emulation from the Leadership requirements and making it sufficient
to be a Faghih. The day after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini on June 3, 1989, the Assembly of
Leadership Experts convened an emergency meeting to select the next Leader. The Assembly
selected Ayatollah Khamenei as the new Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. While it was
seen as one of the most smoothest successions in the history of the world’s revolutions (Amir
Arjomand 2009b), it marked a crucial shift in the life of the Islamic Republic in terms of the
structure of the political system. This succession coincided with a series of constitutional
changes, which were reflected in the Constitution’s revisions and constitutional amendments,
and were ratified by a referendum in July 1989, less than two months after Ayatollah
Khomeini’s death. Thus, the post-Khomeini era is highlighted by a transition to a more conciliar
system. The 1989 amendment endorsed the role of the Guardian Council, which was originally
established to supervise presidential and Majles elections; strengthened the position of the
Assembly of Leadership Experts, which was originally in charge of selecting the Supreme
Leader; and established the Expediency Council, as an advisory body for the Leader. This is the
line that differentiated what has been labeled the ‘second republic’ (Ehteshami 2002), which
follows the ‘first republic’ of Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini.
The two-layer nature of the structure of power in Iran, however, is not the only cause of
misunderstandings of the political system of postrevolutionary Iran. The second dimension of
complexity of the Iranian political system emanates from something that is described as
“discrepancies between announced principles and daily practices of the constitution” (Tilly
2007:7). This discrepancy is conceptualized in a distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’
power structures. The former is referred to as the structure of power that is determined in the
94

Constitution; the latter refers to the practical exercise of power in Iran. To simplify the structure
of informal power, some observers portray ‘concentric rings’ of power. Buchta (2000:7-10), for
instance, differentiates four rings that increase in size from inner to the outer circles. The
central ring is composed of the most influential figures who represent the most powerful
decision-making body of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The second ring is composed of highranking executive, legislative, and judicial officials, and provincial governors and administrators.
The third ring includes those officials who control various revolutionary entities and
organizations. The fourth and final ring consists of individuals who have had an important role
in the power structure in the past but have been marginalized after their retirement.
In Rakel’s (2008, 2009) analysis, the four concentric rings of power have been
categorized into three concentric circles of informal power, each of which has a different
degree of political influence. The ‘inner-circle elite’ includes the most powerful members of the
political elite from three state branches, as well as members of the Guardian Council, the
Assembly of Leadership Experts, the Expediency Council, heads of religious foundations and
representatives of the Leader. The second circle, entitled the ‘administrative elite,’ is composed
of secondary administrations from the state branches, mayors of important cities, and
technocrats. Rakel recognizes a third circle of a ‘discourse elite’ that includes journalists,
writers, and leaders of NGOs who influence the atmosphere of the political discourses in Iran.
Amir Arjomand (2009a:117), alternately, distinguishes two strata: the narrower ‘ruling’ stratum,
and a much broader ‘second’ stratum. He contrasts a predominantly clerical composition of the
ruling stratum with the more or less layered feature of the administrative cadre of the
revolutionary and developmental administration of the second stratum.
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These complex dimensions of the complexity of the postrevolutionary structure of
power in Iran, namely its two-layer nature and its de facto and de jure discrepancy, have made
applying a conventional label to the Iranian style of governing controversial. While labels like
theocratic republic, Islamic theocracy, and democratic centralism have been widely used in the
media (for example see Frontline 2002), the terminology that the native political elites use,
namely religious democracy seems to be more befitting. It captures both the layers of popular
participation in electing critical state organizations, as well as the supervisory characteristic of
the ruling jurisconsult, which is driven by a theory of Islamic government. To summarize, Rajaee
as formulated the matter (2007:225), the Islamic Republic is characterized by two branches of
government (the presidency and the Majles) that represent the ‘republican’ apparatus of the
state, and the office of Leader, the Guardian Council, and the Assembly of Experts which
represent the ‘Islamic’ apparatus for the sake of guaranteeing that no measures are taken
outside the Islamic framework.

Human Rights Issues
The Iranian government is blamed by human rights’ critics for pursuing what has been
called the politics of ‘monolingualism, and ‘monoculturalism’ (Asgharzadeh 2007). The critics
argue that the post-revolution political system has systematically excluded and marginalized
certain ethnic and religious minority groups from their basic rights. It is further proclaimed that
the policies of exclusion are not only implemented through the coercive forces of the
government, such as by repressing and silencing the activists who advocate for the rights of
marginalized groups, but also through the use of the education system to enforce assimilatory
policies which attempt to alienate minority cultures (Asgharzadeh 2007:200). According to
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these debates, “controlling people's dress codes, stopping mixed-sex swimming, not allowing
women to attend soccer matches, censoring music, banning card games” (Bradley 2007:2-3, for
a list of suppression of civil rights also see Kashefi 2008:86-87) are said to be examples of the
implementation of repressive policies in post-revolution Iran.
Human Rights Watch blames the hardline faction, which has a superior position,
according to HRW claims, in the hybrid political system of Iran, for cracking down on Iranian
citizens for no more than the legitimate exercise of their rights: particularly freedom of speech
and free aggregation (Human Rights Watch 2017a). According to human rights claims, the main
areas of human rights violations consist in the high number of death penalties; limitations in
providing fair trials, particularly for individuals charged with national security crimes;
restrictions on free speech and dissent especially in the case of student and women’s rights
activists, human rights defenders and political activists, civil society actors, journalists, bloggers,
and online media activists exercising their right to freedom of expression; the blockage of
hundreds of websites, including social media platforms; the disqualification of liberal and
reformist election candidates by the Guardian Council; arbitrary arrest and imprisonment,
discrimination against women in cases of divorce, inheritance, and child custody (Amnesty
International 2016, Human Rights Watch 2017b:334-39, UN Human Rights Council 2016, US
Human Rights Report 2015).
A counter argument challenges the above-mentioned claims by stating that the
international accusation of the Iranian government’s human rights violations is used as a
political measure aimed at isolating Iran within the international community. These lines of
reasoning argue that Western powers in the international community are manipulating and
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using appeals to human rights for political gains (Zarif 2016). While accepting that there are
deficiencies regarding human rights in Iran which need to be addressed solely by Iranians, this
body of argument criticizes selectivity and double standards, as for example in comparison with
the violation of human rights in the occupied territories by the Zionist regime, or by Saudi
regime in Saudi Arabia and in Iran. Other observers and scholars point to the efforts of religious
intellectuals who have begun challenging the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam as a sign of
progress in the disposition towards human rights within Iran (for example see Mir-Hosseini and
Tapper 2006; for a discussion of this challenge on the gender equality also see Moallem
2005:chapter 5). Another group of scholars notes the role of civil society, albeit restricted, in
the efforts to improve human rights improvements: “Iranian civil society is sustained by
students, teachers, lawyers, writers, artists, journalists, and a host of other civically minded,
democracy-seeking activists” (Azimi 2008:448-49). Others emphasize the republican
apparatuses of the Islamic Republic and reason that Iran is doing better than its neighbours in
the region (see Baktiari 1996). Observers argue that with regards to elections, for example,
while Iran has held regular elections (an average of one election a year) since the Islamic
Revolution, elections are non-existed or very limited in the Persian Gulf states like Saudi Arabia,
Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar. In the case of Saudi Arabia for example, as an absolute
monarchy, the king of the country is at the same time the head of government, in which the
members of the ruling family prevail, and a situation in which the members of the Saudi
Parliament are appointed by royal decree. While the Iranian women have had suffrage since
1963, Saudi women had been excluded from elections until 2015 (PressTV 2017).
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To summarize, the notion of ‘hybridity’ of the political system of the Islamic Republic
has important implications for this study. It should be noted that, in the final analysis, it is the
‘Islamic apparatus’ that has the power to decide what an approved framework is. According to
Article 98 of the Islamic Republic Constitution ([1989] 2007:30), the interpretation of the
constitution is the responsibility of the Guardian Council. According to the law, the
interpretations are to be approved by a three-fourths majority of the Council members. As
discussed earlier, the Guardian Council has the right to vet candidates and reject their
competency before the Iranian people can decide who they wish to vote for. Thus, any analysis
of the composition of the Iranian Member of Parliament should take the notion of hybridity
into account. The hybridity of the Iranian political system emphasizes that when there is a block
of power which is elected by the vote of the people, at the same time, there are indirectly
elected and non-elected pillars of power which have strong voices in Iranian politics (Abootalebi
2009). This chapter aimed to highlight the nature of the structure of power in Iran in order to
inform our analysis of the exact meaning of representation in the country. Therefore, if this
study finds support for either Marxist or liberal-pluralist explanations, it must be qualified by
the fact that Majles representatives in Iran are only members of one pillar of power and do not
necessarily have the final word in policy-making. This is also true with regards to other aspects
of representation related to gender, religion, education, place of birth, ethnicity, etc. All in all,
the socio-economic and demographic representation of the Iranian people by members of
Majles should be reflected on from within the context of hybridity in Iranian politics.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CLASS AND POLITICS IN AN IRANIAN
SETTING
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The Study of Class in Iran
Despite the importance of having an updated and detailed understanding of the configuration
of a society’s classes for any social analysis, there have been very few works on the
postrevolutionary class structure of Iran (for example see Behdad and Nomani 2009, Nomani
and Behdad 2006). Based upon a review of the literature, this section will provide a picture of
social class in postrevolutionary Iran.
The economic modernization plans inaugurated at the outset of the twentieth century
in Iran, which was accompanied by the educational development and an increase in the
population, due to Pahlavi’s investment in human development projects, brought about
widespread industrialization, specialization, and a modern division of labor. This process
dramatically accelerated the changes in the morphology of the class structure of Iranian
society, which had otherwise remained relatively intact for several decades. The Islamic
Revolution was the second turning point in the class structure of Iran, when it transformed the
configuration of Iran’s social system. The Islamic Revolution not only changed the direction of
the country’s socio-cultural and economic development, but changed the structure of political
supremacy and subordination.
One important factor which contributed to the reshuffling of the class structure in the
wake of the Islamic Revolution, was the disruption of the Shah’s capitalist economic
modernization policies for a period of one decade, a period which has been labeled as the
‘structural involution’ (Nomani and Behdad 2006). This disruption accompanied the reordering
of the old relations of production and rapid dislocation (e.g., migration). This was also
accompanied by the call for ‘redistribution of wealth’ policies, which were then implemented
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by the Islamic state in the first decade after the Revolution. These policies disrupted property
rights and the accumulation of economic capital in that first decade after the Revolution, in
favour of ‘disenfranchised’ groups and were furthermore directed against capitalists,
landowners, and even merchants, Bazaaris and conservative Ulama. This period has also been
named the ‘social revolutionary phase’ (Moaddel 1991) to address the rebellion of the working
and peasant classes against the upper classes, who were empowered by the support of top
revolutionary figures, particularly Ayatollah Khomeini himself, the council of the Revolution,
and later prime minister Mousavi during his two cabinet terms (1981-89), under Ayatollah
Khamenei’s Presidency. Although the ‘reversal phase’ of the Hashemi government undid what
had been done in the revolutionary phase, nevertheless, the ratification of postrevolutionary
land reforms, the nationalization of foreign trade, industries and banks, labor law reforms, etc.,
had an effect on class structure in the first decade of the Islamic Republic (Nomani and Behdad
2006). Partial fulfillment of such policies earned the working class an improvement in control of
production processes through labor councils, a reduction of working hours and increases in
income. It also earned peasants a reversion to smaller scale private economic ventures in rural
areas, seizure of larger and more fertile lands, the nationalized forests, and the right to refuse
to pay payments. Succinctly put, it increased the peasantization44 of agriculture (see Moaddel
1991 and Nomani and Behdad 2006). Consequently, these three structural changes together
disrupted the capitalist-like class formation that was initiated by Pahlavi’s modernization.
If during the ‘first Republic,’ which had put the clerical elites on the top of the social
hierarchy, the lower classes were encouraged to move up, or rather, the possibility of their

44

Returning of peasants who had immigrated to cities to their villages
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upward mobility was facilitated, then the ‘second Republic’ favoured state employees and
functionaries, petty bourgeoisie and Bazaaris, and a second generation of clerics and Bazaaris
who had family connections within the established politico-economic power (Amir Arjomand
2009a). The Islamic Republic also performed an essential favour to the national bourgeoisie and
petty bourgeois class by controlling and tightening the presence of transnational corporations
within the Iranian economy, otherwise they would have been seriously endangered.
In its categorization of the ‘employment status’ of the employed population, the
Statistical Center of Iran breaks the population into five major categories: employers, selfemployed, private sector employees, public sector employees, and unpaid family workers (see
Table 4). This provides a general picture of the employment categories of the economically
active population and the trends in the size of each category in contemporary Iran.
The employer class had been rising slightly ever since the beginning of Mohammad Reza
Shah’s modernization of the 1960s, but recently, according to the 2011 census, the employer
class has experienced a decrease. The size of the employer class increased between the 1976
and 1986 censuses, when the capitalist development plan of the Shah had started taking effect.
It remained almost intact during the revolutionary period, between 1986 and 1991, and then
increased from 3% to 7.5% until 2006 when the liberalization policies of Hashemi and Khatami
had taken effect. With regard to this increase in the portion of upper class (employers), it
should however be noted that due to lack of data regarding the size of the enterprises, it is
always possible that the number of employers as being over-counted, for example by selfemployed persons being mis-categorized in censuses as employers. It should also be noted that
recent research shows that a significant proportion of the post-revolution Iranian capitalist class
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are involved in financial business and speculation, rather than in productive economic activities
(Asr-e Iran 2010). This section of Iranian capitalist class, has often had the Iranian government’s
support and enjoyed a secured margin in their economic activities (Idjadi 2014).
However, in the subsequent five years (2006 to 2011), the size of the capitalist class
decreased again to 3.7% of the total active population. This can be partly explained by
Ahmadinejad’s assertion that the oil money must be brought back to people’s tables, which
translated into his administration’s redistribution and inequality reduction policies, such as the
Subsidies Targeting Act and the distribution of Justice Stocks. Implementation of these nationwide policies resulted in the size of the government, partly measured by government’s
investment and expenditure, to increase at the expense of the size of private entrepreneurs.
Although some privatization programs were enforced during Ahmadinejad’s period, the state
shares were largely purchased by semi-state institutions and foundations, such as the
Revolutionary Guard and bonyads (see Habibi 2013). The shrinking of the number of employers
might also reflect Ahmadinejad’s ambitious domestic and foreign policies, which led to political
anxiety, economic insecurity, and financial irregularities, as well as the implementation of
crippling international sanctions against the Iranian economy, and in turn, made capitalists
apprehensive about investing money in Iran.
Alternately, the self-employed (bazaar) class showed a 10% increase from 1960s to end
of the first decade of the Revolution and then experienced a slight decline before plateauing.
This class category constituted about 42% of the economically active population in 1991.
Private sector wage and salary earners saw a reduction from 1976 to 1986, but increased by 9
percent in subsequent decades. This was consistent with the privatization wave of 1990s. In
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contrast, the public sector wage and salary earners grew by 12 percent up to 1991 but
decreased afterwards (see table 4). As will be elaborated upon in the following pages, when
Nomani and Behdad’s class model is introduced, it shows that the size of the middle and
working classes changed, due mainly to the economic policies implemented after the
Revolution. It is important to remind that the Iran-Iraq war encouraged interventionist policies
during the first decade of the Islamic Republic, which is reflected in the increase in the number
of public sector employees up to 1991 (also see the discussion under the political economy of
the first decade of the Islamic Republic in chapter 3).

Table 4: Active Population by Occupational Categories (1000 persons)

Occupational Categories
Year

Employed

Employers

Self-

Private

Public

Unpaid

Not

(bourgeoisie)

employed

sector

sector

family

stated

(petty

wage and

wage and

workers

bourgeoisie)

salary

salary

earners

earners

Population

1976

182

2810

3072

1673

1021

41

8799

(%)

(2.1)

(31.9)

(35.0)

(19.0)

(11.6)

(0.4)

(100)

1986

341

4390

1875

3453

484

458

11002

(%)

(3.1)

(39.9)

(17.0)

(31.4)

(4.4)

(4.2)

(100)

1991

396

5453

2348

4346

337

217

13097

(%)

(3.0)

(41.6)

(18.0)

(33.2)

(2.6)

(1.6)

(100)

1996

528

5199

3270

4258

797

463

14572

(%)

(3.6)

(35.7)

(22.5)

(29.5)

(5.5)

(3.2)

(100)

2006

1530

7366

5485

5025

683

387

20476

(%)

(7.5)

(35.9)

(27.0)

(24.5)

(3.3)

(1.8)

(100)

2011

769

7333

6292

4323

861

968

20547

(%)

(3.7)

(35.8)

(30.6)

(21.0)

(4.2)

(4.7)

(100)

Source: Statistical Center of Iran: Manpower (2013a)
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Overall, as figure 7 illustrates, the effect of the state modernization plans of the Shah
(i.e., an increase in the number of public sector wage earners), and economic liberalization and
privatization of the post-revolution (i.e., an increase in the number of private sector wage
earners) are seen to be reflected in the configuration of the employment statuses. During this
period, the employer and self-employed classes have experienced a relative overall increase,
though with some fluctuations.

Figure 7: Active Population by Occupational Categories
Source: Statistical Center of Iran: Manpower (2013a)
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Nomani and Behdad’s (2006, and also Behdad and Nomani 2009) work on the
quantitative composition of the postrevolutionary social classes in Iran is one of the few, if not
the only, investigation in this area. Their analysis is based on the four decennial censuses
conducted - Iran’s National Census of Population and Housing (1976, 1986, 1996, 2006). They
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differentiated two processes of economic involution and deinvolution, which were carried out
in the postrevolutionary period. It has been argued that economic policies were implemented
specifically during the longer period of the deinvolution which created new ‘politicosocioeconomic opportunities’ for some and limited these opportunities for others. This is a
critical point because it highlights that the economic policies affected the structure of social
classes. As Behdad and Nomani put it, under such policies:
These changes affect the distribution of employment, as well as the pattern of
employment status and occupational positions. In ‘normal’ circumstances, these
changes are generally effected in a long-run trend in response to technological,
demographic, or socioeconomic changes. In the transitional process in the
postrevolutionary conditions, changes in the occupational pattern of the workforce are
abrupt and unstable (Behdad and Nomani 2009:85-86).

Behdad and Nomani (2006) investigated the sources of expansion or contraction of class
locations of the Iranian workforce caused by involutionary and de-involutionary processes in
the postrevolutionary decades. It is hypothesized by Behdad and Nomani (2006) that the
‘structural involution’ period (1981-1989) brought about the deproletarianization of the urban
economy, the peasantization of agriculture, and a significant increase in small-scale service
activities. This trend is reversed during the ‘de-involutionary period,’ which is marked by
economic liberalization and is hypothesized to have led to the proletarianization of the
workforce and the de-peasantization of the rural economy.
In their analysis, five neo-Marxian class categories and one author-created category are
identified based on the ownership of property, authority, and skill dimensions. These include
capitalist, petty bourgeoisie, unpaid family workers, middle class, political functionaries, and
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working class. As Nomani and Behdad (2006:6-7) write, their suggested class model is inspired
by Erick Wright’s, and is based on three dimensions of ownership, organizational authority, and
possession of skills and credentials in economic activities. Inspired by Wright’s
conceptualization of state employment, Nomani and Behdad (2006:23-24) argue that the state
has two apparatuses: the political state and decommodified state services (or social services).
Nomani and Behdad (2006:24-25) argue that the social services apparatus of the state is
engaged in production of decommodified (non-market) services, such as public education,
public health, and public recreation. They add that in Iran, the state also is engaged in the
production of a long list of goods and products, which constitute the ‘economic activities’ of the
state in Iran (a possible third apparatus of the state). However, the only state employees that
are categorized as the ‘political functionaries of the state’ are employees of the political
apparatus of the state: “executive and administrative, legislative, and judiciary branches of the
government. It also includes the coercive arms of the government- the police, military, and
paramilitary group” (2006:24-25). They continue to say that although high-level professional
managers and military personnel, and administrators are in many ways similar in their
characteristics to the middle class, they are not classified as middle class. Likewise, “those who
work at the lower ranks of the political apparatus of the state, but have little autonomy or
expertise, constitute the rank and file of political functionaries” (Behdad and Nomani 2009:87),
and while they in many respects are close to the working class, they are not as a group included
in the working class category (Nomani and Behdad 2006:23). The employees of other two
apparatuses of the state, however, are grouped in the same manner as employees in the
private sector.

108

Nomani and Behdad try to justify this separation by saying that in oil-exporting
countries, the state is in a peculiar position that enables it to enjoy a monopoly over valuable
resources, and such a state “has a giant administration and bureaucracy, large military and
paramilitary forces” (Nomani and Behdad 2006:22). It is also discussed that political
functionaries are in an ambiguous class location because they are just instruments in the hands of
the government and that they don’t have a definite role in the relations of production, thus
their separation from the middle and working classes is justifiable (Behdad 2010:5). However,
the extent to which a political functionary class appropriates surplus value, or oppresses the
working class is not clarified in their formulation. Moreover, since the political functionary class
seems to include members who otherwise could be categorized in both middle and working
classes, the consistency in which social classes are defined or operationalized in their study is
questionable.
In their class model, the capitalist and petty bourgeois classes are divided into two
categories: modern and traditional45. Alternately, the middle class and working class are broken
into private sector46 and state employees, while political functionaries are divided into
administrative and managerial, professional/technical, rank and file, and military and
paramilitary forces. What distinguishes the middle class from other classes, according to
Nomani and Behdad’s operationalization, is the skills or credentials that they have, as well as
the relative degree of authority that they enjoy in their work. On the other hand, those who
“neither own property, nor have skills, credentials, or organizational assets, and have little

45

The peasant farmers have been categorized under traditional petty bourgeoisie.

46

Agriculture workers have been categorized under private sector working class.
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autonomy in their work process” are located in the working class (Nomani and Behdad
2006:18).
Behdad and Nomani also present a class composition of the employed worked force of
Iran from 1976 to 2006. They selected the census of 1986 to be representative of the
involutionary period and three censuses of 1976, following the capitalist development under
Shah, 1996, and 2006 to be indicative of the period of deinvolution. A ‘decomposing technique’
has been applied to control the employment effect, which is the effect of the natural increase
in the number of those in employment from one census to another.
They found that the working class, which at just over 40% comprised the largest class of
the employed workforce in 1976, substantially decreased to 24.6% during the involution phase
(1976-1986), mainly as a result of the deproletarianization of the urban economy. The petty
bourgeoisie increased from 31.9% in 1976 to 39.9% in 1986, thus becoming the largest class
category. This represents the expansion of the petty commodity economic activities. There was
also a sharp increase in the absolute and relative size of the political functionaries, which
suggests that the enlargement of the political apparatus of the state absorbed the middle
classes, and that the disruption in capitalist production dismantled a large segment of the
working class during the involution process. Many of the latter were attracted by newly
established revolutionary military organs such as komiteh, basij and the Revolutionary Guard,
or joined the volunteers fighting in the Iran-Iraq war, while others were absorbed into petty
commodity production.
During the deinvolution period (1986-2006), the size of the capitalist, middle, and
working classes increased vigorously. However, while the increase in the size of the capitalist
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and middle classes continued after 1996, the share of the working class remained at 30% during
the period spanning 1996 to 2006. During this period, the petty bourgeoisie first declined
(1986-1996), but then increased slightly (1996-2006) and stayed at 30% of the employed
workforce. This class category, however, would equal 40% if unpaid family workers were
included in its count. The political functionaries, as a group, experienced a steady decline,
which is seen as a result of ‘demobilization of the military forces’ after the war. The
composition of class structure in Iran as of 2006 breaks down as follows: 40% are petty
bourgeoisie (including unpaid family workers), 30% are working class, 7.5% are capitalist, 12%
are middle class, and 9% are political functionaries (see table 5).

Table 5: Class Distribution of Iranian Society

1976

Capitalist class
Middle class

Total
1000
182
477

1986
%
2.1

Total
1000
341

5.4

1996
%
3.1

Total
1000
528

774

7.0

2006
%
3.6

Total
1000
1530

%
7.5

1,493

10.2

2,514

12.3

Petty bourgeoisie

2,810 31.9

4,390

39.9

5,199

35.7

7,366

36.0

Working class

3,535 40.2

2,702

24.6

4,474

30.7

6,215

30.4

1,851

16.8

1,618

11.1

1,780

8.7

484

4.4

797

5.5

683

3.3

Political functionaries

732

8.3

Unpaid family workers 1,021 11.6
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Unspecified
Total

41

0.5

458

4.2

463

3.2

387

1.9

8,799

100

11,002

100

14,572

100

20,476

100

Source: Nomani and Behdad (2006:218), Behdad and Nomani (2009: 91)

Figure 8 illustrates changes in the five major social classes of Iran from 1976 to 2006,
which is drawn from Nomani and Behdad’s work. The only classes that experienced an increase
were the upper and middle classes, which have been growing at the expense of other classes
over 35 years.
Figure 8: Class Distribution of the Iranian Society
Source: Nomani and Behdad (2006:218), Behdad and Nomani (2009:91)
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Behdad and Nomani (2009:96) conclude that “the class structure of the workforce in
2006, in sheer contrast to that in 1986, depicts a change toward resembling that of the
prerevolutionary class structure.” This conclusion has been challenged by those who argue that
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the 1979 Revolution ‘did matter,’ or those who criticize the author’s failure in assessing the
impact of Iran-Iraq War, or the rentier economy on class relations (see for example Moaddel
2007, and Salehi Isfahani 2007).
Such study of class in Iran suggests that social classes have been affected by the
interventionist or liberalist economic policies that have been implemented since the Islamic
Revolution in 1979. Research shows that economic privatization, liberalization, and the
development of a service economy have helped the capitalist and middle classes to enlarge.
The primary decline in the working class during the first decade of the Revolution and its
subsequent increase has also been discussed. In the next section, an analysis of the disposition
of political elites in postrevolutionary Iran will be presented. That analysis is grounded in the
context of the postrevolutionary political economy, the structure of political power, and the
class apparatuses that have been discussed in earlier sections and chapters.

The Study of Political Elites in Iran
The next step in the study of the relations between Iranian social classes and politics is
conceptualizing the political elite, and more generally, the study of elites. The following section
briefly reviews the classic theory of elites in a general manner, and then provides an exhaustive
account of the Iranian political elite. It is argued that in the context of developing countries, and
a political condition of opposition between modern and tradition forces into account, the
importance of leaders and political elites is even more enhanced (Bottomore 1993).
An elite is defined as a select group of citizens who control large amounts of power or
are situated at the top of society (Vergara 2013). A political elite, specifically, is “persons who,
by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements,
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are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially” (Higley 2009:3). Elite studies
emphasize the role and importance of political elites in accordance with the nature and pace of
social change in different social settings. According to the literature, the elite strata, in the most
general sense, shares two main attributes: they do their best to preserve their privileged
position, and they would like to make themselves distinct from the rest of the society by
different means (Bourdieu 1984, Daloz 2010).
The study of elites in the modern era began with Mosca (1939), Michels (1959), and
Pareto (1968). They, of course, remained highly indebted to earlier generations of modern
political philosophy thinkers, such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau (Butterworth
1980:12), and at the same time tried to offer an alternative version of elite theory to the
mainstream ‘radical’ Marxist approach (Blondel and Müller‐Rommel 2007:820). For Pareto, the
stratification of a system is represented in the number of ‘social pyramids’ in which a few
talented people, based on their higher abilities, characteristics, and qualities, sit on the vertex
of, while the wide base of each pyramid is composed of lower level people. Consequently,
Pareto recognizes the existence of several groups of elites in society, however, there will be a
considerable overlap between the pyramids of social and political power (Kolegar 1967:355-56).
For Pareto, the characteristics of a market-based economy, which arose out of liberal ideology,
ensure maximum social mobility as well as normal circulation of elites, during which the
‘economically fittest,’ or those who are best fitted, sit as the ‘governing elite.’ In addition to
their superior intelligence and education, elites, in Pareto’s thesis, are superior in possessing
two out of six classes of residues (qualities) as specific and immutable traits. Class I represents
the instinct for combination, which is responsible for innovations, ingenuity, and intelligence;
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and class II represents the persistence of aggregates, which drives loyalty and stable
orientations in both economic life and in systems of values, beliefs, habits, and customs
(Hartmann 2007:13-14). The distinction is between those who possess these traits and those
who don’t, which in turn, separates elites from non-elites in Pareto’s theory. The natural
process of elite circulation takes place gradually via the slow infiltration into the corridors of
power of the governing elite’s adversaries. However, if the normal processes are blocked by
barriers that limit the ability of ‘new blood’ to replace the elite in power, then the risk of
revolution and social crisis increases and reaches the point where the old ruling elite is abruptly
replaced be a new one (Hartmann 2007:20). Pareto, thus, sees the history as the ‘graveyard of
aristocracies.’
In his The Ruling Class, Mosca divides human society into two classes: a ruling or elite
class, and the masses or the ruled or governed class. The root of such a distinction for Mosca is
the permanent attempt of human kind to attain superiority over others (Barkley 1955). One of
the main assumptions of Mosca’s elite theory is that the elite class does its best to maintain its
power and supremacy. On the basis of this assumption, Mosca rejects Rousseau’s concept of
‘popular sovereignty,’ which assumes that the ruling class chooses the way to best serve the
public interests (Butterworth 1980:44-45). Mosca also introduced a second ‘stratum’ into the
hierarchy of political elites, which is defined as those who live below the highest level of the
ruling class. For Mosca, as for Pareto, revolutions are a point in which a new political class
emerges.
Mills (1973 [1956]) belongs to the following generation of theorists who extended the
theory of elites to the post-war circumstance. For Mills, the power elites of the United States
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who sit in top positions in major social institutions - including military, government, and
business - are a socially homogeneous group from upper social strata who share common
interests and values (Blondel and Müller‐Rommel 2007:822). In Mills formulation, elite
recruitment is not merely based on expert qualification (Mills 1973 [1956]:240), rather, most of
the power elites in the three aforementioned sectors come from the upper echelons, whose life
style, professional career, and personal contacts make them alike (Hartmann 2007:42). Mills
(1973 [1956]:241) writes “neither professional party politicians, nor professional bureaucrats
are now at the executive centers of decision. Those centers are occupied by the political
directorate of the power elite.” Mills theory can be considered to be in-line with class-centred
theories of power that, as previously argued, hypothesize that particular groups enjoy a
monopoly over power. Critics (for example see Domhoff 1990), however, argue that this theory
is limited to US society and has little analytical utility in other social settings.
The study of modern political elites in Iran was initiated by Zahra Shaji’ee (1965, 1983),
James Bill (1963, 1972), and Marvin Zonis (1971). As the first Persian researcher in the field of
the contemporary political elites, Shaji’ee tried to investigate the social origins of Iranian
presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, and Majles deputies following the Constitutional
Revolution up to the Islamic Republic. She recorded a bibliography of elites, and tried to provide
a picture of the prerevolutionary Iranian political community. Although it is a descriptive work,
Shaji’ee’s study is one of the first and most valuable sources of the study of political elites in the
social system of pre-revolution Iran.
Zonis (1971), likewise, studied the correlation between personal, or what he calls
‘psycho-cultural,’ and socioeconomic factors of Iranian political elites and their attitudes and
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behaviors in prerevolutionary Iran. Zonis defines political elites simply as those members of
Iranian society “who exercised and possessed political power to a greater degree than other
members” of society (Zonis 1971:6). According to his method of elite selection under
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s reign, Zonis first identified the holders of formal positions within the
government, as well as members and officeholders of political parties and interest groups. Then
he sought the occupants of key social, economic, and civil roles. Accordingly, a list of ‘general
elites,’ classified according to 30 categories and including three-thousand names, was
constructed. As a second stage, the list was ranked by a panel of 10 knowledgeable rankers to
attribute ‘various levels of political power’ to the peoples in the list and then a cut-off point of
10% consistent with three hundred high-ranked elites, was defined (Zonis 1971:345-52). To
discover their social background, 167 members of the political elite were interviewed and the
biographical information of the remaining 140 persons was collected where applicable. This
data included variables such as birth place and residence, religion, elite parents or offspring,
education, knowledge of a foreign language, the frequency of foreign travels, and their previous
and present occupations.
In terms of the elites’ attitudes and orientations, Zonis found signs of feeling personal
and occupational ‘insecurity,’ especially among old and high status Iranian elites, which has
underlined their political behavior. He (1971:241) points out that “the very security that
members of the elite seek in multiple association memberships and occupational positions
contributes to their felt insecurity”. Zonis also addressed attitudinal characteristics of cynicism,
mistrust, selfishness, and xenophobia towards foreign governments among political elites. He
emphasized the significance of education in the elite circulation process in Iran which opened
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the way for young elites to gain high-ranking positions and compete with their older
counterparts, who were from a higher social status but received the same levels of education.
Zonis named these younger groups the ‘up-and-coming members of elites’ (Zonis 1971:266). All
told, as Harik (1980:59) asserts, the most salient contribution of Zonis to the study of elites has
been identifying a direct relationship between the socialization experiences of elites, which
itself is a class-based process, and their political attitudes.
As discussed, the Islamic Revolution shifted and reconfigured the structure of power
attainment in Iran. One of the most significant contributors to this reconfiguration was the
Islamic Republic’s ideological pledge to expel the ‘Taghouti’47 from power and to abolish it in
order to help the ‘dispossessed’ groups govern. This ideology dramatically helped to shift the
composition of political elites after the Revolution. While the pre-revolution generation of elites
was overwhelmingly secular, more or less aged, usually came from higher and often feudal
socio-economic backgrounds, and often had substantial connections with the monarchical
regime (Ashraf and Banuazizi 2007), the post-revolution group of elites were primarily young,
comparatively less educated, and often came from lower or middle socioeconomic
backgrounds. It was immediately after the transition of power to the revolutionary elites by the
Islamic Revolution, that the process of state reconstitution started. Throughout this process,
new groups and classes, usually in the form of political parties, began to seize a share of power
and gradually formed the new generation of political elites in Iran.

47

A segment of the upper class whose advantageous position was not believed to be possessed as a result of its competences but due to its
unjust access to the power centers and its loyalty to Shah in the monarchical regime.
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In what follows, previous investigations into the link between social classes and the
structure of the political elites will be reviewed. As a first step, it is critical to look at the
literature on postrevolutionary political elites.
To have a solid picture of the configuration of political elites in postrevolutionary Iran,
the role of the Revolution itself is the first thing that should be considered. It has been argued
that revolutions, in general, by freeing social restraints, accelerate the pace of and facilitate
social change. As Amir Arjomand (2009a) argues, in the postrevolutionary condition, which was
accompanied by the growth of urbanization and expansion of education, social mobility
became easier. This led to the opening and broadening of the social base of the political
community48, which in turn paved the way for new elite groups to come to power. This is what
Brym (1985) deems the ‘significant redistribution of power,’ or what has been termed the
‘circulation of power’ by classic elite theorists.
The significance of the postrevolutionary political opening is further highlighted when
one considers the almost non-circulative political system under the Shah. When the Shah stood
at the centre of power and the decision making process, the cadre of power elites in the Pahlavi
regime was confined to the Shah and royal family patronage, a group of military officers, and a
limited number of loyal Ulama, high-ranked bureaucrats, and large landlords. The Shah himself
appointed the commanders of the military forces, as well as prime ministers (see Rakel 2009).
Moreover, the members of the cabinet and parliament were all subject to his approval (Rakel
2009:107). As Abrahamian (1982) suggests, the one-party regime officially began in 1975 by the
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adopting John Locke’s thesis
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establishment of Rastakhiz Party, which further limited the possibility of the circulation of elites
in an underdeveloped political system.
When the ‘broadening of the political community’ (Amir Arjomand 2009b) and
decentralization of power became feasible because of the Revolution, a plurality of political
forces and elites were witnessed in the early months of the Revolution. Simply put, the
postrevolutionary power claimants clearly reflected the revolutionary forces that had actively
participated in the overthrown of the Shah. Asides from a common antagonism to the Shah,
they also accepted Imam Khomeini as the leader of the Islamic Revolution. However, as time
went on, a process of ‘fragmentation’ of the resistance forces (Foran 1993:397) occurred and
several groups were eliminated from power, and the state remained in the control of a more
homogeneous group of elites. This elimination of the opposing political forces and the
consequent centralization of power occurred at different points of time and corresponded with
different sociopolitical circumstances.
Diverse periodizations of the postrevolutionary stages have been presented by scholars.
For instance, Moaddel (1991, 1993) used the ‘revolutionary and reversal phases’ to
differentiate two forms of the postrevolutionary class conflicts. Rajaee (1999, 2007)
distinguishes the ‘politics of revolution and Islamism’ from the ‘politics of restoration’ in order
to underline different generational reactions to identity tensions in the country. Ehteshami
(2002) and Amir Arjomand (2009a) adopted ‘first and second republics’ and ‘revolutionary and
Thermidor decades’ respectively to emphasize the different constitutional and political
dispositions that were adopted in the pre- and post-Khomeini eras. Also, basing themselves
upon the political economy dimension, Behdad and Nomani (2009, Nomani and Behdad 2006)
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introduced ‘structural involution and deinvolution’ to address the openness of the economic
policies towards a capitalist mode of production. These periodizations could be linked to the
issue of the exclusion of political groups: a first stage of excluding all secular and less-religious
groups occurred and lasted up until the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, and a second stage of
‘factional rivalries,’ to use Rakel’s (2008, 2009) term, began in the 1990s and continued
onwards.
In the first stage, the first groups from the new political elite to be excluded from power
were liberals. This started with the resignation of the Bazargan’s provisional government in
November 1979. The second round of political tightening began after the dismissal of BaniSadr, the first president of the Islamic Republic, in June 1981. This round led to the defeat of
the Mojahedin and other military opponents to the Islamic republic and continued with the
banning of the Tudeh party and other non-religious leftist elements in 1983. This process of
political cleansing, and the social integration that war had caused, not only helped to stabilize
the political situation, but consolidated the Islamic Republic’s political system. As Ehteshami
(2002) argues, at the moment of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, the backbone of the Islamic
Republic’s political leadership had been formed.
However, that is not to say that the remaining groups of Islamic elites were uniform. A
second stage of factional rivalries, this time among the loyal elites of the Islamic Republic, soon
arose. The post-Khomeini rivalries helped the entrance of new groups into the league of
political elites at the expense of driving others out. Although the controversies among Islamicminded groups existed from the eve of the Islamic Revolution, the presence of Ayatollah
Khomeini and his charismatic accommodation reduced such infighting. However, the first signs
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of such ‘intra-elite rivalry’ (Rakel 2009) appeared among the members of the Islamic Republic
Party and became one of the reasons of its dissolution in June 1987.
The appearance of factionalism among Islamic elites originally stemmed from different
interpretations of Islam, which emerged before the Revolution. Ali Shariati was the speaker of a
‘radical’ Islam that advocated a levelled and equal society to be ruled by intelligentsias.
Bazargan, and to a lesser extent Ayatollah Taleghani, were the voices of a ‘liberal’ Islam that
dreamed of amalgamating Islam and modernity. Ayatollah Khomeini was the defender of a
‘militant’ Islam to be realized through the establishment of an Islamic state as a result of a
revolution. Lastly, there was a ‘traditionalist’ interpretation supported by an alliance of
conservative Ulama and Bazaaris (see Ashraf 1994, Maloney 2015, and Mahdavi 2014).
Beside their prerevolutionary dissension, four other primary factors contributed to the
divergence of the Islamic-minded factions. The first reason was their disagreement over policymaking with respect to the economic, societal, political, and cultural issues. This included the
way in which the economic system should be designed, as, for instance, either a state or
market-based capitalistic economy; the way that the civil society and public life should be
organized; the direction of foreign policy; and the level of openness and tolerance regarding the
cultural production of society (Ashraf 1994). Depending on the views that different political
elites had for these dilemmas, diverse political factions formed.
A second reason for factional diversity among the postrevolutionary political elites was
the existence of diverse sources of privilege, which was introduced by the Islamic Republic and
in some cases formed rival sources of power. These new factors of privilege in the political
apparatus of Iran functioned analogously to the conventional bases of determination of one’s
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location in the social stratification system such as family’s socioeconomic status, education,
occupation, and income. Those who were students of Ayatollah Khomeini, figures such as
Mohammad Beheshti, Morteza Motahhari, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Montazeri,
Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ahmad Jannati, Mohammad Yazdi, Ali Meshkini, Mahdavi Kani, and Sadegh
Khalkhali, found themselves with the great chance to sit as the top echelon of the political elite
of Iran after the Revolution. There were also significant privileges that helped some, regardless
of their socioeconomic status, to experience quick upward mobility. These included being a
political prisoner or being exiled by the Shah’s regime, membership in anti-Shah Islamic
associations and clubs, participation in the Revolution, and serving in revolution-generated
organizations, institutions, and committees. This new system of privilege continued after the
revolution and extended to other cases, such as having a history of participation in the Iran-Iraq
War, becoming a war veteran, or being a child of a martyr or veteran. Ashraf (1994:126)
demonstrates that about 80% of post revolution cabinet members had served in revolutionary
tribunals, committees, Bonyads (foundations), the Revolutionary Guards, and other
revolutionary organizations. These diverse sources of power and legitimacy created sometimes
conflicting power centres.
The third reason for rivalry among insiders relies on the nature of the organization of
Shi’ism. As Milani (1993:84) argues, in Shi’ism, a multiplicity of religious powers is
acknowledged from which faithful Muslims can select their source of emulation from among
existing Ulama. Such religious polycephaly has been reflected in the political sphere and
translated into the existence of rival factions. A fourth factor that encouraged the rise of
political factions has been the republican attributes of the Iranian political system, which
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brought about the holding of regular elections by which different groups and wings could find
opportunities to control the government and the Majles. These elections created an Islamic
pluralism (Rajaee 1999) and a heterogeneity of elites. As Amir Arjomand (2009a) notes, the
Majles elections alone present more than 50 new members to the cadre of the Iranian political
elites every four years.
The plurality of political factions led to the formation of several power centres in the
public domain, which created another source of ambiguity for Western observers and scholars
seeking to understand Iran. To illustrate the situation, Buchta (2000) used the phrase ‘Iran’s
maze of power centres,’ while others adopted terms such as ‘intense factionalism’ (Rakel 2009),
‘endemic factionalism’ (Ehteshami 2002), or ‘the labyrinth of Iran’s factional politics’ (Milani
1993). In the situation that these scholars describe, political factions, instead of conventional
political parties, rooted themselves in diverse sources of legitimacy and social and ideological
credits, and tried to capture and hold positions of power. Conquest of the government, the
highest executive institution of the country, has long been the ultimate goal of Iranian political
factions. This is consistent with Alavi (1972), who emphasized the importance of the control of
government for the elites in, what then was termed, the Third World during the postcolonial
era.
Although the overall configuration of the main political factions and the distribution of
Iranian elites among them has remained the same, they have experienced some fluctuation
since the Islamic Revolutions. Two, three, or four political factions have been recognized by
different commentators. Buchta, for instance, recognizes a left-wing and a right-wing as the
two main ideological factions and claims that both power centres are controlled by Islamic
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revolutionary leadership elites that are composed of clerics and religious lay persons (Buchta
2000:9-10). He argues that the conventional ‘radical versus moderate’ dichotomy is a flawed
approach when trying to explain the factional divergence in Iran. He continues to say that the
right-wing faction is divided into a traditional right and a moderate right. Bashiriyeh (1984:13038) recognizes two dominant factions with different class bases who occupied the early
postrevolutionary power blocks: a moderate modernist wing, more or less liberal, and a religious
fundamentalist anti-liberal wing. While the supporters of the former were primarily found among
high-ranking officials, entrepreneurs, professionals, lawyers, managers, and cleric, the latter had
strong ties with the traditional petty bourgeoisie and lower class masses.
Rakel (2009), though, distinguishes two camps of power: the conservative camp and the
radical left camp. The former consists of conservatives, moderates, and pragmatists, and the
latter includes hardliners and reformists. Rakel also recognizes four periods of rivalry for power
among these two political camps and their sub-factions since the Revolution: from 1979 to
1989 (left Mousavi cabinet), from 1989 to 1997 (pragmatist Hashemi cabinet), from 1997 to
2005 (reformist Khatami cabinet), and since 2005 (conservative Ahmadinejad cabinet). One
may extend these courses to the end of president Ahmadinejad’s term and a fifth course
beginning in 2013 in which the moderate, pragmatist Rohani cabinet came to power. Ashraf
(1994:131-33) observed three main factions: rightists, leftists, and pragmatists. Ashraf
continues to say that rightists are supportive of Ulama and Bazaari interests, advocates of
privatization and economic liberalism, and are strict on social and cultural issues. Leftists are
pro-public economy and pro-income distributive policies. The pragmatists, who are composed
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of the religious technocrats and professionals, take a moderate stance to reconcile extreme
tendencies among leftists and rightists.
Katouzian and Shahidi (2008) introduced a fourfold spectrum in which a radical
fundamentalist faction on the right extreme and a revisionist reformist faction on the left end
are moderated through a conservative tendency that is closer to the right end, and a pragmatic
tendency that is closer to the left end. Rajaee (1999) distinguishes the traditional right (Rast-e
Sonnati), the modern right (Rast-e Modern), the left (chap), and the radical right (rast-e Efrati).
He introduces the term ‘Islamic Yuppies’ as the primary members of the second and third
factions, while the ‘Islamist coalition’ forms the first and last factions. According to Rajaee
(1999), as an outgrowth of the globalization and recent modernization, Islamic Yuppies have a
middle class and intelligentsia background and reflect a voice of the Islam of modern
universities. It is in such socioeconomic backgrounds that this generation of political elites
advocates for political and cultural tolerance and pluralism.
Historically speaking, the leftist elites dominated the political arena until the demise of
Ayatollah Khomeini. In spite of several efforts from rightists, Ayatollah Khomeini did not allow
their exclusion. They had the upper hand in the Mousavi’s cabinet as well as first and third
Majleses. After Ayatollah Khomeini’s death and abatement of the revolutionary atmosphere,
leftists were left out of the government by President Hashemi Rafsanjani, and also kept out of
the fourth Majles by the Guardian Council which remained in charge of evaluating the
qualification of candidates for the Majles election. However, pragmatists, also known as
Kargozaran, and moderate leftists of the Hashemi cabinet were coupled with a nascent faction
called the reformist wing and won the 1997 presidential election, as well as the sixth Majles in
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2000. A coalition of conservative technocrats and the traditional right coalesced under the ‘Osul
garaa’ faction for the election of the second City Council in 2003 and won the subsequent
seventh Majles election in 2004 and the presidential election of 2005 (see Rakel 2008 and
Maloney 2015). Later, a coalition of centrist rightist and leftists, forming a moderate faction
called ‘Etedal garaa,’ won the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections and the tenth Majles in
2016. The political factions that remained active in Iran’s political structure as of 2017,
therefore, are fundamentalists (Osul garaa), moderates (E’tedal garaa), and reformists (Eslah
talab)49.

To link this factionalism with Weber’s concept of party, it should be noted that in the
absence of political parties, Iranian political factions used their social and economic resources in
elections to support their fellow MPs. Examples include Khaane-ye Kaargar50, which is in charge
of supporting the deputies who safeguard the interests and preferences of the working classes,
which has been under control of pragmatist and reformist camps in two recent decades (i.e.,
since the 1990 by election of Alireza Mahjoub as the president of the House); and Hezb-e
Mo’talefeye Eslami51, and Jame’e-ye Anjomanha-ye Eslami-ye Asnaaf va Bazaar52, which are
traditionally supporters of conservative candidates in both presidential and Majles election (see
the statement of the Islamic Coalition Party in supporting the conservative candidates in 2016
Majles election53).
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Table A.1 in Appendix A portrays the history of post-revolution presidential and Majles elections, presidents, Majles speakers and the
election turnouts.
50
The House of Worker
51

The Islamic Coalition Party

52

The Society of Islamic Associations of Guilds and Bazaar
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http://www.mehrnews.com/news/ [Accessed 11 August 2017]
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The affiliated political elites of each of these factions not only represent the interests of
diverse groups and strata in the society, but also enjoy different financial resources (see AkhaviPour and Azodanloo 1998). Moderate and reformist elites primarily represent the middle
classes, the intelligentsia and the modern bourgeois strata. When they are in power, they also
enjoy the benefits of major state economic enterprises and service industries. Alternately,
fundamentalists represent the interests of the conservative Ulama, traditional Bazaaris, and the
highly religious segment of the public. Their institutions and their elites receive official
resources as well, but also enjoy non-official sources of income, usually independent of the
government. These include payments to mosques, holy shrines, religious taxes and donations,
and financial supports from revolutionary Bonyads (foundations)54 (Rakel 2009, and Maloney
2015).
To summarize, the Islamic Revolution, was not merely a political transference of power,
but was also a social revolution that transformed the structure of the political class in Iran. The
abrupt replacement of the old league of elites with a new one might be called an immediate
effect of the Revolution’s circulation of elites. The main actors in this phase of circulation were
members of the Council of Revolution, members of the Islamic Republic Party, and Ayatollah
Khomeini’s clerical students. According to Ashraf (1994:112), these new men of power came
from Ulama families, petty bourgeois families, and peasant farmers. In subsequent years, the
Islamic Revolution also created other bases for the later phases of elite circulation. These bases
represented the secondary effect of the Revolution on elite recruitment. These two effects
helped to change the structure of elite recruitment, from an exclusive system under the Shah to
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Revolutionary-generated Bonyads control about 40 percent of the Iranian economy (Amir Arjomand 2009b).
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an integrative one, or what Keshavarzian (2007:280) calls an ‘inclusionary mode of rule,’ under
the Islamic Republic.
Embedded in the secondary effect, the Revolution facilitated upward mobility by
enhancing accessibility to education and through the “integration of small towns on the
periphery of Iranian society” (Amir Arjomand 2009a:117). Later, affiliations based on familial
ties, clerical background and religious education in seminaries, service in revolutionary forces,
and participation in the Iran-Iraq War (Thaler et al. 2010:53) comprised extra ladders for
upward mobility. These elements helped the intelligentsia, and children of the first generation
of political elites and of religious families, to find greater chances to elevate themselves and to
be recruited as the second generation of the Islamic Republic’s political elite.
The inclusionary system of elite recruitment in postrevolutionary Iran was
institutionalized and consolidated by the electoral bases of the Constitution. On average, there
has been one election a year since the Revolution. Evidently, each public election in the life of
the Islamic Republic has introduced numerous new personalities to the league of political elites.
The Majles, particularly, has been an exceptional way to enter the new elites and has the
potential to introduce 290 new men and women of power every four years. Presidential
elections have also enabled different factions to come to power and have introduced new
groups of high-ranking ministers who, as discussed earlier, hailed from different factions, and in
turn, represented diverse class backgrounds.
What the current study expects to find, based on the literature reviewed in this chapter,
is the inclusion of all class backgrounds in the composition of the Majleses, particularly in their
early terms when the egalitarian ideology of the Revolution were more prevalent and political
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factionalism was in its earlier stages. As argued, the Revolution contributed to opening and
broadening the social bases of the political elites. The literature also discusses the increasing
accessibility of education after the Revolution. These two principals predict that post-revolution
political elites will come from more diverse backgrounds. However, with regards to the pattern
of change, a trend towards more homogeneity among political elites emerges - especially when
considering the elimination of outsiders, and intra-elite rivalry. An increase in the size of
political elites who once served as state or bureaucratic officials and managers is also expected.
As discussed, state officials and political functionaries have been deemed to serve as a
springboard for future generations of political elites in Iran. This trend happened at the expense
of the decrease in the size of those political elites who have traditional middle-class (Ulama and
bazaari) backgrounds. Therefore, the decrease of political elites with a clerical status is also
anticipated. This study also assumes a link between the economic policies implemented after
the Revolution and the composition of Iran’s political elites. Thus, whenever liberal and proservice economy development helped to enlarge the professional stratum in Iranian society, an
increase in the proportion of professionals among the political elites is expected to be
observed. In addition, it is anticipated that we will observe an increase in working class
representation in the 1990s and 2000s, at time when the size of the working class in Iranian
society slightly enlarged.
The next chapter, which emphasizes the Iranian post-revolution Majleses, will guide us
in reaching for a more tangible perception of the composition and origins of the members of
the Iranian parliament.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE PLACE AND ROLE OF MAJLES IN THE
POLITICAL APPARATUS OF IRAN
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In the historical lecture that Ayatollah Khomeini delivered at Behesht-e Zahra cemetery upon his
return to Iran from exile on 1st February 1979, he spent some time remarking on the illegitimacy
of the Pahlavi regime. The main focus of his reasoning was the Majles under Pahlavi and its
deputies’ lack of legitimacy. He stated that “since the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, with the
exception of a few deputies in a few periods of time, Majleses were not the real representatives
of the public” and that most did not know who the deputies in their own constituencies were
(Khomeini 1979). He later emphasized his assertion by repeating a well-known phrase: “Majles
is an institution above all other institutions in the country.”
Iran has one of the oldest parliamentary heritages in the region. The quest for
parliamentary democracy has been central to all social movements against autocratic political
systems, most notably in the two full-scale revolutions that occurred in Iran during the 20th
century: the 1906 Constitutional Revolution and the Islamic Revolution. The former earned Iran
the ‘National Consultative Assembly,’ which opened in November 1906, and 24 terms were
convened until 1979. The Islamic Revolution, in turn, revived the Iranian Majles, which had
become quite ceremonial, particularly after the dismissal of Prime Minister Mosaddegh’s
democratic government by an American-British organized coup in the summer 1953. Ten terms
of the ‘Islamic Consultative Assembly’ have been held since the Revolution, every four years
since 1980.
The first postrevolutionary Majles opened in March 1980. Among other things, this
Majles had unique characteristics and is exceptional in some senses. Thirty-four members of
this Majles were killed, mostly in the terrorist explosion of the Islamic Republic Party on July 8 th,
1981, and others perished the Iran-Iraq War. The second supreme leader of the Islamic
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Republic, five out of six future presidents55, and about 20 subsequent ministers were members
of this Majles. Many others deputies of the first Majles later served as the imam in Friday
prayer in various provinces and many got positions in the judicial branch of the state. As is
evident, this Majles actually acted as a spring-board for many men of the next generation of the
political elite in Iran. A second exceptional characteristic of the first Majles was its high level of
political diversity and plurality. Since the Guardian Council, which has long been in charge of
vetting election candidates, had not yet been formed at the moment of the first Majles
election, a wide range of political orientations, from the National Front and the Liberty
Movement to the Islamic Revolution Mojahedin, and from radical left to radical right (Hojjatieh
association) were present in this Majles. By establishing the Guardian Council in July 1980,
Majles candidates had to prove their theoretical as well as practical observance to the tenets of
Islam56.
The deputies of the first Majlis were predominantly clerical figures and largely from the
leftist camp, which was consistent with the revolutionary atmosphere as well as Ayatollah
Khomeini’s support. They lost their majority, though not their strong influence, to the rightists
in the second Majles (1984-1988). They regained a large majority in the third Majles (19881992). When Hashemi Rafsanjani, the incumbent speaker of the third Majles, was elected as
president in July 1989, the leftist representatives selected Karoubi, a revolutionary leftist, to sit
as the new speaker. Nevertheless, it was the third leftist Majles that approved the post-
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President Rajaee, Khamenei, Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Rohani

56 Which has been termed Nezarat-e Estesvaabi (approbationary supervision) in the Iranian political literature since 1991.
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Khomeini liberal economic orientation of the Hashemi government. This was actually the last
Majles inaugurated in the ‘first republic’ era, during which Ayatollah Khomeini did not allow the
marginalization of leftists.
Later, in one of the Friday prayers of March 1992, the new Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei,
criticized the leftists (Ehteshami 2002:61), which in turn led to wide rejection of the
qualifications of leftist candidates by the Guardian Council in advance of the fourth Majles
election (1992-1996). Rightist technocrats and pragmatists kept their upper hand in the fifth
Majles (1996-2000), though ironically began opposing the Hashemi government’s liberalization
and economic adjustment plans, as its implementation had dissatisfied the public. As Ehteshami
(2002:63) argues, the political composition of the fourth and fifth Majleses indicates the rise of
a new generation of parliamentarians who had looser ties with the political discourse of the
Ayatollah Khomeini decade. In the sixth Majles (2000-2004), the rightists lost their dominance
to a newly-formed ‘reformist’ coalition of pragmatists and moderate leftists. The sixth Majles
was the outcome of an opening-up political approach that was adopted by the Guardian
Council, which let the insider opposition group come to power. This Majles coincided with the
reformist Khatami presidency and supported his agenda. However, the guardian Council
changed its vetting approach again, making it harsher, when the sixth Majles’s representatives
seriously challenged the established authority of the central core of power. By having a
hardliner like Ahmadinejad come to power, this time reorganized under the ‘fundamentalist’
wing, conservatives and rightists won the three subsequent Majleses (2004-2016) but lost their
majority again in the current tenth Majles (2016-2020) to ‘moderates’ who had a margin of
support from the moderate president, Rohani (see table 6).
134

Table 6: Main indices of the Iranian Majles since the Revolution

The Islamic Majles
Terms

Year*

The Majority Faction**

First

1980-1984

Leftists

Second

1984-1988

Rightists

Third

1988-1992

Leftists

Fourth

1992-1996

Rightists

Fifth

1996-2000

Rightists

Sixth

2000-2004

Reformists

Seventh

2004-2008

Fundamentalists

Eighth

2008-2012

Fundamentalists

Ninth

2012-2016

Fundamentalists

Tenth

2016-2020

Moderates

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)*; Maloney (2015)**

With regards to the socioeconomic composition of Majleses, Ashraf (1994:121-23)
found that a shift towards a decreasing representation of landowning families (agricultural land
owners), merchants, government employees, and professionals had begun after the 21st Majles
of the Shah’s regime in 1963. According to him, the Revolution merely accelerated this trend
and helped three groups of people: the traditional intelligentsia, such as the Ulama and lower
level clerics; the petty bourgeoisie, including shopkeepers and artisans; and peasant (non-
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owner agricultural workers) representation to increase at the expense of the aforementioned
categories (see figure 9). Although Ashraf’s findings show that there was no particular turning
point, it is clear that the structure of representation was reversed during this period of time.
Ashraf’s evidence shows a trend toward more representation of managers and professionals,
rising to up to 47% in the third term of Islamic Majles, at the expense of Ulama who’s share fell
to 27%. Vakili-Zad (1994) confirms that the socioeconomic background of the deputies indicates
an orientation towards secularism as Iranian society was moving away from the revolutionary
days.
Figure 9: Major Class categories as a percentage of total representation
Adopted from Ashraf (1994): 121-123.
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1st Islamic Majles
(1980-1984)

Studies that concentrated on the early postrevolutionary Majleses observe an
overrepresentation of traditionalists, as well as of the religious, deprived, and rural strata of
society (Amir Arjomand 2009a, Vakili-Zad 1994). According to these studies, the occupational
background of the first Majles reveals that one third of deputies were from peasant families.
This fact has been taken as an indicator of a sharp contrast to the structure of political elites in
the prerevolutionary Majleses. Moreover, the three first Majleses were predominantly filled by
deputies who were born in small towns or villages. However, the high representation of
peasants, 30% in the first Majles, looks proportional to the population since the same portion
of the population was active in agriculture. Again, the configuration of postrevolutionary
parliamentarians by their place of birth seems proportionate to the population distribution of
the 1970s, when less than one third of population was living in major cities57.
Moradi (1995), who assessed the social status of members of four periods of Majles
(1980-1992), found that the majority of MPs had a middle class background. He also reported a
decline in the number of clerical representatives from the first to fourth Majlis. Moradi
demonstrates that the educational attainment of members of parliament has been higher in
each subsequent parliament. He also showed that female participation in the political sphere,
particularly in parliament, has increased from 1980 to 1992. Amir Arjomand (2009b) shows that
over 60% of the parliamentarians in the 1990s and 2000s were recruited from a second
stratum: the administrative cadre of the revolutionary and developmental administration. This
highlights how important membership in revolutionary institutions and organs are with respect
to getting elected as a representative to the Majles.

57

Capitals and main industrial cities of provinces
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Saee (1998), who analyzed the first five Islamic parliaments after the Islamic Revolution
in terms of the demographic and the socioeconomic status of their members, found a positive
linear relationship between the number of years that passed after the Revolution and the
number of representatives who have modern educations. In contrast, according to his findings,
the proportion of parliamentarians who received religious education decreased from the first to
fifth Majlis. Ketabi, Ghasemi, and Masoumi (2004) studied the first to sixth Majleses and found
that in the first and second Majlis, the majority of parliamentarians had no more than high
school education, while in the fourth, fifth and sixth Majleses, the majority of MPs had a
bachelor’s certification. According to them, the average of parliamentarians who solely had
religious education declined from 46% in the first two Majleses to 6% in the sixth Majles.
The study of Islamic Majles in Iran, however, has largely remained limited to the first
two decades of the Revolution and rarely extended to recent Majleses. Moreover, previous
research did not measure the proportion of each occupational, age, gender, and educational
groups among the parliamentarians to that of their respective general population. This is the
gap that the current study intends to fill.
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS

139

Based on the literature that has been reviewed in previous chapters, this study has established
several research questions and hypotheses to be answered and tested. In the first instance, the
current study examines the transformation in the composition of parliamentarians since the
Islamic Revolution. Then, it seeks to establish the extent to which the structural changes in
Iranian society after the Revolution are reflected in the composition of the membership of the
Iranian Majles. Likewise, this study tries to answer whether there is a match or mismatch
between the class background of the members of the Iranian Majles and the distribution of social
classes in Iranian society. In a broader sense, the current study tries to answer the question of the
extent that the socio-demographic characteristics of the Iranian Majles matches that of the
general population.
As the class-centred theory of power predicts, people with an upper class background
have a greater chance to acquire political power. If this is the case, we should expect to see that
members of parliament from an upper class background will be overrepresented in the Majles.
The review of the economic policies that have been implemented in post-revolution Iran has
shown that economic liberalization helped the upper and intermediate classes to grow. Thus, this
study also expects to see corresponding changes in the composition of the Majles. The study of
the early Islamic Majleses also predicts an increase in MPs with a state occupation background.
On the other hand, a liberal-pluralist theory of power predicts that state institutions are
autonomous from social classes. The focus here is on the skills and competence of individuals
who serve in the state apparatus. If a liberal-pluralist theory of power is to have explanatory
power in the case of Iran, we should observe that skilled and competent people, regardless of
their class background, occupy Majles seats.
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Marxist and liberal-pluralist theories are similar in that they try to understand the nature
of the state and are theories of power. However, discrepancies arise when answering the question
of whom has power and how they use it. While Marxist approaches place emphasis on who rules
the state, pluralist theories see the state as a field in which different social groups participate.
Alternately, while the main focus in a Marxist’s paradigm is on the importance of economic
interests, a pluralist approach will recognize other sources of influence, such as educational
credentials. From a Marxist perspective, educational attainment itself is considered to be classbased, and the relevant question is whether advantaged classes have a better chance to be
represented because they possess more economic resources and have better access to education.
Concerning changes in the age structure of the population, this study predicts a shift
towards older ages in the Majles. Through an exploration of the expansion of pre-university and
higher education, the current study hypothesizes that the Majles’ configuration reflects these
changes in the general population. With regard to the waves of secularization, two rival
approaches in the literature were reviewed. As discussed in chapter three, the first approach
maintains that secularization is strongly in place at both the political and social levels, and that
Iran is not exceptional. This line of argument emphasizes the unavoidable consequences of
modernization, and also the role of an ever-increasing middle class as relentless demanders of
secularization. The second approach, however, highlights the intrinsic and integral role of
religion in the Iranian culture and does not see secularization as inevitable. This study seeks to
determine whether the composition of members of parliament in postrevolutionary Iran
represents a trend toward electing a greater or fewer numbers of religious deputies.
The literature acknowledges that the Islamic Revolution brought about a new basis for
social stratification by introducing new sources of social prestige. An ‘integrative’ system of elite
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recruitment, which allowed a more open circulation of elites to operate, entails that political
representatives, the Majles deputies in this case, should epitomize a proportional representation
of all social classes. This fact is further highlighted when considering appeals to political justice
and for the elimination of the Taghouti class as core demands of the Islamic Revolution, and
noting that the Islamic state promised to be the state of the ‘dispossessed’ and to represent their
interests and needs. The results of this study could locate the position of the Iranian political
apparatus on a political spectrum in which ‘liberal-pluralist’ and ‘Marxist’ sit as the extremes. A
liberalist approach predicts that competent individuals from different social backgrounds sit in
the position of power, and a Marxist thesis suggest that these are advantaged classes that are
better represented descriptively (instrumentalist view) or substantively (structuralist view). A
Marxist paradigm assumes that education is an instrument of class reproduction in the society.
This means that privileged classes benefit their better access to education and translate it into
better occupational attainments, including access to power, for their offspring. Thus, this study
seeks to explore the extent to which the evidence supports the reproduction thesis respecting the
way in which access to power position in Iran is associated with class.
Inspired by a normative proportional representation thesis, this study maintains that to
have a just representation of the interest and tastes of all segments of society, a representative
institution should be ‘descriptively’ proportionate to its social classes. As argued, the research
shows that people are more likely to pay attention to, as well as to have better understanding
of, the issues and problems of their own socioeconomic status. In order to adhere to the
Revolution’s ideals of ‘egalitarian redistribution of wealth and power,’ to use Fraser’s (2010)
terminology, it could be hypothesized that the Majles, as an elective institution of the Islamic
Republic, should recruit representatives from all social backgrounds. This study seeks to
142

determine to what extent this process of elite circulation via the Iranian Majles matches the
overall social transformations in the country, and has been proportionate to the social class,
place of birth, size of religious minorities, age, gender, and education in the general population.
To Summarize, the current study primarily seeks to identify:
1- The class backgrounds of the members of the post-revolution Iranian parliament
2- The extent to which MPs’ class background matches the class distribution of Iranian
society
3- The extent to which MPs’ class background has changed since the Islamic Revolution
4- The extent to which the changes in MPs’ class background matches changes in the
class distribution of the Iranian society.

143

CHAPTER SEVEN: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
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Methods
This study aims to categorize and frame the changes in the configuration of parliamentarians
since the Revolution and determine how these changes correspond to the structural changes
throughout Iranian society. Thus, this study seeks to answer four major questions. The first and
second address the class backgrounds of the Iranian MPs and how the composition of
parliamentarians, most importantly their class background, matches the overall class distribution
in Iran. The third and fourth questions explore the extent to which MPs’ class background
changed and to what extent these changes corresponded with the class configuration of the
general population. In terms of the research method, this study would be a case study and in
terms of the research techniques, secondary data analysis and historical techniques are utilized.
One may categorize the topic of this study under different areas of sociology, such as
social change, political sociology, and/or social stratification wherein historical research has
been always a common method of acquiring knowledge (Neuman 2007:305). Given that the
questions of class and political elite transformation are historical by nature, a ‘historical
technique’ has been used to answer the study’s core questions. This study used primary and
secondary historical evidence to develop its argument and to address the trends of change
occurring during the period of investigation. Moreover, in order to locate historical data, such as
the family background of MPs, the ordering of their occupations, and their place of birth and
residence, the researcher referred to historical resources such as newspapers, diaries, and life
histories. These resources are used in cases that the main source of information for MPs either
did not provide information, or the provided information was inaccurate or ambiguous. Thus,
through a ‘secondary data analysis’ technique, the data from reliable sources (see the next
section) such as government and bureaucratic documents are utilized to assist this study in
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answering its empirical questions. However, since the Iranian Parliamentary Guide, which is
used as the main source of information for MPs, is a quite complete source, the use of historical
sources has been granted minimal importance and they have been used in only a few cases. It is
also worth noting that the information that has been gathered from historical sources does not
look to be limited to some specific groups and is distributed randomly among Iranian MPs. With
respect to ethnicity, this study utilizes information regarding cities of birth, which are themselves
ethnically diverse, and will run an intersectionality analysis. This will be further discussed in the
measures section of this chapter.

Data
This study uses two main sources of data. First, a series of decennial national censuses called the
“National Population and Housing Census” (NPHC), which were implemented in 1986, 1996,
2006, and 2011 by the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI). These censuses identify the distribution of
Iranians according to education, occupation, gender, and region of residence. The second source
is the biographical dataset (The Iranian Parliamentary Guide) of Iranian representatives compiled
by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. This dataset provides background information on
members of parliament since the Islamic Revolution and identifies their names, previous
education, occupation, gender, age, and their region of residence.
In addition, several key data sets are used. These include Labor Force and Employment
Surveys58 (used to identify the changes in the size of economically active population in Iran),
The Iran Data Portal, based at Syracuse University59 (used in referring to the regulations of
Majles elections); The Nashriyah Project which provides digital versions of Iranian newspapers

58
59

Available at http://www.amar.org.ir/english/Statistics-by-Topic/Labor-force#2222531-meta-data
Available at http://irandataportal.syr.edu/
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and periodicals and is found at the University of Manchester60 (used in checking the number of
MPs for each Majles, and election turnouts, as well as for in finding the political tendencies of
the parliamentarians); The Households Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES)61 ; The World
Bank's Data Group62 (used in identifying fluctuations of international oil prices); The Statistical
Economic and Social Research and Training Center for Islamic Countries63 (used in checking the
enrolments numbers in the higher education); and The United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA)64 and UN Statistical Yearbooks (used in examining the population pyramid and
trends). These complementary sources of data strengthen the study’s data set and helped to
quantify its argument.

Measures
Two main concepts and six variables are to be operationalized for the purposes of this analysis:
the concept of ‘political elites’ and the concept of ‘class’. The variables are the strata of clergy,
modern and religious education, age, place of birth, religious minorities, and gender.
The political elite is measured here by the members of parliament. This study considers
the members of parliament to be political elites. As discussed in chapter five, political elites, in
both classic and current elite theories, are actors who sit in key positions of the state. Members of
parliament in Iran are in the position of legislating for the country, and therefore they are in a
strategic position that gives them decision-making power. However, it should be noted that MPs
in Iran are not the primary group of elites (see chapter 4). For the purpose of this study, a
‘member of parliament’ is someone who has been elected to act as a political representative in

Available at http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/about/projects/nashriyah-digital-iranian-history/
Available at http://www.amar.org.ir/english/Statistics-by-Topic/Household-Expenditure-and-Income#287685-definitions--concepts
62 Available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/iran-islamic-republic
63 Available at http://www.sesrtcic.org/oic-member-countries-infigures.php?c_code=25
64
Available at http://iran.unfpa.org/Country%20Profile.asp
60
61
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the Islamic Consultative assembly. On the basis of parliamentary terms, there have been 2814
members of the Iranian parliament who have been elected through ten parliamentary elections
since 1980 up to the tenth parliamentary election in 2016, some of whom have been elected more
than once.
In the operationalization of ‘class’ as a sociological concept, there are two generic
approaches: a property-based formulation of social classes (inspired from a Marxian
conceptualization of class) versus an occupational-based one (inspired heavily from a Weberian
differentiation of class situation according to skills and authority, and the Durkheimian division
of labor perception). In the first approach, class categories are primarily split over lines of
relation to the means of production and to other assets within the process of production. Models
that are premised on this approach usually recognize three or four classes (capitalist, petty
bourgeoisie, middle class, and working class). The class theories of Poulantzas (1975), Bourdieu
(1984), and Wright (1985) could be considered as examples of this approach. A second approach
bases its classification on occupational categories. The models of Giddens (1981a) including
eight categories, and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) with eleven categories are examples of this
approach. However, Wright’s (1985) and Erikson and Goldthorpe’s (1992) class analyses are
examples of efforts in integrating those two paradigms in the study of class.
In Bourdieu’s (1984) model, professionals and ‘cultural producers,’ including artists and
intellectuals, are recognized as nascent class positions. For Bourdieu, the occupational division
of labor creates a system. Within such occupational system, the objective positions are structured
and occupied by individuals according to the volume and composition of their economic and
cultural capitals. Bourdieu goes on to argue that with regards to the ‘volume’ of cultural and
economic capital, three occupational classes are distinguishable: a ‘dominant class’, sometimes

148

called a bourgeoisie, on the top; and a ‘working class’ in the bottom. Between them is a ‘petite
bourgeoisie class’ that includes small business owners, technicians, secretaries, and primary
school teachers (Bourdieu 1984:Part I, Weininger 2005:86-88). Within these classes, there are
several strata according to the ‘composition’ of economic or cultural capitals. Within the
dominant class, there are professors and artistic producers, who hold greater cultural capital but
the least economic capital; and also industrialists and commercial employers, who hold greater
economic but less cultural capital. Within the petite bourgeoisie, the situation is the same
between school teachers and small business owners. In Bourdieu’s theory of class, a concept of
‘time’ is embedded, which is the most innovative aspect of his formulation. According to this
concept, a class analysis must include an awareness of class transformation over time
corresponding with changes in the volume, composition, and also ‘conversion’ of one type of
capital into another.
The other leading class model is associated with Giddens’s recent works. Giddens
identifies the shift in the occupational system and the class division in contemporary society by
referring to statistical figures. He explains that in the era that manufacturing industries have been
closed down, “at least 50 percent of jobs in the knowledge/service economy demand a high level
of cognitive and/or personal skills” (Giddens 2008b:1016). According to his account, despite the
fact that the blue-collar working class was the largest group in the industrial age, it is a minority
in today’s knowledge/service economy. Likewise, unskilled workers are replaced by a class of
semi-skilled and skilled workers, including clerical workers, whose job requires different levels
of knowledge of informational technology or other skills such as ‘face-to-face social skills’
(Giddens 2008b:1017).
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Giddens (1981a, 2007) suggests an 8-level model of class structure in post-industrial
society. The upper layer consists of “cosmopolitan elites who centered around government,
business and the top echelons of the professions”. The second class groups are “professionals
and managers”. The third groups are “IT/high-tech specialists,” and what Giddens calls “Apple
Mac” groups. “Wired workers,” including clerical workers, sit in the fourth stratum. “Owners of
small businesses” locate at the fifth layer. “Big Mac” workers posit in the sixth class. Finally,
“industrial working” class and “farm workers” are located in seventh and eighth class categories
respectively. According to Giddens, class groups 3, 6, and then 4 represent the largest numbers
of the labor force in England (see table 7).
Table 7: Giddens Class Map

Social
Rank
1

Class Categories
Cosmopolitan elites centered around government, business and the top echelons of the
professions

2

Professionals and managers

3

IT/high-tech specialists - 'Apple Mac' groups

4

Wired workers - including clerical workers

5

Owners of small businesses

6

'Big Mac' workers

7

Industrial working class

8

Farm workers

Adopted from Giddens 2007

Goldthorpe’s schema (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, Goldthorpe 1987, Goldthorpe
2001), as a third leading class theory, is profoundly rooted in organizational economics and tries
to distinguish occupations in terms of their position in the labor market. As was earlier noted, the
combination of the social division of labor (based on the ownership dimension) and the technical
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division of labor (based on work differentiation), has made Goldthorpe’s formulation of classes
central to synthesizing the two aforementioned approaches in the study of class. In other words,
Goldthorpe model is an attempt to combine production-based and market-based criteria
(Jakopovich 2014). As a result, this model is one of the most-used class schemas to have been
employed in the operationalization of class in recent years (Breen 2005). Essentially,
Goldthorpe’s account could be read as the class allocation of occupations in which class
cleavages are divided along the lines of ownership of the means of production (proprietorship),
and then based on dimensions of ‘asset-specificity’ and ‘monitoring difficulty’ (Erikson and
Goldthorpe 1992, also see Breen 2005:36-37). The resulting disaggregated class model consists
of the seven class categories which follow.
Class I includes higher-grade self-employed individuals, professionals, legislators,
managers, and large proprietors. Goldthorpe notes that although it is unfortunate that employer,
self-employed, and employees should be combined in this class, what makes them similar is their
high levels of income; the nature of their positions, which involve the exercise of an authority
that offers freedom from others’ control; and/or their high levels of expertise (Goldthorpe
1987:41). Class II is made up of lower-grade professionals, higher-grade technicians, lowergrade administrators and officials, managers in services and in small businesses, and supervisors
of non-manual employees. These first two classes include occupations that have a ‘service
relationship’, in the sense that they enjoy the highest degrees of discretion and autonomy and are
subjected to the lowest degree of monitoring or control. Thus, they are the ‘service classes’.
Class II members, however, tend to be located in the middle and lower ranges of hierarchies
because they are subject to more or less systematic control from above. Class III are routine nonmanual employees in administration and commerce, and other rank-and-file employees in
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services. Class IV is constituted of small proprietors, self-employed artisans, and all other own
account workers, which is equated to with what is termed petty bourgeoisie in neo-Marxist class
analysis (Goldthorpe 1987:42). Class V is made up of lower-grade technicians and supervisors of
manual workers, Class VI is composed of skilled manual wage-workers in industry, and Class
VII includes all manual wage-workers in industry in semi- and unskilled grades. According to
Goldthorpe, the last two classes could be equated with the working class.
To bridge the two approaches to class operationalization, Goldthorpe has tried to justify
the classification of large employers (bourgeoisie or capitalist class in Marxian concept) into
class I. He argues that owners of large enterprises should be places in class I because “in so far as
such large proprietors tend to be quite extensively involved in managerial as well as
entrepreneurial activities, they may be regarded as having a yet greater affinity with those
salaried managers to be found in class I who have a substantial share in the ownership of the
enterprises in which they work” (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992:41). At the same time, it should
be noted that Goldthorpe’s formulation has maintained its distance from a Marxian formulation
of classes in such a way that it does not consider classes to be responsible for social changes, or
to be in an exploitative relationship, or to be positions that automatically develop a class
consciousness (Breen 2005:42-43).
The European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC) has been developed as an
operationalization of the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) schema (Harrison and Rose
2006, Rose and Harrison 2007, for a practical application also see Wauters 2010). In this
classification employees are classified according to the ‘employment relation of their
employment’ (Harrison and Rose 2006:6). Consequently, a nine-class model is designed, though
six, five, and three-category versions have also been created. As shown in table 8, the nine-
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category classification is analogous to the second approach of class measurement, and the threecategory model is closer to the first class measurement approach based on the ownership and
possession of authority and skills.

Table 8: European Socio-economic Classification (EseC)

Code
1

2

3

6
4

5

EseC Class
Large capitalists and employers,
higher grade professional,
administrative and managerial
occupations
Lower grade professional,
administrative and managerial
occupations and higher grade
technician and supervisory
occupations
Intermediate occupations

Lower supervisory and lower
technician occupations
Small employer and self-employed
occupations (excluding agriculture
etc)
Self-employed occupations
(agriculture etc)

7

Lower supervisory and lower
technician occupations

8
9

Lower technical occupations
Routine occupations

10

Never worked and long-term
unemployed
Source: Harrison and Rose (2006)

9 Class Model

6 Class Model

5 Class Model

3 Class Model

Salariat

Salariat

Salariat

Intermediate
employee

Intermediate
employee

Small employers
and selfemployed

Small
employers and
self-employed

Lower grade
white
collar workers
Skilled workers
Semi- and
nonskilled
Workers
Unemployed

Lower grade
white
collar workers
lower technical
and routine
occupations

Higher salariat

Lower salariat

Higher grade
white collar
workers
Higher grade blue
collar workers
Petit bourgeoisie
or
independents
Petit bourgeoisie
or
independents
Lower grade white
collar workers
Skilled workers
Semi- and
nonskilled
workers
Unemployed

Intermediate

Unemployed

Working class

Unemployed

A fourth well-known class formulation is Wright’s (1980, 1985, 1997, 2006) model of
class structure in post-industrial society, which is heavily based on the concept of ownership of
capital assets and has the notion of exploitation in mind. For Wright, as a neo-Marxist class
analyst, a simple model of the class structure should be initially constructed based on the linkage
between property rights in the means of production and exploitation in capitalist society. Thus,
Wright’s primary model is composed of three classes: a bourgeois or capitalist (exploiter) class,
153

a worker class (exploited), and a petty bourgeois class (neither exploiter nor exploited). Based on
the relationship to the means of production, capitalists and petty bourgeois are categorized as
owners, and workers are categorized as employees. Wright (1997:20-27) goes on to introduce a
more nuanced set of class categories. As a first step, a middle class must be recognized between
capitalist and worker class positions. In differentiating of sub-class locations within the middle
and working classes, Wright introduces two dimensions: the first is the relationship of
individuals to authority within the production process, and the second is their possession of skills
or expertise. Along the axes of the relationship to authority, the locations of managers,
supervisors, and non-managerial staff are differentiated. Three categories have been delineated
along the spectrum of scarce skills: expert, skilled, and non-skilled. Moreover, in the
differentiation of the owner classes, the dimension of the number of employees distinguishes
capitalists (many employees), small employers (few employees), and the petty bourgeoisie (no
employees). Altogether, in an elaborated typological model of class, there are twelve class
locations (see table 9) .
Table 9: Wright class scheme

Relation to Scarce Skills

(many employees)

3.Expert managers

3.Skilled managers

3.Nonskilled managers

3.Expert

3.Skilled

3.Nonskilled

supervisors

supervisors

supervisors

4.Experts

4.Skilled workers

4.Nonskilled workers

1.Small employers
(few employees)
2.Petty bourgeoisie
(non employees)

Source: Wright (1985:88 and 1997:21), also Grabb (1997:144)
1= capitalist class, 2= petty bourgeoisie, 3= middle class, and 4= working class.
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Relation to
Authority

Number of Employees

1.Capitalists

The application of Wright’s model or any other model of social class to the case of Iran
should be done with caution. Such applications face some difficulties. Firstly, the existing petty
bourgeoisie65 in Iran is known as a traditional ‘middle class’ (for example see Abrahamian
2008), which differentiates them from the new or modern middle classes that are largely a
product of modern education and bureaucratization. This has made class analysis in Iran
somewhat ambiguous, especially when one seeks to address a newly emerged (modern) petty
bourgeoisie that is not connected to the traditional bazaar. Thus, the concept ‘middle class’ in
the Iranian context may paradoxically contain traditional and modern petty bourgeoisie as well
as the propertyless white collar salariat.
The second difficulty, a more or less quantitative issue, arises when we consider the level
of industrialization. Wright’s class model was originally designed to analyze the class structure
of advanced capitalist societies, which not only has gone through a fully-fledged technological
industrialization, but has entered the era of ‘post-industrialism,’ a condition in which farm
workers comprise less than 5% of the labor force (Giddens 2008b). One third of the Iranian
population still lives in rural areas. According to the Statistical Centre of Iran (2015), about 20%
of the Iranian labor force is working in the agriculture sector. Another quantitative issue is that
the Iranian economy could still be labeled a state-economy. According to the Iranian Business
House newsletter (2015), the participation of the private sector in the Iranian economy is less
than 30%. This indicates that the majority of the labor force still works for the state or statecontrolled enterprises which is not the case in advanced capitalist societies. In addition, the
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The self-employed property owning class traditionally comes together around the institution of the bazaar that includes bazaaris and
merchants.
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location of the clerical stratum is another problem in the application of class models of Western
origin, which will be elaborated on later in this chapter.
Social classes can be operationalized in several different ways depending on diverse
theoretical frameworks. However, empirical measurements of class are limited to the availability
of data. In addition to the above-mentioned limitations with regards to the applicability of the
reviewed class models, the available data regarding the general population’s occupation, as well
as of MPs’ occupational history, limits the measurement of a well-established model of class for
the purpose of this study. The main difficulty is ambiguity concerning ownership. There is no
information in the Iranian censuses, or in the Majles Guide which represents the ownership
disposition of respondents. However, there are available data that classify people based on their
occupation.
The Statistics Center of Iran has classified Iranian occupations based on the International
Standard Classification of Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88) and 2008 (ISCO-08), which is proposed
by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The ISCO classification enumerates occupations
in 10 major and about 500 sub-major groups (Statistical Centre of Iran 2014:28). In this
classification, ‘Legislators, senior officials and military officers, and high-grade managers’
(occupational group I) are those who formulate policies, plan, direct, coordinate, and evaluate the
overall activates of governments, enterprises, and other organizations. Performance in most
occupation in this group normally requires high skill levels (International Labor Organization
2012:88). ‘Professionals’ (occupational group II) conduct research, develop theories and
operational models, and apply knowledge relating to various fields of sciences. Competent
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performance in most occupations in this category usually requires the highest levels of education
and skill66 (International Labor Organization 2012:110).
Technicians and associate professionals (occupational group III), as the third
occupational category includes those who perform technical work connected with research and
the application of operational methods in the fields of the physical sciences, life sciences, and
social sciences; those who carry out technical services related to trade, finance, and
administration; and those who provide technical support for the arts and advertisement
(International Labor Organization 2012:169). Clerks or clerical support workers (occupational
group IV) record, organize, store, compute, and retrieve information, and perform the clerical
tasks in connection with money handling operations, travel arrangements, requests for
information, and appointments. Performance in most of occupations in this category usually
needs an average level of education (International Labor Organization 2012:219). Service and
sales workers (occupational group V) are those who demonstrate or sell goods in wholesale or
retail shops, stalls or markets, or those who provide personal or protective services related to
travel, housekeeping, catering, and personal care (International Labor Organization 2012:235).
The category of skilled agricultural, forestry, and fishery workers (occupational group
VI) includes those who prepare soil, sowing, plant, spray, fertilize, and harvest field corps; grow
fruits and other tree and shrub crops; grow garden vegetables and horticultural products; gather
wild fruits and plants; breed, raise, tend, or hunt animals to obtain meat, milk, hair, fur, skin, or
sericulture, apiarian or other products; cultivate, conserve, and exploit forests, breed or catch
fish, cultivate or gather other forms of aquatic life, and sell their product to purchasers or at
market (International Labor Organization 2012:261). Craft and related trade workers
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The concept of skill, which is central in formulation of the ISCO’s classification is defined as “the ability to carry out the tasks and duties of
a given job” (International Labor Organization 2012:11)
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(occupational group VII) are defined as those who apply specific technical and practical
knowledge and skills to produce or process foodstuff, textiles and wooden, metal, and other
articles, including handicrafts goods; to construct and maintain buildings; form metal; erect
metal structures; set machine tools or make and repair machinery or tools; and carry out printing
work (International Labor Organization 2012:277). The next group, plant and machine operators,
assemblers and drivers (occupational group VIII), includes those who operate and monitor
mining or other industrial machinery and equipment for processing metal, minerals, wood, etc.;
drive and operate trains and motor vehicles; and assemble products from component parts
according to strict specifications (International Labor Organization 2012:313). Elementary
occupation workers (occupational group IX) are those involved in the performance of simple and
routine tasks which may require the use of simple tools and considerable physical effort and
usually requires no or low levels of skill (International Labour Organization 2012:337).
The current study proposes a model for the study of class composition in Iran based on
the classification of ‘occupational groups’ suggested by the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) as
described above. The European classification (EseC) has been utilized here as a guideline for
converting nine occupational groups into a three-class model (see table 8). The first SCI
occupational group (legislators, senior officials, and managers), similar to the first two
occupational categories in EseC has been labeled the upper class. Professionals, and technical
and associate professionals are located in the second class category: the intermediate class. These
occupations are higher-grade white- and blue-collar employees in the nine-category classification
of EseC. And lastly, clerks, service and sales workers, agricultural and fishery workers, crafts
and related trades workers, plant and machine operators, assemblers and drivers, and elementary
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occupations workers are what has been classified as lower-grade white-collar workers and other
skilled to non-skilled workers in EseC and are labeled the working class (see table 10).
Table 10: Nine and three class versions of EseC and the corresponding Iranian Occupational Groups

EseC Classification

9 class
version

Higher salariat

1

Lower salariat

2

Higher white collar
workers

3

Higher grade blue collar

6

Small employer and selfemployed occupations
(excl. agriculture etc.)

4

Self-employed
occupations (agriculture
etc.)

5

Lower white collar
workers

7

Skilled workers

8

Semi-/unskilled workers

9

Unemployed

ISCO 08 (Iranian Occupation Classification)

1- Legislators, senior officials, and managers

2- Professionals
3- Technical and associate professionals

4 class version

Upper Class
(Salariat)

Intermediate
Class

4- Clerks
5- Service workers and shop and market sales
workers
6- Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
Working Class
7- Crafts and related trades workers
8- Planet and machine operators, assemblers
and drivers
9- Elementary occupations workers

(10)

-

-

The most important feature of the class model suggested here is its compatibility with the
classification of Iranian occupations, which classifies occupations primarily based on the skill
levels that each occupation requires (recalling Weber’s concept of marketable skills). As was
noted above, the available data do not allow us to determine whether an individual is an
employer or self-employed. This limitation prevents this study’s class model from being a
Weberian model. Weber sees the possession of market relevant assets as a criterion for class
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placement. However, as Harrison and Rose (2006) note, EseC assumes that it is one’s position in
the market that largely determines his/her life chances, and occupation is taken to be its central
indicator. This emphasis on the market, as well as the notion of life chances, makes the class
model that is used in the current study close to that of Weber.
At the same time, the class model that is used here is different from Goldthorpe’s because
unlike his, this study’s class model does not include bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes.
However, as Rose and Harrison argue, when only occupational data (coded to ISCO88) are
available, meaning that there is no data available regarding ownership status (which is the case in
this study), a ‘simplified mode’ of Goldthorpe’s (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) Weberianinspired class schema (note that Goldthorpe does not consider his model to be necessarily
Weberian (see Breen 2005:42)), could be applied (Rose and Harrison 2007; also Harrison and
Rose 2006). This simplified model bases its class categorization only on the information on
occupation that is used in this study. Therefore, it could be concluded that the class model of the
current study is linked to both Weber’s and Goldthorpe’s models of class analysis. Alternately,
the class model of this study can be said to differ from a neo-Marxian class model, which would
mainly emphasize the concept of ownership of capital assets, and the notions of exploitation,
class consciousness, and class action (but see the discussion regarding the testability of Marxist
theory in the concluding chapter).
The proposed model enables the current study to investigate the level of match or
mismatch between the general population and Iranian political representatives in terms of their
social background. Informed by the literature, this study theorizes that class has important
implications and outcomes: both Weber and Goldthorpe emphasize that class positions are
associated with differences in life chances. These life chances, in turn, determine one’s valuable
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resources, such as one’s access to education. This argument suggests that educational attainment
is a class-based outcome. As Goldthorpe and Jackson argue in the case of Britain (Goldthorpe
and Jackson 2007, also see Breen and Goldthorpe 2001), class origin is strongly pertinent in
shaping the class of destination. Due to their different life chances, upper and intermediate
classes are more likely to gain valuable economic assets and cultural resources including higher
education, and therefore have greater chances of experiencing upward mobility, or becoming
political representatives. In other words, while the upper class is assumed to have more economic
resources, the intermediate class has skills and educational credentials (cultural resources) that
can help this group to gain political popularity. Similarly, in the case of Iran, it could be
predicted that the higher the class position, the higher the chance of gaining economic and
cultural resources, and thus, the higher the chance of being elected as an MP.
Thus, to understand the dynamics of class-state relations in Iran, the current study, first,
classifies the population and parliamentarians based on the nine occupation categories. Second,
the general population and MPs are classified based on the three-class model. The present study
aims to examine the extent to which the composition of occupational categories and class
categories in the general population corresponds with that of parliamentarians.
As mentioned earlier, the primary data source for the occupation of MPs is the Iranian
Parliamentary Guide. For identification of MPs’ class background, the occupation that is
reported by them as their latest occupation before their election has been regarded as the source
for deciding on their socioeconomic and class status. However, some MPs reported several
occupations which made it difficult in ascertaining their occupations just before their election. To
solve the possible validity problem, I chose the highest occupation of those MPs whose
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occupation list did not seem to be in a historical order, assuming that the highest occupation is
more likely to be the occupation of an MP just before his/her election as a parliamentarian.
One remaining issue in the class measurement is the status of the clergy. According to
conventional class structures in advanced capitalist settings (International Labour Office 1990:68
and 163), religious experts are categorized as a sub-group under the category of ‘professionals’.
The current study presumes that, in the case of Iran, it is necessary to create a separate category
or stratum for clergy. This is justifiable because a) ascendancy of religious groups just after the
revolution, resulting in their significant role in the legislature and the state’s functionality, b) in
the doctrine of most Islamic Shia factions, religion and politics are deeply intertwined, and c) the
process of secularization, at least in an institutional level, is not officially pursued in Iran.
Therefore, religious groups and occupations constitute a proportion of the population that is
significant enough to be individually classified.
In this study, clergy is defined as those who have received Islamic education in the
seminary or religious schools and at the same time wear clerical dress, work in an Islamic
religious profession, or both. In this case, for example, a clergywoman who received Islamic
education and is in religious occupation but does not wear a clerical dress is categorized as
clergy stratum and, alternately, a man who received Islamic education but neither wears clerical
dress nor works in a religious occupation, is categorized as a layperson. Religious education has
been classified based on the stages of seminary education. In the preliminary stage,
Moghaddamat, which takes approximately 4 years, seminary students are taught Arabic literature
and introductory courses. The intermediate level, Sotouh, takes a minimum of 5 years and
includes Fighh and Osul-e Feghh courses. The advanced level, Kharej, which is designed to
develop the analytical and reasoning skills of the students, takes between 8 to 10 years. Ejtehaad
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is the highest level of Islamic religious education and is the certification of the successful
completion of the Kharej level. Clergies, however, are not considered here as a class.
With regard to the modern educational distribution of the Iranian population and its
variation during the past three decades, this study utilizes the available data provided by the
Statistical Center of Iran, the Iranian ministry of Education, the Organization for Educational
Research and Planning, the Iran Data Portal of the Syracuse University, and the World Bank
development data. This study adopts a five-group categorization for the level of the education
among both Members of Parliament and the general population. These categories include ‘less
than high school,’ ‘high school diploma,’ ‘bachelor,’ ‘masters and GP (general practitioner),’ and
‘professional and specialty doctorate.’ The number of years spent in each level of modern and
religious education in the Iranian education system are reported in table 11.

Table 11: Educational levels by the average number of years spent in each level

Number of

Cumulative

years

years

Moghaddamat

4

4

Religious

Sotouh

5

9

Education

Kharej

8

17

Ejtehaad

2

19

Less than high school

8

8

High school

4

12

Modern

Bachelor

4

16

Education

Masters and GP (general physician)

3

19

Professional and specialty doctorate

4

23

Source: Howzeh Elmiyeh (2016), Ministry of Education, Statistical Center of Iran
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The age variable is categorized based on the Statistical Center of Iran classification. This
classification is composed of 5-year age groups, i.e. 15-19, 20-24, etc. In the dataset of Iranian
representatives, the date of birth of MPs is identified and, therefore, for the sake of the analysis,
is calculated to show their age at the moment of the election.
Likewise, based on the Statistical Center of Iran’s definition, the residence status reflects
the distribution of the Iranian population who live in urban or rural areas. According to SCI, each
geographical area with a municipality is considered an urban centers, while, contiguous spaces
and lands - agricultural or nonagricultural - located outside of city borders and having
independent, registered or conventional boundaries are considered rural (Statistical Center of
Iran 2013b:96). For the major and medium city versus small city divisions, to be consistent
across all years, this study categorizes the capital of each province as well as cities with
economic and population67 importance as major and medium cities and counts other cities as
small. With a few exceptions, this pattern is justifiable for all years when cities in each category
remained in the same category during the time. The exceptions are the cities of Karaj (Alborz
province), and Islamshahr and Shahriar (Tehran province), which have seen explosive growth in
recent years and have gone from unimportant and underpopulated cities to mega-cities. Since this
study takes the place of birth of members of parliament as the indicator of their residence status,
these exceptional cases have been treated as small cities because they were rather small 30 years
ago when the younger MP in the ninth Majles was born.
Due to the lack of data on ethnicity in the Iranian national censuses, calculation of an
index of dissimilarity for ethnic representation is not possible. An intersectionality analysis,
however, is presented to investigate whether being in a double-minority situation, e.g., being an
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More than 100 thousands population
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ethnic minority woman in the case of this study, contributes in locating a MP in a disadvantaged
status. Based on different estimates, between 16 and 24% of the Iran’s population are Azari
(Turks). Iranian Turks mostly live in eastern and western Azerbaijan, Ardebil, Zanjan, and
Qazvin provinces, and are also scattered throughout many other cities of Iran. Between 7% and
10% of the country’s population is estimated to be Kurd, making Kurds the second largest ethnic
minority in Iran. Iranian Kurds mainly reside in the west side of the country, such as Kurdistan
and Kermanshah provinces and in southern cities of the Western Azerbaijan province. Iranian
Lors compose about 5% of whole population and is the third largest ethnic group in Iran. They
live in the south-west of western Iran, mainly in Lurestan and Kermanshah provinces. Iranian
Baluchis comprise around 2% of population and reside mainly in Baluchistan province.
Turkmans approximately compose 2% of Iran’s population, and live in the Turkoman Sahra and
in the Gorgan plains on the north-east borders (see Rashidvash 2013:220-23). The birthplace of
an MP (city) has been regarded as an indication of his/her ethnic origin.
The censuses suffer from non-existing data regarding the number of Sunnis68 in the
general population. Data are however available for the population of legally recognized nonMuslim religions: Armenians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Jews, and Zoroastrians. They have been
identified in both the general population and among the members of the parliament and the index
of dissimilarity has been calculated to assess the religious representation in Iran.
Another important issue is the correspondence between the Majles terms and censuses. In
the period of our analysis, 10 Majles have been inaugurated and 4 subsequent censuses have
been conducted by the Statistical Center of Iran. In this study, MPs year of election are compared
to the nearest census (see table A1 in Appendix A). Thus, the first, second, and third terms of
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It is estimated that between 5% and 10% of the Iranian Muslims are Sunni.
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Majles (1980, 1984, and 1988) have been linked to the results of the 1986 census; the fourth,
fifth, and sixth terms of Majles (1992, 1996 and 2000) are connected to the 1996 census; the
seventh and eighth Majleses (2004 and 2008) are linked to the 2006 censuses; and the 2011
census corresponds with the ninth and tenth Majleses (2012 and 2016).

Table 12: Cross-tabulation of Census Years by Majles Terms and number of MPs
Census Year

Total

Majles Term
1986

1996

2006

1980

329

329

1984

277

277

1988

278

278

1992

267

267

1996

248

248

2000

274

274

2004

281

2008

285

2012

(% of total)

281
285
286

2016
Total

2011

286

289

289

884

789

566

575

2814

(31.4)

(28.0)

(20.1)

(20.4)

(100)

To obtain the most accurate results, all comparisons must be based on the 25-74 age
group of the population, which is close to the range of MPs’ age. However, while the data for
this age group was available for some years but not available for some other years, I examined
whether its use as a yardstick makes a difference. In other cases, when the data is unavailable for
all years, the closest age groups (population in the voting age or the economically active
population) have been used for the comparison and it has been noted that the results should be
treated with caution. In this case, the index of dissimilarity potentially contains the error of
comparing two groups that does not necessarily have similar characteristics. This is specifically
highlighted when one considers that the young generation is unevenly distributed among social
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classes. To the extent that the upper class representatives tend to be more senior, the result of
comparison might be biased. In addition, every possible effort is made to minimize the size of
missing or unspecified cases, specifically in the case of the members of the Iranian parliament.
These efforts include, but are not limited to, consulting newspapers, webs and blogs, interviews,
biographies and diaries, personal communications, and utilizing the aforementioned
complementary sources of data70.

Statistics
To standardize MPs’ socioeconomic representation across time, the conventional ‘index of
dissimilarity’ will be calculated. This index represents the ratio of the proportion of various class
categories among Iranian parliamentarians in the numerator, and the corresponding proportion of
the Iranian population in the denominator (see Guppy, Freeman and Buchan 1987). A figure of
1.00 implies equal representation of a given class category, a figure over 1.00 denotes
overrepresentation, and a figure below 1.00 denotes underrepresentation. The dissimilarity index
helps to answer the question of class representation, specifically, the extent to which each class
category of parliamentarians proportionally represents its counterparts in Iranian society.
The Index of Diversity is also generated in order to provide the answer to the question of
how diverse/concentrated is the distribution of MPs within class categories. This index has been
calculated using the formula of 1 – [Σ n(n-1)/N(N-1)], where ‘n’ represents the number of people
in each class category and ‘N’ represents the total number of people in all categories (see Knoke,
Bohrnstedt and Mee 2002:46-47).
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In 14 cases, the researcher referred to MPs’ biographies to identify their previous occupations. In two cases, the MPs’ interviews was
utilized in finding their demographic and socioeconomic background. In addition, in about 30 cases, MPs’ resumes was used to identify their
place of birth.
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Moreover, a multinomial logistic regression is performed to more accurately estimate the
effect of predictors, such as education, clerical status, age, gender, and residence on the nominal
outcome variable of class status of parliamentarians. A multinomial analysis will enable the
current study to determine which variables are important, and which are not, for predicting the
class background of MPs when controlling the effects of other variables.
With regard to ethnicity, this study utilizes information regarding those specific cities that
are ethnically diverse and will run an intersectionality analysis.

Ethical Concerns
As Neuman (2007:245) notes, since people are not directly involved in ‘nonreactive’ types of
research, such as historical and secondary data analysis, ethical issues are not a serious concern
in the current study.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
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The main propose of this study is to understand the pattern of change in socioeconomic
representation in the Iranian politics, as illustrated by the membership of the Iranian parliament
as well as by finding an answer to the question as to whether all Iranian social classes have a
voice in the Majles. This chapter will first provide general information about and a description of
ten post-revolution Majles terms. In the next step, a comprehensive comparison between the
Majles’ composition and the characteristics of the general population is delivered in order to
enable this study to answer its research questions, to test its hypothesis, and to justify its position
in the context of the literature. This comparison takes place along seven lines of analysis: class
background, educational attainment, clerical verses non-clerical distribution, representation of
religious minorities, residence status, gender distribution, and age distribution. The focus here is
on trends and patterns of change and the level of match or mismatch between the composition of
political representatives and the general population. A full discussion of the implications of the
results, however, is presented in the Discussion and Conclusion chapter.

Descriptive Analysis
According to Article No. 63 of the Islamic Republic Constitution (2007 [1989]), the election of
each Majles term should be conducted well prior to the termination of the incumbent Majles, and
in such a way that the country never remains without a Majles. Ten terms of Majles have been
inaugurated, one at every interval of four years, since 1980, the year following the Islamic
Revolution. During the past 37 years of Majleses, 1764 persons have occupied 2814
representative positions. That means that the remaining 1050 persons have been elected twice or
more as Majles deputies. According to the law, there is no limitation on the number of times that
one person can register in the Majles elections as a candidate. As table 13 shows, with the
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exception of the first Majles, in which all the deputies had been elected for the first time, more
than 50% of each subsequent Majles were new representatives71 (Ministry of Interior 2017).
Table 13: Majles Terms by the percentage of first time representatives

Majles Term

Year

Number of deputies

First-time deputies N (%)

1 (1980)

1980-1984

329

329 (100)

2 (1984)

1984-1988

277

170 (61)

3 (1988)

1988-1992

278

152 (55)

4 (1992)

1992-1996

267

157 (59)

5 (1996)

1996-2000

248

127 (51)

6 (2000)

2000-2004

274

170 (62)

7 (2004)

2004-2008

281

161 (57)

8 (2008)

2008-2012

285

154 (54)

9 (2012)

2012-2016

286

166 (58)

10 (2016)

2016-2020

289

178 (62)

Total

1980-2020

2814

1764 (100)

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011), Ministry of Interior (2017)

Table 14 contains information regarding the representatives who have had previous
experience sitting as Majles deputies as well as the number of times that they have been elected.
This table reveals that on average, 65% of MPs have been elected once or twice and 35% have
entered the Majles three times or more. This table also shows that Majles terms 7 and 9 have

71

For a discussion of how the Guardian Council Vets MP candidates see chapter 4.
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contained the most experienced MPs with 48% of its members having been elected three times or
more. Data, however, have not yet been released for the tenth Majles.
Table 14: Percentages of reelected representatives by frequency of being elected

Majles Term

Representation History

Total N

Two times

Three times or more

2

100%

0.0%

107

3

67.5

32.5

126

4

58.2

41.8

110

5

64.3

34.7

121

6

51.7

35.6

104

7

58.8

47.5

120

8

52.5

41.2

131

9

64.4

48.3

120

10

NA

NA

111

Total

65.3

35.7

1050

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Table 15 paints a descriptive picture of all variables of the study. More than half of the
representatives had an upper class background while 40% and 7% came from intermediate and
working class background respectively. With regards to MPs’ modern education, most of the
members of parliament have some university education or Master’s degrees, ranging from 16 and
19 years of modern education. Those who received religious education are mostly in the third
level of religious education: Kharej, who receive 17 years of religious education on average. One
fourth of MPs have been non-clergy, while non-Muslims constituted about 2% of
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representatives. The majority of MPs were born in small cities or villages. About 3% of MPs are
women. The mode of the age groups is 35-44 years old, and fewer that 40% of representatives
are elected more than once.
Table 15: Descriptive statistics of variables of the Study
Variables

N

%

Valid %

Class72
Upper Class
Intermediate Class
Working Class
Total
Missing
Total

1296
1020
175
2491
34
25251

51.3
40.4
6.9
98.7
1.3
100

52.0
40.9
7.0
100

Modern education
Less than high school
High school
Bachelor
Masters and GP
Professional and specialty doctorate
Total
Unknown
Total

159
219
840
814
505
2537
277
28142

5.7
7.8
29.9
28.9
17.9
90.2
9.8
100

6.3
8.6
33.1
32.1
19.9
100

Religious education
Moghaddamat
Sotouh
Kharej
Ejtehaad
Total
Not applicable
Total

106
241
454
121
922
1892
28142

3.8
8.6
16.1
4.3
32.8
67.2
100

11.5
26.1
49.2
13.1
100

Clergy status73
Clerics
Non clerics
Total

713
2101
28142

25.3
74.7
100

Religion
Christian
Jewish
Zoroastrian
Muslim
Total

26
9
9
2481
25251

1.1
0.4
0.4
98.3
100

72

A detailed classification of occupations is presented in next section of this chapter.
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Total number of clergy is different from those who have religious education because, as described in the methodology chapter, some MPs
who received religious education neither wear clergy dress, nor work as a clergy.
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Place of Birth
Major and Medium Cities
Small Cities/Villages
Outside Iran
Total

1114
1386
21
25251

44.2
55.0
0.8
100

Sex
Men
Women
Total

2726
88
28142

96.9
3.1
100

Age groups
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
Total

361
1017
856
244
47
25251

14.3
40.3
33.9
9.7
1.9
100

Representation History
Once
Twice
Three times or more
Total

1586
604
335
25251

62.8
23.9
13.3
100

1: excluding Majles 10
2: including Majles 10

Class and Occupational Representation
The aim of this section is to provide an answer to the main research question of this study: what
is the pattern of socioeconomic representation of post-revolution Iranian MPs and how has the
pattern changed since the revolution? As discussed in the methodology chapter, and based on
their pre-election occupations, members of parliament have been classified into three class
categories: an upper class (Legislators, senior officials and military officers, and high-grade
managers), an intermediate class (professionals and associate professionals), and a working class
(clerks, service and sales workers, agricultural workers, semi-skilled and elementary workers).
The overall result of nine terms of Majles indicates that MPs are mostly divided between those
who had an upper class (51%) and those from an intermediate class backgrounds (40%). About
7% had served as a worker in his/her pre-election occupation. A more detailed distribution of
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occupations among members of the parliament is presented in table 16. As shown, the
distribution of first-time elected MPs between class categories is almost the same as their
distribution when all members are taken into consideration. This finding provides a primary
indication as to whether or not the occupational background of an MP can predict the chance of
his/her reelection. The distinction between first-time elected MPs and total MPs, however,
indicates that members of the upper class are slightly more likely to be reelected than MPs from
intermediate or working classes.
Table 16: MPs' occupational and class background and the number of election
First-time MPs

Class and Occupation Categories

All MPs

Frequency

Percentage

Frequency

Percentage

793

50.0

1296

51.3

Legislators and senior officials

381

24.0

635

25.1

Managers

381

24.0

602

23.8

Military officials

31

2.0

59

2.3

651

41.0

1020

40.4

Legal, social, and cultural professionals

353

22.3

547

21.7

Teaching professionals

233

14.7

376

14.9

Science and engineering professionals

22

1.4

41

1.6

Health professionals

34

2.1

43

1.7

Technical and associate professionals

9

0.6

13

0.5

114

7.2

175

6.9

Clerks

30

1.9

47

1.9

Service workers and market salesmen

74

4.7

115

4.6

Skilled agriculture and fishery workers

10

0.6

13

0.5

Total

1558

98.2

2491

98.7

Missing Cases
Total

28
1586

1.8
100

34
2525

1.3
100.0

Upper Class

Intermediate Class

Working Class

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

The next table reports the distribution of the MPs’ occupational backgrounds for each
Majles. It shows the pattern of change in socioeconomic representation of MPs since the Islamic
Revolution. This table demonstrates that the percentage of legislators (25%), managers (24%),
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legal, social and cultural professionals (22%), and teaching professionals (15%) have been high
in all Majleses. The percentages of legislators and managers have increased since the Revolution,
particularly after the 3rd Majlis. In contrast, the percentages of legal and professional groups,
including clerics, has continuously decreased (see tables 19 and 20). The decrease in the share of
the legal and professional group is associated with the striking decrease of number of clerics in
Majles. As will be further discussed in the next chapter, the significant increase of the number of
legislators, senior officials, and managers, who, in Nomani and Behdad’s terminology, are
referred to as political functionaries, can be explained by the political resources that these groups
were able to obtain by serving the political state. It could also be assigned to the vetting process
by the Guardian Council that naturally tends to trust those who have already proven to be
insiders. The data show that the share of MPs with a background in petty commodity and skilled
agricultural occupations has started to drop since the fourth Majles in 1992. This trend seems to
be in concordance with the same trend of a relative decrease in the size and importance of the
petty bourgeois class in the general population as a result of the introduction of liberalist
economic policies beginning in 1989 (see chapter five).
Table 17: Cross-tabulation of Majles terms and MPs’ occupational background

Majles Term

Occupation Categories (%)

5.8
7.1
8.0

Skilled agriculture and fishery workers

1.6
3.0
3.3

Service workers and market salesmen

0.0
0.8
1.8

Clerks

0.6
0.8
1.4

Technical and associate professionals
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0.3
1.5
2.9

Health professionals

17.9
17.3
12.0

Science and engineering professionals

35.5
37.6
28.3

Teaching professionals

1.6
2.3
1.8

Legal, social, and cultural professionals

16.6
12.4
18.1

Military officials

17.6
16.2
22.1

Managers

Legislators and senior officials

1
2
3

Total

2.6
1.1
0.4

313
266
276

4
5
6
7
8
9
Total

29.2
34.7
38.2
22.1
26.3
25.2

22.1
28.2
35.7
31.0
29.8
24.5

3.7
3.7
2.2
1.4
2.5
2.4

22.8
11.8
9.2
17.1
16.8
16.4

10.1
11.0
8.1
19.2
17.9
21.0

1.5
2.4
1.1
2.5
1.4
1.4

1.5
1.2
2.6
1.1
1.4
4.9

1.1
0.8
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0

2.6
1.2
1.1
1.1
2.5
0.7

4.9
4.9
1.5
4.6
1.4
3.5

0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

635
602
59
547
376
41
43
13
47
115
13
(25.1) (23.8) (2.4) (22.0) (15.1) (1.6) (1.7) (0.5) (1.9) (4.6) (0.5)

267
245
272
281
285
286
2491

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

For a picture of the changes in the class background of Iranian members of parliament,
refer to table 18. This table demonstrates that the percentage of upper class MPs increased from
the first Majles up to 6th Majles before decreasing. Contrarily, MPs with an intermediate class
background have shown an overall decrease in representation since the Revolution up until the
sixth Majles, with slight increases afterwards. With regards to the significance of the sixth
Majles, it should be noted that the Guardian Council applied a more restrictive approach to
vetting Majles candidates after the sixth Majles, during which a relatively open-minded vetting
by the Council had facilitated the election of members of the reformist camp to the Majles;
reformist MPs of the sixth Majles started to challenge established political procedures in Iran
(see chapter 4). Thereafter, the Council started to vet candidates with higher degrees of
precaution and began to trust less well-known insider professionals and figures (see chapter six).
The considerable change in the turnout of the Majles election can also be seen as responsible for
the observed shift in the composition of Majleses, though the exact mechanism is unclear: the
turnout dropped in the seventh Majles by 16% as compared with the sixth Majles election and
remained low for the eighth Majles election. The seventh Majles’s turnout was the lowest
election participation since the Revolution (for turnout percentages see Table A1 in Appendix
A).
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Members of parliament from a working class background decreased, though with
fluctuations, and remained small in number in recent Majleses. As will be discussed in the
concluding chapter, this low representation can be explained by a lack of resources and the lower
level of human capital which the working class possesses. The following table and figures
indicate the change in MPs’ class background. Overall, the data underline public sentiments
towards the upper and intermediate classes at the expense of the working classes.

Table 18: Cross-tabulation of Majles terms and MPs’ class background

Majles Term

Class Categories (%)

Total

Upper Class

Intermediate class

Working class

1

35.8

54.3

9.9

313

2

30.8

57.9

11.3

266

3

42.0

46.4

11.6

276

4

55.1

37.1

7.9

267

5

66.5

27.3

6.1

245

6

76.1

21.3

2.6

272

7

54.4

39.9

5.7

281

8

58.6

37.5

3.9

285

9

53.1

43.7

4.2

286

Total

1296

1067

60

2525

(52.0)

(42.8)

(5.1)

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)
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Figure 10: Class background of MPs by Number of Majles
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To identify the class background of clerics, table 19 focuses upon them as a group. As
shown, the percentage of occupational categories has increased significantly in two cases when
clerical members are included in the analysis: legal, social, and cultural professions, and teaching
professions. This implies that the majority of clerics had served in these two occupational groups
before their election as MPs.

Table 19: MPs' occupational and class background and clerical status
Clergies excluded

Class and Occupation Categories

All MPs

Frequency

Percentage

Frequency

Percentage

1102

60.3

1296

51.3

Legislators and senior officials

532

29.1

635

25.1

Managers

527

28.8

602

23.8

Military officials

43

2.4

59

2.3

575

31.4

1020

40.4

Legal, social, and cultural professionals

255

13.9

547

21.7

Teaching professionals

225

12.3

376

14.9

Science and engineering professionals

40

2.2

41

1.6

Health professionals

42

2.3

43

1.7

Upper Class

Intermediate Class
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Technical and associate professionals

13

0.7

13

0.5

136

7.4

175

6.9

Clerks

43

2.4

47

1.9

Service workers and market salesmen

88

4.8

115

4.6

Skilled agriculture and fishery workers

5

0.3

13

0.5

Total

1813

99.1

2491

98.7

Missing Cases
Total

16
1829

0.9
100

34
2525

1.3
100.0

Working Class

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

As table 20 shows, the next largest group that clergy came from are the occupations of
legislator and senior officials (14%), and managers (10%). Given that the presence of
representatives from the clergy has strikingly decreased since the second Majles74, it could be
concluded that the change in occupational composition of MPs is partly due to the change in the
number of clerical representatives, who largely tend to come from specific occupational groups.

Table 20: Clerical MPs’ occupational and class background
Clerical MPs

Class and Occupation Categories

Frequency

Percentage

194

27.9

Legislators and senior officials

103

14.8

Managers

75

10.8

Military officials

16

2.3

445

64.0

Legal, social, and cultural professionals

292

42.0

Teaching professionals

151

21.7

Science and engineering professionals

1

0.1

Health professionals

1

0.1

Technical and associate professionals

0

0.0

39

5.6

Clerks

4

0.6

Service workers and market salesmen

27

3.9

Skilled agriculture and fishery workers

8

1.1

Upper Class

Intermediate Class

Working Class

74

See the Representation of Clergy Stratum section in this chapter
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Total

678

97.4

Missing Cases

18

2.6

Total

696

100

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Table 21 illustrates the average number of the years spent in modern and religious
education as reported for each class category. With regards to mean years of modern education,
the upper class has the highest mean number of years of education (17.8 years). The intermediate
class category has a mean of 16.7. These two averages years of education together constitute a
degree somewhere between a bachelor’s and a Master’s in Iran. The high mean of modern
education in these two classes is reasonable given that this category contains the highest echelon
of industrial and bureaucratic officials and managers, as well as higher-grade professionals who
are in positions that requires high levels of qualification. The working class predictably holds the
lower levels of mean education, somewhere between high school and bachelor’s degrees. The
Eta test (0.19, p-value=0.03), shows that the differences in means are significant. As will be
discussed later, the level of education (as a human capital), particularly modern education, that
MPs have received, could thus be converted for use a predictor of their other forms of capital
(Abazari, Varij Kazemi and Faraji 2008), and in turn, their chance of being individually reelected
as a parliamentarian.

Table 21: Mean Years of Modern and Religious education by MPs’ Class Background

Modern Education
Mean

Std.
Deviation

Religious Education
N
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mean

Std.
Deviation

N

Upper Class

17.79

3.44

1223

12.51

5.64

317

Intermediate Class

16.70

4.54

854

14.53

4.53

513

Working Class

14.98

3.57

151

12.11

4.85

62

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Table 22 shows the socioeconomic representation of members of parliament and its
changes since the Islamic Revolution. It shows an overrepresentation of the upper and an
underrepresentation of the working classes in all terms of the Majles since the Islamic
Revolution. Members of the intermediate classes are underrepresented in the first three Majleses,
underrepresented in the next five Majleses and somewhat overrepresented in the last three
Majleses. While underrepresentation of the working classes has not improved over time, the data
indicate that the overrepresentation of the upper class has decreased significantly by about six
times. Although there has been some decrease in the index of representation for the intermediate
class, its change has been in a state of flux. The most significant contributor to the change
towards more equal representation of the upper and intermediate class categories seems to be
demographic in nature: increase in the population size of these groups (see chapter five).
The percentage of the upper class in both the general population and occupying seats in
the Majles has increased over time, though it had a sharper slope in the general population. This
table also shows that while the percentage of the intermediate class has increased somewhat in
the general population, its counterpart members of parliament experienced a diminishing share in
the Majleses from 53% in 1986 to 44% in 2011.
For the purpose of comparing class diversity in both the general population and Majles,
the Index of Diversity has also been calculated. It shows that unlike the general population, in
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which the diversity of classes has increased since the Revolution, from 0.41 to 0.55, it has
slightly decreased among parliamentarians from 0.58 to 0.53. This suggests that the extent of
diversity among MPs compared to the general population has decreased.

Table 22: Socioeconomic representation of MPs by Census Year

General Population (1000 persons)

Majles Representatives

Class categories

Upper Class

1986

1996

2006

2011

1st,2nd&3rd
Majleses

4rd,5th&6th
Majleses

7th & 8th
Majleses

9th
Majleses

44
(0.9)

325
(5.5)

608
(6.4)

746
(7.5)

310
(36.3)

517
(65.9)

320
(56.5)

149
(52.1)

3794
(38.2)

40.3
452
(52.9)

11.9
224
(28.6)

8.8
219
(38.7)

6.9
125
(43.7)

1.9

0.7

0.9

1.1

93
(10.5)

43
(5.5)

27
(4.8)

12
(4.2)

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

I of D75

Intermediate
Class

1421
(27.9)

2334
(39.6)

3926
(41.3)

I of D
Working Class

3637
(71.3)

3234
(54.9)

4963
(52.3)

5383
(54.2)

I of D
Total N

51021

58931

94971

99231

855

784

566

286

Index of
Diversity76

0.41

0.53

0.55

0.55

0.58

0.48

0.53

0.53

1- Economically Active Population
Sources: for distribution of class categories in general population data are from the Statistical Center of Iran (2015); for
members of parliament’s occupation data come from the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011).

As was discussed in the methodology chapter, to produce an accurate comparison, the
population should be limited to the same age group as MPs (25-74). However, I was only able to
access data for the age groups 25-65 and over, and 20-65 and over only for the 1986 and 1996
censuses, respectively. The following table compares the number of MPs in three classes with

75

Index of Dissimilarity: the ratio of the MPs (numerator) to the general population (denominator) in each specific category.

76

Index of Diversity: how diverse/concentrated is class distribution, using 1 – [Σ n(n-1)/N(N-1)] formula (see chapter seven).
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the population in the same age group to show whether this yardstick would make a difference if
the data was available for other censuses. A comparison of table 22 and 23 shows that
implementation of an age yardstick does not alter the index of dissimilarity for the upper class.
However, the overrepresentation of the middle class somewhat increases and that of working
class decreases. Nevertheless, the pattern for all classes remained the same.

Table 23: Socioeconomic representation of MPs in same age groups by Census Year

General Population
(1000 persons)
1986
1996
Upper class
I of D
Intermediate
I of D
Working
I of D
Total
1-

44
(0.9)

323
(5.8)

1383
(31.0)

2308
(41.5)

3079
(68.3)

2930
(52.6)

45061
Population in 20-65+ age group

55612

Majles Representatives
1st,2nd&3rd
Majleses

4rd,5th&6th
Majleses

310
(36.3)
40.3
452
(52.9)
1.7
93
(10.5)
0.1
855
2- Population in 25-65+ age group

517
(65.9)
11.4
224
(28.6)
0.7
43
(5.5)
0.1
784

Source: for distribution of class categories in general population data are from Statistical Center of Iran 1987 and 1996; for
members of parliament’s occupation data come from the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011).

The figures 11-13 display the fluctuations of the class representation of Iranian MPs in four
periods. An MPs’ line above that of the general population denotes overrepresentation and vice
versa. As table 50 in the conclusion chapter summarizes, the direction of change in size of each
class has been regarded as an indication of match or mismatch. For instance, the size of the upper
class in the general population has been increasing since 1986, which matches the same trend
among the parliamentarians.
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Figure 11: Socioeconomic Representation of Upper Class
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Figure 12: Socioeconomic Representation of Intermediate Class
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Figure 13: Socioeconomic Representation of Working Class
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In order to have a more detailed understanding of occupational representation, table 24
has been derived from the 2011 census, for which the necessary data is available. The 2011
census is available from the Statistical Centre of Iran. This dataset contains a subset (1,481,586
cases which is a sample of 2%) of the general population (74,016,630 persons). Since a stratified
sampling method has been applied in extracting the sample, the census data had to be weighted
in order to generate valid results. Table 24 affirms the overrepresentation of the highest echelon
of the occupational hierarchy, legislators and managers, in corresponding Majleses (2008-2016).
Science and engineering professionals are the only group among professionals that are close to
equal representation, while other professional occupations are all substantially overrepresented.
Technical associate professionals, skilled agricultural and fishery workers, craft and trade
workers, and semi- and unskilled workers are occupational groups that have not had
representation in the Iranian parliament in recent years, and clerks and service workers have been
extremely underrepresented. Armed force and military employees, however, were almost equally
represented (I of D = 1.1).

Table 24: Occupational Representation of MPs in the 2011 Census

General population

MPs

I of D

Frequency

Valid %

%

Legislators and senior officials

22671

0.1

25.7

10.0

Managers

715146

3.6

27.1

7.5

legal, social, and cultural professionals

489582

2.5

16.6

6.6

Teaching professionals

900332

4.6

19.4

4.2

Science and engineering professionals

219317

1.1

1.4

1.3

Health professionals

191486

1.0

3.2

3.2

Technical and associate professionals

1113722

5.6

0.0

0.0

Legislators, senior officials, and managers

Professionals
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Clerks

878009

4.5

1.6

0.4

Service workers and shop and market sales workers

2312599

11.7

2.5

0.2

Skilled agricultural and fishery workers

3554481

18.1

0.0

0.0

Crafts and related trades workers

3496461

17.7

0.0

0.0

Planet and machine operators, assemblers and

2240262

11.4

0.0

0.0

Elementary occupations workers

3136531

15.9

0.0

0.0

Armed forces

436802

2.2

2.5

1.1

Total

19707401

100.0

100

Missing System

54309229

Total

74016630

drivers

Sources: for distribution of occupational categories data are from the Statistical Center of Iran website
(https://www.amar.org.ir/english/Population-and-Housing-Censuses); for members of parliament’s occupation data come
from the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011).

A re-classification of pre-election occupations of members of the parliament will enable
the current study to analyze the composition of parliamentarians in further details. For this
purpose, Iranian parliamentarians have been classified in eleven categories as shown in Table 25.
This table shows that the most populated occupational category, consisting of about one-fourth
of MPs, is that of university and seminary professors. Governors and public sector managers are
the next largest occupational groups, entailing 18.6% and 18.1% of parliamentarians
respectively. Religious and cultural professionals, and teachers and civil employers together
constitute 25%. Only 5.4% of Iranian members of parliament used to serve as judges, lawyers, or
judiciary officials, and the share of businesspersons, merchants, and Bazaaris is just 1.2%. The
extent of representation of legal professionals and the business class has important implications
for the study of occupational representation, particularly with regards to the extent to which
representatives are from selective socioeconomic statuses (see the next chapter).
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Table 25: MPs’ Pre-election Occupations

Frequency

Percent

Governors and political functionaries

496

18.6

Judiciary officials, judges and lawyers

145

5.4

Public sector managers

482

18.1

Private sector managers

122

4.6

Merchants, Bazaaris, and businesspersons

31

1.2

Professors (university and seminary)

542

20.4

Teachers and civil employees

318

12.0

Religious and cultural professionals

351

13.2

Engineers and technicians

54

2.0

Physicians

61

2.3

Military officers

59

2.2

2661

100

Pre-election Occupation of MPs

Total
Missing

1531

Total

28141

1- Including 10th Majles
Sources: for Majles one to nine data are from The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011); for members of 10th parliament
occupation data come from the Ministry of Interior. 2017

In the following sections, the representation of Iranian members of parliament and its
changes is tested in six categories: educational attainment, clerical verses non-clerical
distribution, religious minorities, place of birth, gender distribution, and age distribution. These
sections investigate the extent to which parliamentarians proportionally represent their
electorates.

Educational Distribution
In terms of educational background, the Majles representatives can be divided based upon the
type of education which they have received: religious or modern. Table 26 shows that in all
terms of the Majles, among MPs who reported their level of modern education, the majority
188

(60%) had Bachelor’s or Master’s degrees. Less than 20% had received professional or specialty
doctorates and the rest, less than 15%, had a high school diploma or had received lower levels of
education. About 10% of MPs did not report their modern level of education, and who are mostly
the clergy members of parliament. A separation between first-time elected and all MPs reveals
that the education variable can be regarded as a predictor of being elected more than once. As
shown in the last two categories of education, those with higher levels of education, e.g.,
Master’s and Doctorates, are more likely to be elected more than once.

Table 26: MPs' Modern Educational Attainment for First time and All MPs

First-time MPs
Modern Education

All MPs

Frequency

%

Frequency

%

Less than high school

105

6.6

159

6.3

High school

141

8.9

219

8.6

Bachelor's

532

33.5

840

33.1

Masters and GP

419

26.4

814

32.1

Professional and specialty doctorate

235

14.8

505

19.9

Total

1586

100.0

2537

100.0

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

With regards to religious education (table 27), out of 931 members of parliament in all
Majleses who had received religious education, the majority are in Kharej level, whose
certification of completion is equivalent to an academic PhD degree in a modern education,
according to the Iranian Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution (SCCR).
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Table 27: MPs' Level of Traditional Education

Religious Education

Frequency

Percentage

Moghaddamat

106

11.5

Sotouh

241

26.1

Kharej

454

49.2

Ejtehaad

121
922

13.1
100

Total
Inapplicable

1883

Total

2814

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

There is a high number of cases, 1883 (67%), who did not report their religious
education. To make sure that this high rate of cases is not missing and does not pose a serious
problem with the validity of the education data, table 28 was created. This table, a crosstabulation of modern and religious education, includes all MPs with both types of education. It
shows that almost all (except 4 who are missing cases) of those who did not report any type of
education are those who had received the other type of education. Among the 227 missing cases
in the modern education, 223 cases are members of the clergy who instead, possessed a religious
education.

Table 28: Crosstabulation of Religious and Modern Education for MPs, 1980-2016

Traditional Education
Missing Total
Modern Education

Moghaddamat Sotouh Kharej Ejtehaad Other
Less than high school

1

36

81

25

2

14

159

High school Diploma

9

37

86

18

0

69

219

190

Bachelor's

43

65

59

6

5

662

840

Master’s and GP

33

45

33

6

2

695

814

Professional and specialty
Doctorate

20

16

23

7

0

439

505

Missing

0

39

175

59

0

4

277

106

238

457

121

9

1883

2814

Total

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

To identify the changes in the religious and modern educational qualifications of
representatives within the ten terms of Majles, tables 29 and 30 have been generated77. These
two tables help this study to highlight the opposing relationship that exists between the two
forms of education in post-revolution Majleses. Table 29 shows that since the first term of
Majles, the frequency of parliamentarians with higher levels of modern education has increased.
The average year of schooling of each Majles shows this trend. The percentage of religiously
educated MPs shows the opposite trend: the number of MPs who have received religious
education has been steadily declining. This is compatible with the trend of declining clerical
representatives since the Revolution. The increase in the general level of modern education
among MPs could also be seen as a result of the technical change in the minimum educational
requirements for Majles candidates which came to effect in 2006. This change required that the
Majles candidates have at least a Master’s degree or its equivalent. It should be noted, however,
that the new regulation exempted candidates who formerly served as Majles representatives. This
is why the frequency of the educational categories lower than a Master’s degree is not zero after
the eighth Majles when the new regulation was in place.

77

Note that the difference between figures in this table and the findings of Vakili-Zad (1994) and Gheisarianfard and Khosravizadeh (2012) is
due to the different N used in calculating the percentages. In other words, they compared, for instance, modern educated MPs in each
category with all MPs, while the current study compared them just with those who had modern education and excluded the religiously
educated MPs from the total N, which obviously creates more accurate results.
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Table 29: MPs’ Mean Years of Modern Education

Majles
Term

Level of Modern Education
Mean
years of
modern
education
(8-23)

Standard
Deviation

262

14.84

4.665

20.4

329

3.5

231

13.85

3.995

16.6

277

10.8

4.8

250

14.98

3.519

10.1

278

47.7

23.9

9.9

243

16.47

3.486

9.0

267

3.6

43.7

32.9

14.9

222

17.49

3.440

10.5

248

1.2

3.1

38.2

37.5

20.1

259

18.31

3.022

5.5

274

Seventh

0.0

3.9

30.1

38.7

27.3

256

18.92

3.004

8.9

281

Eighth

0.0

0.4

30.7

40.9

28.0

257

19.17

2.728

9.8

285

Ninth

0.4

1.5

12.0

51.6

34.5

275

19.88

2.648

3.8

286

Tenth

0.0

0.4

8.5

51.8

39.4

282

20.29

2.363

2.4

289

Total

159

219

840

814

505

2537

17.51

3.970

-

2814

Less
than
high
school

High
school
Diploma

Bachelor’s

Master’s
and
GP

Professional
and
specialty
Doctorate

Total

First

21.0

17.9

34.0

16.4

10.7

Second

22.1

23.4

40.7

10.4

Third

10.4

21.2

52.8

Fourth

4.9

13.6

Fifth

5.0

Sixth

% of
religiously
educated
MPs in
each
Majles

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Table 30 shows the distribution of levels of traditional education within the ten terms of
Majles. Unlike the ever-increasing levels of modern education, the average number of years
spent in religious education has not changed across different terms of Majles. Likewise, the
majority of representatives have had Kharej certification, and accordingly, the mean of the
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Total

religious education remained well above the average (average=13.7). The number of nonreligiously educated MPs, however, increased. Together, tables 29 and 30 illustrate the
composition of MPs in terms of the level and the type of education they received and the pattern
of change since the Revolution. As will be further discussed later, the striking incremental
increase in the number of modern-educated MPs is consistent with the same trend in the
expansion of modern education within Iranian society since the Revolution.

Table 30: MPs’ Mean Years of Traditional Education

Majles
Term

Level of Religious Education

Moghaddamat Sotouh Kharej Ejtehaad Total

Mean of
religious
education
(4-19)

Standard
Deviation

% of modern
educated
MPs in each
Majles

Total

First

11.0

23.4

48.2

17.4

218

14.05

5.066

33.7

329

Second

5.6

24.0

58.1

12.3

179

14.60

4.432

35.4

277

Third

14.3

26.9

45.4

13.4

119

13.26

5.305

57.2

278

Fourth

17.9

21.1

46.3

14.7

95

13.28

5.552

64.4

267

Fifth

20.0

23.8

38.8

17.5

80

12.85

5.735

67.7

248

Sixth

7.5

32.1

50.9

9.4

53

13.64

4.776

80.7

274

Seventh

7.4

32.4

55.9

4.4

68

13.54

4.657

75.8

281

Eighth

9.1

38.2

41.8

10.9

55

12.98

4.953

80.7

285

Ninth

16.7

27.1

50.0

6.3

48

12.79

5.351

83.2

286

Tenth

0.0

42.9

57.1

0.0

7

13.57

4.276

97.5

289

Total

106

241

454

121

922

13.68

5.066

-

2814

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)
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Table 31 examines the educational representation of MPs in the general population based
on the available data from the 2006 and 2011 censuses of those with university educations. It
shows a high rate of overrepresentation of university educated MPs in all terms of Majles78,
which by itself, supports the liberal-pluralist thesis (see the conclusion chapter). The
overrepresentation of educated MPs, however, has been decreasing among bachelor and master’s
degree holders as a result of the expansion of education in the society, or what has been termed
‘inflation of educational credentials’ (Collins 2011).
Another interesting finding of table 31 is that the higher the level of education, the greater
the educational overrepresentation, which could be partly due to the increase in the minimum
educational requirement for Majles candidacy. The overrepresentation of professional and
specialty doctorate is as high as 125 and 179. The explanations and implication of this pattern
will be discussed in the next chapter of this study. A class-based explanation will also ask the
extent to which education is a class-based asset.

Table 31: Educational representation of MPs by Census

Level of modern education

Bachelor’s

General Population

Majles Representatives

2006

2011

7th & 8th Majleses

9th &10th Majleses

3927686
(11.6%)

5689701
(14.0%)

156
(27.6)

57
(10)

2.3

0.7

204
(36.0)

288
(50.1)

36

35.8

142
(25.1)

206
(35.8)

125

179

566

575

I of D
Master’s and GP

336467
(1.0%)

577260
(1.4%)

I of D
Professional and specialty
Doctorate

62844
(0.2)

93614
(0.2)

I of D
Total N
78

337362471

406869591

except bachelors in 2011
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1- Population in 25-74 age group
Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011), Statistical Centre of Iran, UN Statistical Yearbook (2017)

Representation of Clerical Stratum
The clerical stratum of the Islamic Republic’s Majles has always been a strong and effective
group. The discourse of the clergy, as men or women who profess Islamic ideology, has always
played an important role in the process of legislation. Nevertheless, the actual presence of the
clergy in the Majles has been decreasing. As table 32 shows, 25% of the MPs in all 37 years of
the Islamic Majleses have been members of the clerical stratum. Among them, there are 20
women clerics who constitute 23% of the total number of women in all Majleses.

Table 32: Clergy Status of MPs by Gender

Clergy Status

Gender

Total N
(% of Total)

Men

Women

Cleric

693
(97.2%)

20
(2.8%)

713
(25%)

Non Cleric

2033
(96.8%)

68
(3.2%)

2101
(75%)

Total

2814

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

A detailed observation of the percentage of clerical representatives within each Majles
provides valuable information regarding the pattern of change in the size of clerical
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representatives (see table 33). With two exceptions, namely the second and seventh Majleses, the
overall proportion of clerical representation has been in decline since the Revolution. The
greatest decline occurred in the most recent Majles, when clerics lost 50% of their seats in the
2016 Majles election which marked an 88% and 90% decrease when compared to the first and
second Majleses, respectively. In another words, while more than half of the first and second
Majleses were clergy, that number has dropped to only 6% in the tenth Majles.

Table 33: Cross-tabulation of Clergy Status and the Majles Term

Majles Terms

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Clergy Status

Total N

Cleric

Yearly change in size of cleric MPs
(%)

Non-cleric

167
(50.8%)
154
(55.6%)
87
(31.3%)
68
(25.5%)
56
(22.6%)
35
(12.8%)
49
(17.4%)
45
(15.8%)
35
(12.2%)
17
(5.9%)

-

162
(49.2%)
123
(44.4%)
191
(68.7%)
199
(74.5%)
192
(77.4%)
239
(87.2%)
232
(82.6%)
240
(84.2%)
251
(87.8%)
272
(94.1%)

+9
- 44
- 18.5
- 11
- 43
+ 36
-9
- 23
- 52

329
277
278
267
248
274
281
285
286
289

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Figure 14 depicts this decline, starting with the second Majles and following through to
the tenth Majles. This trend can be partly assigned to institutional secularization in Iran.
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However, as is argued in the next chapter, society’s perception of the role of the Iranian
parliament and of who is more competent to serve as a legislator seems to be a stronger
contributor to this decline.
Figure 14: Clerics versus Non-cleric MPs

100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%

Non-clerics

40.0%

Clerics

30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%

To explore whether the clergies are more or less likely to be elected for two or more
times, table 34 is created. The data does not support the hypothesis that clerics experience a
noticeable difference in the chance of reelection as an MP.
Table 34: MPs' times of election and clerical status

Clergies Excluded

All MPs

Times of election
Frequency

Percentage

Frequency

Percentage

Once

1190

65.1

1586

62.8

Twice

420

23.0

604

23.9

Three times or more

219

12.0

335

13.3

1829

100

2525

100.0

Total
Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2012)
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Table 35 examines clerical representation in Iranian Majleses over time by calculating the
Index of Dissimilarity. Based on the available data, two sections of Majleses corresponding with
the 1996 and 2011 censuses have been compared. Based on the availability of the data, the cleric
and non-cleric MPs are compared with their counterparts among the active population in 1996
and 2011, and among the population of voting age in 2016. Since a comparison between these
two populations would entail potential errors, these figures should be treated with caution.
However, as I noted in reference to table 22 and 23, this shortcoming produces minimal error.
With regards to the number of clergy in the general population, there seems to be an
overestimation in the size of the clergy in Iran, as high as 360,000 persons (Khalaji, 2016).
However, the current study bases its analysis on the census data. Based on the 1996 and 2011
censuses, 0.5% and 0.2% of the population, respectively, were in clerical occupations like
Islamic missionary, prayer imam, marriage officiant, preacher, religious expert, Mojtahed, or
source of emulation. These figures, of course, exclude seminary students79 and those for whom
clerical occupations are not the source of sustenance. As shown in table 35, the proportion of
clergy among MPs has significantly declined over 20 years.

Table 35: Clergy Status in General Population and among MPs

Clergy
Status

79

General Population
1996

2011

Majles Representatives

2016
(Maximum
estimation)3

Talabeh

198

4rd and 5th
Majleses

8th and 9th
Majleses

10th Majles
(2016)

Clerics

72533
(0.5%)

42676
(0.2%)

360000
(0.6)

I of D
Nonclerics

14499467
(99.5%)

20504324
(99.8%)

57620544
(99.4)

I of D

Total N

145720001 205470001

579805442

124
(24.1%)

80
(14)

17
(6%)

48

70

10

391
(75.9)

491
(86)

272
(94%)

0.8

0.9

0.9

515

571

289

1- Economically active population
2- Population in the voting age
3- Khalaji (2016)
Source: Statistical Center of Iran: The Labor Force Survey (2015); The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

The results show a high overrepresentation of clergy among MPs in the early years after the
Revolution, which has increased over time. The increase in the Index of Dissimilarity for the
clergy’s representation, while observing a significant decline in the number of clerical MPs,
affirms that the proportion of clergy in the general population has consistently declined alongside
the substantial decrease of clerical representation in Majles; otherwise, the clergy representation
index would have decreased. Even if we accept the maximum estimations for 2016, which
includes clerical students and those for whom religious activities are not the source of
sustenance, the clergy’s overrepresentation, even though decreasing, is still high (see I of D in
the last column of the table 35).

Representation of Religious Minorities
According to Article No. 2 of the Regulations of the Majles Election (2011), three seats are
secured for Christian citizens, including Armenians, Assyrians, and Chaldeans in every Majles,
and two seats are also secured for the Zoroastrian and Jewish minorities in Iran. The official
administration of all religious minorities’ elections, except for the Southern Armenians, is in the
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Tehran constituency and that of the Southern Armenians is centred in Isfahan constituency.
There are no available data regarding the number of Sunni or other religious minorities, either in
the Iranian censuses, or in the parliamentary guides. Thus, these groups are excluded from our
analysis.
The data indicate that legally recognized religious minorities have never been
underrepresented, but they are largely overrepresented in the Majleses of the Islamic Republic of
Iran. The index of dissimilarity also represents an equal representation of Muslim MPs (see table
36). While the proportion of religious minority MPs has remained the same in the time since the
Revolution, data shows a fluctuation in religious minority representation. This is due to the
changes in the total numbers of representatives, as well as changes in the number of religious
minorities in the general population. The data show that Jewish Iranians have been better
represented than Zoroastrians, and Zoroastrians in recent decade have been better represented
than Christians in the Majles. As has been noted before, due to the inavailability of data for the
same age group of MPs (25-74), the comparison entails potential errors, and thus, the figures
should be treated with caution.

Table 36: Religion Distributions for the General Population and MPs

Religion
1996

Christian
I of D
Jewish

General Population
2006
2011

78745
(0.13%)

109415
(0.16%)

117704
(0.16%)

12737
(0.02%)

9252
(0.01%)

8756
(0.01%)

I of D
200

4th,5th&6th
Majleses

8
(1.0%)
7.7
3
(0.4%)
20

Majles Representatives
7th&8th
9th
Majleses
Majleses

6
(1.1%)
6.9
2
(0.4%)
40

3
(1.0%)
6.9
1
(0.3%)
30

Zoroastrian

27920
(0.05%)

19823
(0.03%)

25271
(0.03%)

3
(0.4%)
8

2
(0.4%)
13

1
(0.3%)
10

59788791
(99.8%)

70097741
(99.8%)

74682842
(99.8%)

775
(98.2%)
0.98

545
(98.2%)
0.98

281
(98.3%)
0.98

59908193

70236231

74834573

789

566

575

I of D
Muslim
I of D

Total N

Sources: Statistical Centre of Iran (2013, 2009), and the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Place of Residence
The birthplace of post-revolution members of parliament indicates that the majority of them
come from small urban centres and villages (see table 37). Each Majles also has a small number
of members who were born in non-Iranian cities, particularly shrine cities in Iraq.

Table 37: Cross-tabulation of MPs’ Place of Birth and Majles Terms

Majles

Place of Birth

Total

Terms

N
Major and medium cities

Small

Non-Iranian

(%)

cities/villages

cities

First

40.4

58.4

1.2

329

Second

35.4

64.0

0.7

277

Third

33.5

65.7

0.7

278

Fourth

36.6

62.0

1.5

267

Fifth

33.8

65.3

0.8

248

Sixth

37.4

62.6

0.0

274

201

Seventh

37.0

62.6

0.4

281

Eighth

33.0

66.3

0.7

285

Ninth

34.0

64.7

1.4

286

Source: the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

As table 38 shows, the pattern of MPs from small cities and villages outnumbering other
MPs has generally persisted and has slightly strengthened since the first Majles. In another
words, the number of representatives from small cities or village backgrounds not only has not
decreased over time, but maintained and even increased its majority (see figure 15).
Figure 15: Distribution of MPs by Place of Birth
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40

MPs born in small Cities/
Villages

30

MPs born in major and
middle cities

20
10
0

With regards to the distribution of the general population in terms of place of residence
(see chapter 4), the urbanization of Iran accelerated during the post-revolution modernization
plans starting in the 1990s. This caused the rate of urbanization to leap from 54.3% in 1986, to
71.4% in 2011 at the expense of the number of people who live in rural areas. Accordingly, as
the data show, the population of rural areas has decreased by about 20%. The data also assert that
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post-revolution modernization helped to decrease the number of villages in the country from
68,122 in 1996 to 61,748 in 2011 (Statistical Center of Iran 2012). This trend of rapid
urbanization, accompanied by a decrease in the population and in the actual number of villages,
seems to be in contrast to the overrepresentation of Majles representatives who come from small
cities and villages. However, a closer look at the urbanization data shows that small cities80
constitute over 90% of the Iranian urban centres in 1996, and the process of urbanization even
increased the proportion of smaller cities to 93% in 2011 (see table 38).

Table 38: Number of the Iranian Cities by Size

Census

Type of the City

Villages

Major and medium

Small

Total N

1996

59
(10.0%)

553
(90.0)

612

68122

2006

80
(8.0)

932
(92.0)

1012

63125

2011

86
(7.0)

1053
(93.0)

1139

61748

Source: Statistical Centre of Iran (2012b)

Apparently, urban-to-urban migration, the only type of migration that is rising at the
expense of other types of migration (see table 2 in chapter 3), has greatly helped population
increases in small cities, which is reflected in the increase of the quantity of such cities. This
increase, interestingly, has a slow pace similar to the increase in the number of MPs with a

80

cities with population of less than 100,000
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background in small cities. In other words, in accordance with the increase of the number of
small cities from 1986 to 2011, a similar increase in the number of the representatives who come
from the small cities has occurred. This correspondence suggests that as far as the population
size of the place of birth is considered, the post-revolution members of parliament represent the
general population very well, because the number of MPs from each district is decided based on
the city’s population size (see the next chapter).

Age Distribution
According to the Regulations of the Majles’s elections (2011), the minimum and maximum age
requirement for the candidacy of Majles is 30 and 75 years old. Table 39 shows the mean and
median age of members of ten Majleses. The table shows an ever-increasing mean age of MPs
over time. It also shows that members of the tenth parliament have become more than 11 years
older on average, when compared with the first Majles.

Table 39: Descriptive Statistics of the Age Distribution of MPs

Majles Terms

Minimum Age

Maximum Age

Mean

Median

1

25

74

39.7

38

2

25

69

39.8

38

3

27

68

40.1

39

4

27

69

42.4

41

5

31

69

44.0

43

6

31

71

45.0

44

7

31

74

47.1

46

204

8

32

73

48.4

48

9

31

73

49.0

49

10

32

73

51.0

-

Source: the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Table 40 shows that the mean age is higher among those who have been elected more
than once. The mean age of reelected members of parliament is 6 years higher than the mean of
first-time elected representatives.

Table 40: MPs' mean age by Majles terms and representation history

First-time elected MPs

Two or more times
elected MPs

Majles Terms
Mean

N

Mean

N

1

39.7

329

-

-

2

38.0

170

42.6

107

3

37.1

152

43.8

126

4

40.3

157

45.3

110

5

41.1

127

47.0

121

6

43.7

170

47.2

104

7

44.7

161

50.2

120

8

46.0

154

51.3

131

9

46.2

166

53.0

120

Total

41.7

1586

47.66

939

Sources: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)
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Since the number of times elected variable is positively skewed (skewness = 2.2), it is
logged. As the correlation between the age of MPs at the time of their election and the log
number of times MPs are elected shows, there is a positive relation between those two variables
(Pearson = 0.369, p-value 0.000). This means that the increase in the mean age of MPs, at least
in part, is related to the number of times MPs are elected. However, as shown in table 13, the
pattern of reelection has followed an almost steady trend, when, at least, 40% of the members of
every Majles, except the first Majles, have been previously elected MPs.
Figure 16 displays the numbers of representatives in different age groups in the first two
and last Majleses, which shows the shift of age distribution over time. This comparison reveals a
shift toward an increasing mean age of representatives and demonstrates that the majority of the
MPs in the first and second Majleses (1980-1988) have been in the 30-39 age groups, while in
the eighth and ninth Majleses (2004-2012), they were in the 45-54 groups.
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Figure 16: Age distribution of MPs by Year
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As discussed under the Socio-demographic Transformation section in Chapter 3, the
majority of the age distribution of the post-revolution Iran is shifting upward toward the middleage groups. To highlight this shift, the age distribution of both sexes in the general population in
1986 and 2011 are compared in figure 17. For the purpose of the analysis in this section, and
since there has not been a MP younger than 25, age groups of less than 25 years have been
excluded in this figure. As is evident, the population in the 0 to 9 years in 1986, 34% of the total
population, reached to the 25-34 year-old population category in 2011. It should be added that
the high rate of population growth continued until the early 1990s which in turn, helped the
population in the three age groups of 20-34 in 2011 to enlarge to one third of the total
population.
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Figure 17: Age distribution of General Population by Year
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To determine the extent to which the structural shift in the age distribution of the general
population matches the changes in the age configuration of MPs, table 41 has been generated.
This table reveals that in the three first terms of the Majles, the 55-74 age groups have been
underrepresented and 25-54 age groups have been either equally represented or overrepresented.
This pattern has to some extent been reversed in 8th and 9th Majleses, when the 25-44 age groups
are underrepresented and those in their 45-64 age group have been equally or overrepresented.
This is to say that while the early Majleses after the Revolution included a younger generation of
political elites when the age distribution of the society was younger, the recent Majleses have
become more representative of the middle age groups, compatible with the population shift in the
same direction.
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Table 41: Age Distributions for the General Population and the Majles Representatives

Age Groups

25-34

General Population

Majles Representatives

1986

2011

1st, 2nd & 3rd Majleses

8th & 9th Majleses

6580280
(38%)

15644578
(38%)

277
(31.3%)

11
(1.3%)

0.8

0.03

354
(40.0%)

159
(18.5%)

1.8

0.7

195
(22.1%)

281
(32.7%)

1.2

1.7

49
(5.5%)

103
(12.0%)

0.4

1.1

9
(1.0%)

17
(3.0%)

0.2

0.5

884

571

I of D
35-44

3772562
(22%)

10477767
(26%)

I of D
45-54

3254369
(19%)

7557889
(19%)

I of D
55-64

2522378
(15%)

4543026
(11%)

I of D
65-74

915816
(5%)

2463699
(6%)

I of D

Total N

17045405

40686959

(25-74 age group)
Sources: Statistical Centre of Iran (2013, 2009), the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Gender Representation
By law, Iranian women have equal rights to register as candidates in Majles elections. In terms of
gender distribution, the post-revolution Iranian Majles have witnessed a slight increase in the
representation of women since the Revolution. Table 42 presents the frequencies and percentages
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of post-revolution parliamentarians by gender. As shown, the most recent Majles (2016-2020)
includes the highest presence of women in the history of the Islamic Republic Majleses.
Table 42: Gender Distribution of Representatives

Gender
Majles Terms

Men

% of total

Women

% of total

1

325

98.8

4

1.2

2

273

98.6

4

1.4

3

274

98.6

4

1.4

4

258

96.6

9

3.4

5

238

96.0

10

4.0

6

263

96.0

11

4.0

7

269

95.7

12

4.3

8

277

97.2

8

2.8

9

277

96.9

9

3.1

10

272

94.1

17

5.9

Total (N)

2726

96.9

88

3.1

Source: The Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

The data show that the number of women increased 125% in the fifth Majles compared to
the first Majles. After a slight decline in the eight and nine Majleses, it increased 88% in the
tenth Majles compared to the fifth Majles. This marked a 325% increase over 35 years. In
another words, with the exception of Majles 8 and 9, the presence of women in the legislative
body of the Iranian state has been generally on the rise since the Revolution (see figure 18).
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Figure 18: Gender Distributions of MPs
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94.1
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The distribution of the general population, however, indicates a significant
underrepresentation of women in the post-revolution Majleses. Table 43 represents the gender
distributions among the general population and the Majles representatives within the four
censuses, corresponding with Majles terms. The data indicate that only 1.4% of representatives
in the first three terms of Majles from 1980 to 1992 were women, which increased up to 4.5% of
MPs in last two terms of Majles. In the general population, women normally constitute about
half of the population. This means that Iranian women have been strikingly underrepresented
during the same period of time (I of D = 0.03 to 0.09 respectively). The pattern of change from
the first to the tenth Majleses, however, shows a slight increase toward greater representation of
women over time.
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Table 43: Gender Distributions for the General Population and the Majles Representatives

Gender

General Population
1986

Men

1996

2006

Majles Representatives
2011

7th & 8th

9th&10th

Majleses

Majleses

Majleses

Majleses

11876757

17205485

20750349

872

759

546

549

(51%)

(51%)

(51%)

(51%)

(98.6%)

(96.2%)

(96.5%)

(95.5%)

1.93

1.90

1.89

1.87

8352248

11411001

16530761

19936609

12

30

20

34

(49%)

(49%)

(49%)

(49%)

(1.4%)

(3.8%)

(3.5%)

(4.5%)

0.03

0.08

0.07

0.09

884

789

566

575

I of D

Total N

4rd,5th&6th

8693156

I of D
Women

1st,2nd&3rd

170454051

232877591

337362471

406869591

1- Population in 25-74 age group
Sources: Ministry of Interior, Statistical Centre of Iran, and the Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Intersectionality Analysis
To explore the extent to which class, ethnic and gender characteristics intersect in placing MPs in
a disadvantaged and unequal position, an intersectionality analysis has been presented. First, a
description of the MPs’ ethnic distribution needs to be drawn. As discussed in the methodology
chapter, because of the lack of official data for ethnicity in Iran, this study has measured the
ethnic background of the members of Iranian parliament based on their city of birth. MPs who
were born in cities with a high concentration of specific ethnic groups are assumed to belong to
the respective ethnic minority. Accordingly, five ethnic minority groups have been distinguished
in this study: Azaris, Kurds, Lors, Balouchs, and Turkamans. As table 44 shows,
parliamentarians with Azari background constitute the largest ethnic minority group in the
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Majles, making up 16% of total MPs. This is consistent with the estimations of the size of Azaris
in the general population (see chapter 7). Kurds, Lors, and Balouchs also showed to be at least
descriptively represented almost equally by their counterparts in the Iranian Majleses as 6 %,
5.7%, and 2.5% of parliamentarians are from these three ethnic background respectively. The
findings show that Turkamans are underrepresented, as their share of 0.4% is lower than their
estimated size of 2% in the society. A cross-tabulation between ethnic status and class
background indicates that there is no relation between these two variables (Pearson Chi-Square=
6.22, df = 10, p-value = 0.796), which suggests that MPs from ethnic minorities do not seem to
come from less privileged class backgrounds.

Table 44: Ethnic distribution of the Iranian MPs

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Fars

1720

68.1

69.2

Azari

401

15.9

16.1

Kurd

150

5.9

6.0

Lor

141

5.6

5.7

Balouch

63

2.5

2.5

Torkaman

10

0.4

0.4

Total

2485

98.4

100

Missing

40

1.6

2525

100.0

Ethnic groups

Total
Source: Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

An intersectionality analysis of class, ethnicity, and gender suggests that with an
exception of Lors, male MPs of all ethnic groups are more likely to belong to the upper class.
The analysis also shows that among female MPs, except for Azaris, all other ethnic groups are
more or equally likely to have an intermediate occupational background. However, the Pearson
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Chi-Square test (6.22, df = 10, p-value = 6.225) indicate that the difference is not statistically
significant, meaning that there is no pattern of advantage or disadvantage for women based on
their occupation or ethnicity. This is to say that there is not enough evidence to confirm that an
intersection between gender and ethnicity amongst Iranian MPs which places women and ethnic
minorities in a more disadvantageous situation compared to their Fars men counterparts. This can
be attributed to the Majles electoral system in Iran, which ensures that all provinces and districts
have representatives in the Majles81. It could also be due to the small number of women among
MPs.

Table 45: Intersection of MPs class, ethnicity and gender

Gender

Male

Female

81

Ethnicity

Social Class

Total

Upper Class

Intermediate Class

Working Class

Fars

53.5%

39.9%

6.6%

1640

Azari

52.7%

39.3%

8.0%

387

Kurd

52.1%

37.0%

11%

146

Lor

46.7%

48.9%

4.4%

137

Balouch

48.4%

40.3%

11.3%

62

Turkman

50.0%

20.0%

30.0%

10

Total

52.8%

40.0%

7.2%

2382

Fars

25.5%

72.7%

1.8%

55

Azari

88.9%

11.1%

0.0%

9

Kurd

50.0%

50.0%

0.0%

2

Lor

0.0%

100.0%

0.0%

3

Balouch

0.0%

100.0%

0.0%

1

Turkman

0.0%

100.0%

0.0%

0

Total

32.9%

65.7%

1.4%

70

Fars

52.6%

40.9%

6.4%

1695

The electoral system of the Iranian Majles will be further discussed in the conclusion chapter.
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Total

Azari

53.5%

38.6%

7.8%

396

Kurd

52.0%

37.2%

10.8%

148

Lor

45.7%

49.3%

5.0%

140

Balouch

47.6%

41.3%

11.1%

63

Turkman

50.0%

20.0%

30.0%

10

Total

1280 (52.2%)

1046 (42.7%)

126 (5.1%)

2452

Source: Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

Multinomial Logistic Regression
The aim of a multinomial logistic regression is to help researchers to deal with nominal
polytomies (Arnold 2015:273). The outcome variable here is the class status of MPs, which is
broken down into three categories. The selected reference category is the upper class. The
multinomial analysis of class background helps this study to determine which predictors are
important and how they affect the outcome variable. One also might consider an ordinal logistic
regression as an analytical method, however, since the dependent variable is not truly ordered,
the preferred analysis would be a multinomial logistic regression.
In interval predictors, such as age, Majles number, and modern education, the logistic
regression coefficients (bs) tell how much the logit or logged odds increase for a one-unit
increase in the independent variable or when we go from one category to another. For binary
predictors, however, coefficients indicate that one category of independent variable compared to
the other is more, equally, or less likely in the given category versus the reference category of the
dependent variable.
The likelihood ratio test (Chi-Square) of 420 with a p-value < 0.000 demonstrates that the
whole model fits the data significantly better than a model with no predictor. The Pseudo RSquare measures also indicate an acceptable model fit (see tables 46 and 47).
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Table 46: Multinomial Model Fitting Tests

Model

Model Fitting Criteria
-2 Log Likelihood

Intercept Only

2626.327

Final

2205.633

Likelihood Ratio Tests
Chi-Square

df

Sig.

420.695

16

.000

Table 47: Multinomial Pseudo R-Square

Cox and Snell

.158

Nagelkerke

.189

McFadden

.096

Table 48 shows, multinomial logits for MPs class backgrounds. The exponential
coefficients for each predictor are also reported in this table. The coefficients of ethnicity, Majles
year, and birth place of MPs are not significant, suggesting that these variables do not predict the
class status of members of parliament, or said differently, the MPs’ class status in comparison
with the capitalist class, has nothing to do with their ethnicity, the year of election, and place of
birth. Accordingly, it could be said that being an MP from among the upper or lower classes is
equally distributed between both Fars and others ethnic groups, among different years of Majles
election, and between those who were born in small or large cities.
The variable of age is the only explanatory variable for which its coefficients are
significant among both intermediate and working classes. This suggests that a one-unit increase
in age is associated with a 0.37 and 0.35 decrease in the log odds of being in the intermediate and
working classes respectively, versus the upper class. The exponentiated coefficients suggest that
the ratio of an MP being a member of the intermediate or working class as against a member of
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the upper class decreases by 32 (1-.68=.32) and 30 (1-.70=.30) percent, respectively, for unit
change in age.
Gender shows to have a negative effect on an MP being a member of the intermediate
class rather than upper class by 35 percent. This means that males are less likely to be from an
intermediate as opposed to upper class, when compared to females. In other words, females, on
average, are 65% less likely to come from the upper class than the intermediate class when
contrasted with their male counterparts.
In the case of clerical status, bs implies that clerics whose pre-election occupation was in
the intermediate class rather than the upper class are more likely to become MPs when compared
to non-clerics. In another words, MPs who are clerics are 5.4 times more likely to be from an
intermediate class than from the upper class when compared to non-clerics. To put it another
way, the odds of being an MP from the upper class is much higher among non-clerics than
clerics.
Religious denomination as the third predictor of class status is created as a binary
(Muslim vs. non-Muslims) variable. Its coefficients are significant only among the intermediate
class. The result shows that Non-Muslims when compared to Muslim MPs, are 2.4 times more
likely to be from an intermediate class background than an upper class background. In other
words, Muslim MPs are more likely to come from an upper class than intermediate class
categories.
Regarding the education variable, the coefficient is significant among the working class.
Data indicate that the increase in the years spent in modern education by MPs is associated with
a decrease in the log odds of being a working rather than a member of upper class. In other
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words, one unit increases in the level of education exponentially increase the log odds of being a
member of the upper class versus e working class by 50%.
Table 48: Logged odds of class background of MPs by predictors

Class Background (Reference category=Upper Class)
Predictors
Intermediate Class

Working Class

b

exp (b)

b

exp (b)

-1.04***

0.35

0.87

2.39

-0.13

0.87

-0.16

0.89

-0.37***

0.68

-0.35**

0.70

1.69***

5.46

-1.14

0.32

0.03

1.03

1.01

1.10

Non-Muslims

0.89**

2.43

0.51

1.66

Year of Majles

0.07

1.00

-0.06

0.93

Education

0.23

1.02

-0.68***

0.50

DF
McFadden R-Squares

16
0.096

Sex
Male

Ethnicity
Fars

Age
Clergy Status
Cleric

Birth Place
Major and medium cities

Religion

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Variables age, year of Majles, and education (years) are treated as interval.

The multinomial analysis helps this study to discern which factors are more important in
predicting the class backgrounds of MPs when other predictors are controlled. Thus, it can be
concluded that the class compositions of the MPs are influenced by their age, education, clerical
status, religion and gender. In contrast, place of birth and ethnicity does not influence the class
composition of MPs.
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Summary
The statistical analyses in this study demonstrate that in the ten terms of the Iranian Majles
spanning the time period of 1980 to 2016, 1734 persons were introduced into the political elite.
During this period, more than 50%, 170 out of 280 persons on average, of MPs of each Majles
were recruited as an MP for the first time. The proportion of MPs with upper class backgrounds
increased from 36% to 52%; their colleagues from an intermediate class status were reduced
from a proportion of about 53% to 44%; and the share of MPs from the working class
background dropped from 11% to 4%.
In terms of class representation, the data reveal that the upper class was significantly
overrepresented in early Majleses but ended up with more moderate overrepresentation in recent
terms of the Majles (a decrease of 33 points). The overrepresentation of the intermediate class
has also been mitigated since the first Majles and has tended towards equal representation (I of
D=1.1). Underrepresentation of the working class, which has always been extremely high and
has not been corrected, indicates that they are barely represented among MPs. Clerical
representatives show a significant decline from their share of over 50% in the first and second
Majleses to as low as 6% in the most recent Majles.
The analysis shows a high level of overrepresentation of the more educated population
among MPs. It also reveals that the representation of women is overwhelmingly low but is
showing signs of gradual improvements. In contrast, legally recognized religious minorities have
never been underrepresented. The distribution of age shows that the Majles MPs are becoming
older: the mean age has increased from 40 years of age in 1980, to 51 in 2016. In terms of the
place of birth of MPs, the pattern of those born in small cities and villages outnumbering others
has remained robust in all years of the Majles. Furthermore, the intersectionality analysis reveals
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that coming from different ethnic backgrounds does not have a demonstrably significant effect
on the class status of Iranian members of parliament. Moreover, there is no empirical evidence to
affirm that an intersection between gender and ethnic status would worsen the socioeconomic
status of MPs. The implication of these findings will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION, AND FURTHER
CONSIDERATIONS
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This study aimed to contribute to our understanding of the socioeconomic dimension of political
representation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It asked to what extent the political representatives
in the post-revolution Majleses mirrored the Iranian population. It also asked how the changes in
the social structures of Iran corresponded to the changes in the configuration of elected officials
in the Majles. On a broader level, this study was concerned with two themes: 1) the extent to
which the Revolution has been successful in meeting and upholding its goals and ideals, and 2)
what the quality of political representation tells us about the nature of the political system in Iran.
This research was motivated by the assumption that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a
nascent political system that seems to be reluctant to follow the conventional definition of
democracy and to comply with the characteristics of a conventional democratic state. At the
same time, it has developed its own definition of a desirable political system. Within such a
system, the Majles, as the legislative institution, is meant to reflect the interests and preferences
of all segments of society in the process of law making. Success in accomplishing this will
enhance the Majles’s function and have important implications for political justice in Iran.
In chapters two and three, the theoretical context of this study was delineated. It
explained the substantial structural changes that post-industrial societies have undergone in terms
of their class apparatuses. It addressed two mainstream theoretical approaches to explaining the
mechanism of exchange between social classes and political elites: first, a liberal-pluralist
approach which sees the state’s action as independent and autonomous from the interests of
social classes; second, a class-centred or Marxist approach, translated into its instrumentalist and
structuralist variants, which places class interests at the centre of analysis of a state’s behavior. In
the liberal-pluralist paradigm, the political elites are seen as fair representatives of classes and
occupations, but in Marxist approaches, elites tend to represent the interests of the upper strata.
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For the first approach, access to power is open to all segments of the society who have relevant
skills and competency, whereas in the second approach, it is known to be more straightforward
for well-to-do people.
Several empirical studies in Canada and elsewhere have shown that the upper classes are
overrepresented in democratic institutions, and that elected officials are increasingly coming
from exclusive segments and occupations (Olsen 1980, Guppy et al. 1987, Nakhaie 1997,
Wauters 2010). From a normative point of view, it has been argued that disproportionate
representation will harmfully affect the principle of political justice and the quality of
democracy. While making a crucial distinction between ‘descriptive’ and ‘substantive’
representation, previous studies have identified a correlation between those two attributes of
representation in such a way that the former helps enhancing the latter. This has been discussed
along the lines of economic/occupational, ethnic minority, and gender representation.
In chapter four, the transformation of contemporary Iranian society was discussed. It was
shown how population growth, the increase in the rate of urbanization, the expansion of
education, and waves of secularization affected the fabric of Iranian society, particularly after the
Islamic Revolution. These changes were accompanied by the implementation of economic
policies in the form of Development Plans in post-revolution Iran. Throughout the state-centric
political economy of the first decade of the Islamic Republic, the Iranian state adopted an
interventionist approach not only to manage the economic crisis caused by the Revolution, but
also to handle the hardships of the wartime period. This form of political economy was also
favourable to the discourse of anti-Shah advocates. The main themes of this discourse were
opposition to the private ownership of capital, support for the subordinate and oppressed
segments of the society, the Islamic idea of class equilibrium, and hostility to foreign capital and

223

investment. This decade helped to increase the number of public-sector wage earners, as well as
increase the ranks of the self-employed class, which was already active in petty commodity
economic activity.
In the post-Khomeini period, characterized by subsiding revolutionary enthusiasm,
Iranian governments made a shift towards economic liberalization which continued for three
decades (1995-present), though with notable ebbs and flows. It brought about the revival of
capitalist economic relations and the privatization of state institutions, and also accelerated the
movement towards a service economy. These policies helped to increase the size of the capitalist,
middle, and working classes, especially those involved in the private sector. The petty
bourgeoisie remained generally unchanged under economic liberalization. The substantial
growth of the middle class in the post-revolution era is observed to have happened as a result of
population growth, the expansion of education, the enlargement of state and private bureaucracy,
and the fast movement toward a service economy.
The impact of postrevolutionary trends on the interaction between the structure of social
classes and the reconfiguration of political elites was investigated in chapter five. The
redistribution of power that became possible because of the Revolution created new generations
of elected and non-elected political elites. The first generation of the post-revolution political
elite, concordant with the ‘first Republic,’ was composed mostly of clerical elites, hailing from
social origins in the middle, petty bourgeois, and lower classes. They were Islamists and
revolutionaries but at the same time, had little political experience. Corresponding with the
‘second Republic,’ a new generation of political elites were recruited from those who had served
in revolutionary organs and institutions or had family connections with the first generation of
political elites. They, in part, had previously been state employees or what may be termed
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political functionaries. The semi-state economic foundations which still remained wealthy and
powerful in the second Republic, as well as Bazaar-based political factions and associations such
as Hezb-e Mo’talefeye Eslami or Jame’e-ye Anjomanha-ye Eslami-ye Asnaaf va Bazaar, also
contributed to the rise of high-ranked semi-state officials and introduced them into the political
arena, there to be joined to the second generation of political elites. At the same time, a stratum
of middle class professionals started to seek their cut of power. This stratum of professional
power seekers tended to be supported by the middle class of the general population, since the
latter were both from the same class background and had gained a measure of political
knowledge and awareness - thus, they tended to elect experts to serve as their representatives.
Consequently, there emerged a shift from the first generation of the political elite, mainly rooted
in the clergy and petty bourgeois strata, to a second generation, drawn mostly from political
functionaries and from new middle class backgrounds who started to fill elected political
institutions.
It is within this context that the current study posed its empirical questions: To what
extent is the composition of the post-revolution political elite, measured in terms of members of
parliament, proportionate to the character of the general population? How have these two factors
changed as time has passed since the Revolution? What theoretical frameworks can explain the
whole picture?
The findings of this study revealed that in the ten terms of the Islamic Republic Majles,
members of the intermediate and particularly the upper classes were overrepresented, and
members of the working class remained extremely unrepresented amongst parliamentarians. The
pattern of overrepresentation of the upper and intermediate classes in Majles, however, is
decreasing, partly because the portion of these classes in the general population is on the rise (see
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table 22). With regard to the pattern of change over 37 years, as is presented in table 49, the data
imply that the fluctuation of the composition of MPs and the general population matches in the
case of the upper and working classes but is a mismatch with the intermediate class. This is to
say that the overall increase of MPs from the upper class since the Revolution and the overall
decrease of the working class MPs since 1996 match the same trends in Iranian society, though
not at the same rate; but the decrease of MPs from an intermediate background is out of step with
exactly opposite trends within the general population (see figures 11-13).

Table 49: Overall Class Representation and the Pattern of Change

Class categories in General
population
Upper class
Intermediate class
Working class

Overall representation status in

Overall pattern of

Majles

change

overrepresented

match

equally represented on average

mismatch

underrepresented

match

Despite the large size of the working class in the general population, this class has not
been equally represented, at least descriptively, in the Majles. Underrepresentation of the
working class in the Majles was in contrast to this study’s prediction, when it assumed that the
revolutionary ideology of the rule of Mostaz’afan would have been reflected in the composition
of Majles representatives - and this even though, structurally, some policies were actually
favourable to the working class. Kashefi (2008) posited an explanation why the outcomes of the
Iranian Revolution were at variance with the initial demands of the uprising, when he argued that
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the working class was the main loser after the Revolution simply because the Islamic
government failed to establish an advanced economic system in order to manage inequality.
Working class underrepresentation is, however, aligned with a similar wave of decreasing
representation of the working class in many parliaments in consolidated democratic countries, as
for example has been shown by Bartels (2002) and Wauters (2010). The inability of the working
class to mobilize its members and to obtain representation is to be associated with the shortage of
political and economic resources that this class possesses (also see Hickey and Bracking 2005,
Jusko 2008, Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).
The high presence of MPs from an intermediate class background over the past three
decades in Iran is associated with the universal tendency toward the principle of specialization
and meritocracy (Young 1998). The middle class of Iran, which itself has been growing
increasingly since the Revolution, tended to trust their counterpart candidates as more competent
deputies to sit on the legislature and to pursue its goals and interests. The popularity of
professionals in Iran, reflected in the large number of representatives from a professional class
background, has been in the same direction as the findings of Porter regarding the high numbers
of Canadian political elites who have a middle class origin (1965:395). Our findings also confirm
the previous findings in early Iranian Majleses (Ashraf 1994, Moradi 1995, Vakili-Zad 1994).
This study, however, did not find any evidence for the existence of a strong link between lawyers
and the representatives of Majles in Iran, as Weber asserted. As table 25 shows, when the social
and cultural professions are separated from legal professions, MPs with a background in the
latter, only made up 5.5% of all MPs.
The explanation for the overrepresentation of the upper class and the increase of their
presence in Majles since the Revolution is to some extent similar to that of the intermediate
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class. Upper class members, being those who serve in the highest status managerial professions,
gained popularity due to the experience that it is assumed they have gained in the legislative and
political affairs. Such experience is considered by the electorates as a credit, and has always been
highlighted by Majles candidates during their electoral campaigns in Iran. Our finding on the
representation of legislators and senior officials and managers is consistent with those studies
which see a pattern of exchange between high status occupations and political elites (for Canada
see Clement 1975, Guppy, Freeman and Buchan 1987, Hunter 1981). The findings of the current
study are also consistent with Amir Arjomand (2009a), that sees the ‘second stratum’ as a
springboard for the political elites in Iran. Our findings are also a strong support for Ashraf’s
evidences regarding the replacement of members of the intelligentsia (especially the clerical
intelligentsia) by state managers and bureaucratic elements in post-revolution politics
(1994:125). It is worth noting that there is a very small group of capitalist-employers (less than
1%) that are enumerated within the upper class in the Majles, including construction contractors
and factory bosses, who owe their presence in the political arena to the economic liberalization
policies implemented since the second decade of the life of the Islamic Republic. By
encouraging capitalist relations and privatization, the capitalist class regained its importance and
in fact started to enlarge in the 1990s and 2000s. In addition, in the post-revolution period,
thanks to the proliferation of the semi-state economic foundations, a nouveau riche generation of
economic elites emerged. However, a lack of information regarding the size of the economic
enterprises of capitalist MPs prevents this study from going into further detail about the
characteristics of the capitalist and employer representatives in post-revolution Majleses.
These finding must be qualified by the fact that in any hypothetical scenario in which the
Guardian Council would not exist, the composition of any of the post-election Majleses may
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have been different. However, since research has shown that political views and ideologies are
almost equally distributed amongst different social classes in Iran (see Harris 2015, Morady
2011) - meaning that, for example, there are about equal conservative people amongst upper,
middle, and lower classes - it could be predicted that any such difference may actually be
minimal in the case of the class composition of MPs. Alternately, the hypothetical difference in
the composition of the Majles could imaginably be substantial especially in such cases as the
under-representation of the working class, women, and of non-clerical or non-religious selected
as representatives.
This study revealed that Iranian women are not equally represented in the Iranian Majles.
In recent years, however, women have been attaining a larger share in the Majles and their
presence has increased fourfold compared to first two early terms of Majles. This has been
largely indebted to the expansion of education in general, and the wide access of higher
education for women, in particular, in such a way that female university enrolments have even
surpassed men in some cases. The increase in the number of representative women is consistent
with observations that claim that Iranian women, particularly educated women, increasingly
aspire to equality with men and strongly support women’s participation in the labor force
(Kurzman 2008). The multinomial analysis showed that women MPs, compared to their male
counterparts, are less likely to have an upper as opposed to intermediate class background. The
intersectionality analysis also affirmed that the majority of women MPs are from an intermediate
rather than an upper class background.
Our findings on the underrepresentation of women in the Iranian Majles is somewhat
similar to international reports, for example those of Latin America (Campo 2005) or the United
States (Berg 1994). Comparing women’s representation in the Iranian Majles with their share in
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the Parliament of one of the oldest democracies in the world, England (see Audickas 2016,
Borthwick et al. 1991, Hunter and Holden 2015), reveals that although the figures of the last 30
years of the twentieth century are not extremely different: 3% against 1.2% in 1980 and 9%
against 3.4% in 1992 in Britain and Iran respectively, by 2016 this difference increased to 23%.
With regard to women’s representation, however, one narrative in the Islamic Republic of
Iran disagrees with the promise that the equality of political presence of men and women is
necessarily desirable or positive (Howzeh Encyclopedia 2017). Thinkers within this narrative
argue that if the political engagement of women harms their familial and maternal obligations, in
the long run, it creates more loss than gain (Hoseini et al. 2008:525-31, also see Motahari
1990:chapter five). This discourse refers to studies that show that women in political occupations
are disrupted in their ability to efficiently fulfill their responsibilities as a wife or a mother. This
doctrine recommends a sexual division of labor at the family level through which men are more
responsible for affairs outside of the home and women are seen to do a better job at home. This is
in the same line with the well-known distinction between ‘instrumentalist’ and ‘expressive’
gender role divisions (Parsons and Bales 1956).
There is no reliable estimation of the size of sexual minorities in the general population.
This lack of information makes any kind of accurate analysis regarding their representation
difficult. From a legal point of view, according to the Ghanoun-e Mojazaat-e Eslami84 (2013),
homosexuality is to be punished by death (in cases of the use of force and coercion) or lashes (in
voluntary cases) (Articles 234). In one instance, Iran has developed progressive policies with
respect to a sexual minority: the law recognizes the rights of transgendered citizens. According
to law, reassignment is allowed and is even financially supported by the government. Although

84

The Islamic Penal Law
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this policy has been criticized within the larger context of Iranian laws against sexual minorities
(for example see Najmabadi 2008), many observers welcome it on the basis that Iran has adopted
a very progressive law (Pikulicka-Wilczewska 2015), in case of sexual minorities.
This study found evidence for the overrepresentation of recognized religious minorities in
the Iranian Majles. We know that Baha’is, as the largest non-Muslim religious minority in Iran,
are not eligible to be candidates for any election in Iran. As contrary to other non-Muslim
minorities who enjoy the status of the people of the Book, Baha’ism is seen to be a devious and
illegitimate religion, because of its questioning of the main tenets of Islam. Accordingly, they are
not given freedom of religion by law, and have been subject to exclusion from the civil services.
According to the American Bureau of Human Rights and Labor (2015), Baha’is are excluded
unless they did not identify themselves as Baha’i.
In terms of place of birth, data show that the majority of MPs (55%) were born in small
cities or villages. This can be explained by the nature of the Majles election, or in another words,
the electoral system of the Iranian Majles, as a multi-member district (MMD) system based on
proportional representation seat allocation rules. As used in many democracies, this system
guarantees that all 206 Iranian electoral districts (in 2012) have a representative in the Majles,
based on their population. Each MP is supposed to be elected from a specific constituency in
such a way that residents of all districts of the country have a voice in the Majles. In small
constituencies, it is more likely that those candidates who were born there will be trusted and
elected by people of a region. This contributes to the higher numbers of MPs from small cities or
villages.
The dramatic decline of the share of the clergy in the Iranian Majles is one of the most
substantial changes in the structure of the Majles in past 30 years. Unlike religious minorities,
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the clerical stratum does not enjoy any guaranteed seats, thus, their presence in the Majles is
dependent upon their success in gaining votes from the public. This trend could be seen as a
result of the clergy’s reluctance to run for political office. The decreasing number of MPs from
the clergy could also be seen as an effect of the secularizing forces in Iranian society (Banuazizi
1995, Moaddel 2009). In other words, if one takes the decrease of clerical parliamentarians as an
indicator of secularization in Iran, then this study confirms Kian-Thiebaut (1998) and VakiliZad’s (1994) theses which posits secularization to be an ongoing and inevitable phenomenon,
and is in the same line as the post-Islamism discourse which highlights the strong trends of
reconciliation and reform within Islamism (Bayat 1996, Mahdavi 2011). This finding also
supports Kazemipur and Rezaei’s (2003) evidence regarding the personalization of religion and
the decline in religiosity in recent Iran.
The distribution of parliamentarians in terms of their level of modern education reveals
that MPs are much more educated than the general population. This, of course, shows that MPs
mostly belong to an educated stratum. Furthermore, the findings of this study indicate that MPs’
mean years spent in modern education increased by 6 years in the time from the first to tenth
Majleses. This meaning that, while the majority of parliamentarians in the first Majles received
less than bachelor’s degree, the tenth Majles’ MPs mostly had Master’s or a higher-level degree.
The increase in MPs’ education resulted from the educational expansion and subsequent inflation
of educational credentials (Collins 2011), as well as the policy change regarding the minimum
requirements for becoming an MP. The multinomial analysis also reveals that the effects of
education are higher for an upper class MP relative to those of the working class. This, in turn,
questions the liberal notion of meritocracy in case of the Iranian MPs and supports class-centered
theorists and the cultural reproduction thesis, and emphasizes the centrality of ascribed status
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(Bourdieu 1977, Bourdieu and Boltanski 1978, Bowles 1972 and 1977). This body of argument
asserts that the upper class is able to transform its inherited wealth (economic capital) into
credentials (cultural capital) which can be used for access to power.
In explanation for increase of MPs’ education it should also be noted that in the post IranIraq War period, Iranian technocrats and professionals played an impressive role in
reconstructing the infrastructures of the Iranian economy, which were partly destroyed as a
consequence of the eight-year war. A survey conducted in 2008 showed that 60% of Iranian
respondents believe that ‘having experts make decision’ is very good or fairly good for the
successful management of a country (World Values Survey 2008). Although this is a crosssectional finding, it still could be taken as an indicator of the level of trust that Iranians give to
educated and expert individuals, which may be reflected in their voting behavior. Another
explanation is the relative openness of the political system toward educated persons (those who,
of course, remained committed to the values and ideals of the Revolution) wishing to enter into
the elite of Islamic Republic of Iran. The Guardian Council, which is in charge of vetting
election nominees, began to trust some of these groups to participate in the highest levels of
policy-making. The evidence for this assertion is that the Council confirmed the competency of a
wide range of candidates from different political orientations in the fifth and sixth Majles
elections (1996 and 2000). These two elections, specifically the sixth Majles, are among the most
free and fair Majles elections in Iran since the establishment of the Guardian Council.
Statistically speaking, the percentage of those candidates who were allowed to run for the 1996
and 2000 elections were 83.13% and 83.78% respectively, which are amongst the highest rates
of Majles candidate approval by the Guardian Council (Maloney and Borden 2016). As
discussed earlier, the Guardian Council took its trust in experts and educated persons even
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further by ratifying a bill in 2006 increasing the required level of education for Majles candidacy.
As was described in chapter 8, since its implementation, the new rule, which is still in place, has
contributed to the increase in the mean years of education of MPs in the Majles. As noted earlier,
the freedom and fairness of these elections has to be considered with the limitations that the
Council poses on the people’s election. Given that the Council gives priority to candidates’
ideological commitment to the principles of the Islamic Revolution, one can infer that the level
of freedom and fairness of any Majles election is also dependent on the proportion of Majles
nominees who are committed to the clerical ideological Islam and are loyal to the ideals of the
Revolution.
Before making any conclusions with regards to the explanatory power of class-state
theoretical paradigms, two issues should be noted. First, one can claim that a Marxist approach
can convincingly explain a situation only if one or both of the following conditions are satisfied:
one, that the capitalist class is overrepresented; two, that the working class is underrepresented.
Second, occupation-based classifications of classes, like what has been employed in the
classification of occupations in Iran in this study, do not necessarily separate ownership and
therefore do not precisely match a Marxist model of class. Nevertheless, this study uses the
occupations that have been classified as upper class as an indication of dominant classes, to use
the Marxian term. This is justifiable due to fact that the highest status occupations are usually
associated with higher levels of income and accordingly with higher chances of accumulating
economic capital. This association is even further promoted through the line of educational
credentials as is theorized by the cultural reproduction thesis. The International Labor
Organization (2012) assigns skill levels of 3 and 485 to the highest group of occupations
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(managers, senior officials, and legislators). Thus, while remaining aware of the difficulties of
comparing different operationalizations of class, to the extent that it is possible, some inferences
regarding class-MP relations can be provided here.
This study has found that the upper classes have been overrepresented, and that the
working class is not represented at all in the Majleses. These findings support the instrumentalist
approach. We also observed that the Iranian Majleses, in different terms and in different
compositions, supported the implementation of liberal economic policies. These policies ensured
privatization and the expansion of a capitalist economy, which supposedly benefited the
capitalist class. Such findings support the structuralist approach. All told, the evidence provides
some support for Marxist or, better said, a classed-based explanation of the relationship between
the state and society at the level of the parliamentarian political elites in Iran.
On the other hand, to the extent to which the intermediate class, the class of
professionals, constitute the second-largest segment of MPs, we can suggest some support for the
liberal-pluralist theory of power in the case of the Iranian Majles. In addition, the distribution of
MPs in terms of their level of education shows that the Iranian representatives are skilled,
meritorious, and competent, which provide further support for the liberal-pluralist thesis, which
maintains that MPs should be and are from amongst the most skilled and competent individuals
in the population. The minimum educational requirement for becoming an MP highlights the fact
that the Iranian Majles is a place of highly educated and by extension expert people. This
overrepresentation of educated people might also be referred to the inflation of educational
credential thesis (Collins 2011).
However, a crosstabulation of class and educational attainment (table 50) shows that
there is an association between an MP’s education and class: most MPs, 52%, whom received
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the highest levels of education (professional-specialty doctorate and masters) are among the
upper and intermediate classes. The multinomial analysis also suggested that those with high
education are more likely to be among MPs with upper rather than lower class backgrounds. This
evidence, of course, highlights the class-based character of education, and challenges the liberalpluralist theory. Moreover, table 26 revealed that those with higher levels of education, masters
and doctorates, are more likely to be re-elected as Majles representatives. It is important to
emphasize that while the youngest MP in the most recent Majles was 30 years-old, on average,
MPs acquired their education more than 30 years ago. Education in prerevolutionary Iran was
not as widespread as it is now (see table 3) and was largely in the possession of the wealthy
urban population (see Arasteh 1962). In addition, since higher education was, and is still, the
prerogative of the upper class, it could be concluded that these MPs have had upper class family
backgrounds (which means the class of their parents). As was shown in table 21, mean years of
modern education has been significantly higher among upper and intermediate class, suggesting
the association between class and education.

Table 50: Class and educational attainment cross-tabulation

Class

Level of education
less than
high
school
3.6%

high
school

bachelor's

5.3%

Intermediate

11.2%

Working
Total

Upper

Total

38.8%

masters and GP
(general
practitioner)
34.3%

professional
and specialty
doctorate
18.0%

1223

13.0%

31.0%

25.3%

19.4%

854

11.3%

21.2%

47.7%

16.6%

3.3%

151

7.0%

9.3%

36.4%

29.6%

17.5%

2228

Source: Iranian Parliamentary Guide (2011)

236

Even more recently, several studies in Iran have shown that access to education for
children is strongly linked to the economic situation of their families (Aminfar 2005, Bazargan
2007), as is the ability of parents to provide the minimum requirements of education, such as
tuition fees, educational equipment, and transportation to school (see Biabangard 1996).
Dehnavi (2005) also studied 1,082,856 applicants of post-secondary education in Iran who
attended the university entrance exam (Konkour) in 2003. He found that parents’ class and level
of income have a positive association with their children’s entrance exam scores. Dehnavi’s
findings showed that applicants with an upper class background have had the highest (36.6%)
and those from a lower class background have had the lowest chance (17.9%) of being accepted
into universities in 2003. Other research that studied pre-university students of the Khorasan
province in 2001-2002 confirms that the combination of cultural capitals of one’s family,
measured by objective (books or art paintings) and embodied (visiting museums or studying
habits) types of cultural capital, and the family’s economic capital (wealth) increased the chance
of children’s access to post-secondary education in Iran (Noghani 2007). Mirashrafi, Khodaie,
and Jamali (2016) analyzing the data of higher education applicants in 2010, found large positive
effects of the socioeconomic status of one’s family (measured by family income) upon entrance
exam scores. In another study, using the higher education applicant data in 2008, Mirashrafi,
Bol, and Nakhaiezade (2013) showed that the mean total score of the entrance exam is
significantly greater for those applicants whose family income are higher. The logistic regression
showed that the chance of obtaining university admission is higher among applicants of higher
income levels. They also showed that the mean of applicants’ scores is significantly higher
among those whose parents have university degrees.
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These findings are in the same line with evidence of the transmission of parental
socioeconomic status to their offspring via education, which in turn translate into the latter
finding higher-status occupations (Bowles 1972, Bowles and Gintis 1976, Bowles 1977, Bowles
and Gintis 2002). The evidence also supports the cultural reproduction theory. As Bourdieu has
emphasized, besides economic capital, non-economic forms of capital, especially cultural capital
(parents’ education for instance), are subject to conversion into other forms of capital. In the
past, economic capital transmission (inheritance) was used by dominant classes as a strategy for
inter-generational reproduction. In recent times, it is educational credentials which are used as a
means of class reproduction, which in turn reproduces the pattern of dominance instead of
serving as an instrument of equality (Bourdieu 1974, Nash 1990). In the case of this study, it can
be concluded that the mechanism of class reproduction seems to be projected in the elite
reproduction, specifically when one takes the evidence of the class-based importance of
education and importance of education for becoming an MP in Iran into consideration.
Indeed, there are two other mechanisms of reproduction. The first is the vetting process
by the Guardian Council. The members of the Council, one of the most central institutions of the
Islamic Republic, have been carefully selected among the trusty and faithful individuals who
have already proved their loyalty. As discussed earlier, six powerful jurisconsults of the Council
are directly selected by the supreme leader, and six lawyers are suggested by the head of the
judiciary (who is himself selected by the supreme leader). A cursory review of the biography of
the current and former jurisconsult members of the Guardian Council86 reveals that they are a
small number of high-ranked clerics who are ideologically committed to the principles of the
Revolution and strongly believe in Shi’ite. The conscious of the issues and needs of Islamic
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society, according to the Article 91 of the Islamic Republic Constitution (2007 [1989]), is a
required condition for their selection. Moreover, referring to the post-revolution factors of
privilege discussed in chapter five, members of the Council have been drawn from among the
revolutionaries and have been direct students of Ayatollah Khomeini (Ahmad Jannati,
Mohammad Yazdi, Yousof Sanei, Mehdi Mahdavi Kani, Mohamad Emami Kashani, Mahammad
Momen, Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi), born to high-ranking clerical families (Lotfollah Safi
Golpayegani, Sadegh Larijani, Hosein Shabzendedaar), served as high officials in key
revolutionary and governmental organizations during the first Republic (Gholamreza Rezvani,
Mohammad Modarresi Yazdi, Gholamhosein Elham, Abbas Ali Kadkhodaee), or were vetarans
of the Iran-Iraq War (Mohsen Esmaeili). As officials whose main duty is to ensure that all civic,
penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other affairs and
regulations are based on Islamic criteria, the members of the Guardian Council tend to approve
candidates with similar backgrounds. As discussed before, the vetting process of the Guardian
Council is not arbitrary. The Council tends to confirm the competence of individuals who are, of
course, highly educated and are committed to the Revolution. Therefore, those who have
participated in the revolution and Iran-Iraq War, or are from among martyr families, or have held
important revolutionary and governmental positions, or are religious, and have theoretical and
practical commitment to the principals of the constitution of the Islamic Republic are more likely
to be vetted. In other words, a kind of elite reproduction seems to occur through the vetting
process.
A second mechanism of reproduction takes place by help of what Porter (1965) and Mills
(1973 [1956]) referred to as networks of affinity and connection amongst the upper echelons of
Iranian elites. Such networks exist in the form of intermarriages and kinship relations, club
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memberships, etc. In Iran, there are social networks such as mosques and hoseiniyeh, religious
and political gatherings, religious schools, and Friday congregations that serve as means of
connection between some members of elite groups. Moreover, family and kinship connections
help the top echelon of elites to tie themselves together. The most obvious evidence is the high
rate of intermarriage among offspring of grand Ulama (for instance between Khomeini and Sadr
families, and between Mousavi Ardabili and Hashemi Shahroudi families) and high-ranked
governmental and ruling elites (for example between Khamenei and Haddad, and between
Meshkini and Reishahri’s families). These interlocking networks between the upper echelons of
power elites not only served as a separation line, demarcating insiders from outsiders, but
provided a place for existing and future elites to mix with one another, to strengthen their
relationships, to enhance their sense of solidarity, and, more importantly, helped foster class and
elite reproduction in Iran.

Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research
The current study remains limited to the post-revolution Majleses. A comprehensive study of the
Iranian Majles would entail conducting two further investigations. On one level, the
demographic and socioeconomic background of parliamentarians taken as a while, and its match
or mismatch with the general composition of Iranian society in the pre- and postrevolutionary
periods would have to be compared. On a second level, the composition of Iranian deputies
could be compared with that of other parliaments in the region, with other societies in the
process of transitioning to democracy, or with that of older democratic regimes. Such
investigations would produce valuable insights regarding the impact of the Revolution on the
composition of Iran’s political elites, as well as the disposition of Iranian democracy in
comparison to other political systems.
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This study remains limited by the available data up to the 2011 census. The result of the
2016 census will be released in the near future. Moreover, the complete information for the tenth
Majles members of parliament, inaugurated in 2016, has not been published to date. Future
research may want to include such information to determine whether the trends which were
demonstrated in this study continue.
The conceptualization and operationalization of class in this study has drawn on the
Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) schema which was adjusted by the author to match the
classification of occupations in Iran. In addition, as discussed earlier, a lack of the information
regarding upper class ownership prevented this study from providing a fully-fledged Marxist
analysis. Thus, this study remained confined to a limited application of the Marxist theory of
class-elite relations. Further studies may try to access reliable data on the ownership status of
upper class MPs, and also may consider using other typologies of class to check the accuracy of
this study’s findings.
Wauters (2010: 187-88) argues that “Ideally, descriptive analyses should take the whole
professional career of parliamentarians into account. Practical problems, however, often
constitute an obstacle for this kind of analysis. As a consequence, researchers are often forced to
consider only the most recent profession of a person, which frequently is already a salaried
political function.” Due to the limitations of the data that were described in the methodology
chapter, this study selected the most recent occupation that MPs served before their election as a
parliamentarian. A more complete occupational history of members of the parliaments, as well as
complementary information regarding their class of origin and their family backgrounds, will
enrich the findings of this study.
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The findings of this study should be complemented by a parallel research on ‘substantive’
dimensions of representation in the Iranian Majles. We discussed that descriptive and substantive
representation are strongly correlated. However, existing empirical evidence suggests that the
existence or non-existence of descriptive representation does not necessarily entail the existence
or non-existence of substantive representation. For example, a shortage of representatives from
the working classes in the Majles has sometimes been compensated for by the presence of
deputies of the labor unions (for example representatives of the Khaane-ye Kaargar87) who
themselves are not necessarily members of the working class.
Any study of the political system of Iran, particularly the study of the elected institutions,
should take seriously the role of the Guardian Council in vetting the election nominees for the
Majles, the office of Presidential, and the Assembly of Experts. The Council, as described in
chapter 4, has the right of rejecting the qualifications to stand for election of any candidate based
solely on their collective assessment. The implications of this vetting procedure for the present
study is that, while it is technically correct to say that the Iranian people elect their
representatives directly, they do so only when the respective candidates have already passed
through the filter of the Guardian Council. Therefore, any discussion regarding the applicability
of Marxist, liberal-pluralist, or elite-centric theoretical approaches to the case of Iranian Majles
should be informed by the fact that the Iranian people are not the first and last electors of their
representatives. Future studies, may wish to direct their focus to looking at the list of Majles
candidates (particularly those whose qualifications have been rejected), to find out the extent to
which the rejected candidates are from particular social backgrounds.
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On another level, the findings of this study might be contextualized within the larger
framework of democratization in Iran. This would include a discussion of the theories of
democratic transition and consolidation, as well as examining the level of fairness and freedom
of elections; the extent of the institutionalized separation of power of the legislative, executive,
and judiciary branches of the state; the density of Iran’s civil society; the degree of the rule of
law, civil liberties, and political rights; the level of the state’s responsiveness and transparency;
and the presence of democratic institutions such as political parties in Iran.

Implications for Policy
As table 24 shows, despite their considerable share in the Iranian labor force, technicians and
associate professionals, agricultural and fishery workers, craft workers, planet and machine
operators, assemblers, drivers, and workers in elementary occupations are not represented at all
in Majles, at least since 2008. Alternately, legislators and senior officials and managers are
represented in the Iranian Majles at a proportion more than 5 times that of their actual size in the
general population. If a more just representation of Iranian society is desired, policy makers
should take the required measures, perhaps through reviewing the vetting process, or determining
quotas, to ensure that not only all occupational groups, but the working class, and also all
segments of society, including women, find equal chance to be represented in the legislative
body of the Iranian state.
This study would recommend that the Statistical Centre of Iran considers adding
questions to its Population and Housing Census questionnaire in order to distinguish large
employers (owners who employ many employees) and small employers from self-employed
groups (owners who do not employ employees). Such distinction will enable further studies to
utilize other models in mapping social classes in Iran. This study also recommend that the
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Statistical Centre of Iran and the Islamic Consultative Assembly consider gathering information
with regards to ethnicity. It is recommended that the Islamic Consultative Assembly request MPs
to identify their first and their latest occupations before their election as a representative, and also
have them to include information regarding their families’ socioeconomic backgrounds,
particularly, their fathers’ occupations.
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Appendix A: Presidential and Majles terms and correspondent censuses
Postrevolutionary Governments

Islamic Consultative Assembly
(Majlis)

Censuses

1st Presidential Term Started: Feb 1980
Turnout: 68%
President: Abolhasan Bani-Sadr
(PM: Rajaee)
nd

2 Presidential Term Started: July 1981
Turnout: 64%
President: Mohammad Ali Rajaee
(PM: Bahonar)
3rd Presidential Term Started: Oct 1981
Turnout: 74%
President: Ali Khamenei
(PM: Mousavi)
4th Presidential Term Started: Sep 1985
Turnout: 55%
President: Ali Khamenei (PM: Mousavi)
5th Presidential Term Started: Jul 1989
Turnout: 55%
President: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
6th Presidential Term Started: Aug 1993
Turnout: 50%
President: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
7th Presidential Term Started: Aug 1997
Turnout: 80%
President: Mohammad Khatami
8th Presidential Term Started: Aug 2001
Turnout: 67%
President: Mohammad Khatami
9th Presidential Term Started: Aug 2005
Turnout: 63%
President: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
th

10 Presidential Term Started: Aug 2009
Turnout: 85%
President: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
11th Presidential Term Started: Aug 2013
Turnout: 73%
President: Hassan Rohani

1st Majlis Term Started: Mar 1980
Turnout: 51%
Speaker: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
1st Census after the
Revolution: 1986

2nd Majlis Term Started: May 1984
Turnout: 65%
Speaker: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani

3rd Majlis Term Started: May 1988
Turnout: 60%
Speaker: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani /
Mehdi Karoubi
4th Majlis Term Started: May 1992
Turnout: 58%
Speaker: Aliakbar Nategh Nouri

2nd Census: 1996

5th Majlis Term Started: Jun 1996
Turnout: 71%
Speaker: Aliakbar Nategh Nouri
6th Majlis Term Started: May 2000
Turnout: 67%
Speaker: Mehdi Karoubi

3rd Census: 2006

7th Majlis Term Started: May 2004
Turnout: 51%
Speaker: Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel
8th Majlis Term Started: May 2008
Turnout: 51%
Speaker: Ali Larijani

4th Census: 2011

9th Majlis Term Started: May 2012
Turnout: 64%
Speaker: Ali Larijani

5th Census: Nov 2016

10th Majlis Term Started: May 2016
Turnout: 62%
Speaker: Ali Larijani
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Appendix B: Chronology
1891: Tobacco Movement; the first national protest against Western (British) imperialism
1906: Constitutional Revolution
1951: Oil nationalization movement
1953 (August): American-British coup d’état against Prime Minister Mosaddegh
1961 (March): Death of grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi; a conservative and apolitical jurisconsult
who prevented clerics from involving themselves in political activities
1963: The launching of the White Revolution and implementation of the Land Reform
1963 (June): The first antigovernment uprising and riots led by Ayatollah Khomeini
1978 (January 20): The beginning of the presidential term of Jimmy Carter in the USA
1979 (January 12): Formation of the Revolution Council by Ayatollah Khomeini - headed by
Motahari, and including Beheshti, Hashemi, Ardabili and Bahonar.
1979 (February 1): Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran after 15 years of exile
1979 (February 4): Appointment of the Provisional Government headed by Mehdi Bazargan
1979 (February11): Shah’s Prime Minister Bakhtiar flees Iran
1979 (February 11): The official triumph of the Revolution
1979 (February 12): Formation of the Revolutionary Committees
1979 (February 13): Formation of the Revolutionary Tribunals
1979 (February 28): Establishment of the Foundation of Disinherited to confiscate properties of
the Shah and his disciples
1979 (March 1): Departure of Ayatollah Khomeini to Qom
1979 (March 20): The formation of the Islamic Republican Party - IRP
265

1979 (March 30): Islamic Republic referendum - yes/no
1979 (May): Establishment of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps
1979 (August 3): The election of the first Majles
1979 (November 4): Takeover of the US embassy
1979 (November 6): Resignation of the Bazargan’s cabinet
1979 (November): Passing of the new constitution by the Constitution Assembly of Experts
1979 (December 24): The occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Army
1979 (January 23): Ayatollah Khomeini’s heart attack which led to bringing him to Tehran - he
resided in Jamaran until his death
1979 (May 1): Assassination of Morteza Motahari
1980 (January 25): The first presidential election; election of Bani-Sadr as the first president of
the Islamic Republic - prime minister: Rajaee
1980 (March 14): The first Majles election; Hashemi was elected as the Speaker
1980 (April 24): Failure of the Eagle Claw operation ordered by American President Carter to
rescue the US embassy hostages in Iran
1980 (April): The Revolution Council approved the progressive land reform bill, which was
designed by Ayatollah Montazeri, Beheshti, and Meshkini to end the peasantlandlord/conservative Ulama dispute.
1980 (June): Beginning of the Cultural Revolution - closure of the universities
1980 (17 July): Opening of the Guardian Council
1980 (27 July): Death of Mohammad Reza Shah in Cairo
1980 (September 22): Iraq invades Iran; the beginning of an eight years long war
1981 (January 19): Algiers agreement signed between Iran and the US, ending the hostage crisis
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1981 (January 20): Start of the presidential term of Ronald Reagan in the USA
1981 (January 20): Release of the American diplomats
1981(June): Dismissal of president Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr by Majles
1981 (June 27): Assassination attempt against Ayatollah Khamenei
1981 (June 28): Explosion at the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party and assassination of
Beheshti and over 70 political figures
1981 (July): Isolation and defeat of Mojahedin Khalgh
1981 (July 24): The second presidential election; election of Rajaee as the second president of
the Islamic Republic - prime minister: Bahonar
1981 (August 30): Bombing of the Prime Minister’s office and assassination of President Rajaee
and Prime Minister Bahonar
1981 (October 2): The third presidential election; election of Ayatollah Khamenei as the third
president of the Islamic Republic - prime minister: Mir Hosein Mousavi
1982 (April): Majles passes the nationalization of the country's foreign trade bill.
1982 (May 24): The liberation of Khoramshahr after about 580 days of occupation by Iraq
1982 (December): Reopening of the universities following the implementation of the Cultural
Revolution
1983: Banning of the Tudeh party
Mid 1980s: Decline in the fertility rate commences
1984 (April 12): The second Majles election; Hashemi elected as Speaker
1985 (August 16): The fourth presidential election; reelection of Ayatollah Khamenei - prime
minister: Mir Hosein Mousavi
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1985 (November): Selection of Ayatollah Hosein Ali Montazeri as the deputy supreme leader of
the Islamic Republic by Ayatollah Khomeini
1986 (March 26): Ayatollah Khomeini’s second heart attack and his provisional death for a few
seconds - he was revived after the intervention of the emergency medical team of the Jamaran
Heart Hospital
1986 (March): Oil price collapsed
1987 (June): Dissolution of the Islamic Republic Party
1987 (July 29): Resolution 598 adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council calling for an
immediate cease-fire between Iran and Iraq
1987 (July 31): Over 400 deaths after Saudi solders’ open fire against a demonstration by Iranian
pilgrims in Mecca
1988 (Feb): Creation of the Expediency Council
1988 (April 8): The third Majles election; Hashemi elected as Speaker and office then passed to
Mehdi Karoubi
1988 (June): Ayatollah Khomeini appoints Hashemi Rafsanjani as the acting Commander-inChief of the armed forces
1988 (July 3): Shooting down of the Iran Air passenger flight - Tehran-Dubai - by the US Navy
which led to 290 civilian fatalities
1988 (July 20): Iran’s acceptance of the 598 Resolution
1988 (July and August): Forough-e Javidan operation by Mojahedin Khalgh and Iraq’s help and
the official end of the War
1988 (August): Assassination of Mojahedin Khalgh and Tudeh advocators in the Evin prison
1989 (February 14): Ayatollah Khomeini declares Fatwa against Salman Rushdie
1989 (March): Ayatollah Montazeri’s resignation as deputy supreme leader
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1989 (May): Ayatollah Khomeini’s command for the formation of the council of revision of the
Constitution
1989 (June 3): Death of Ayatollah Khomeini
1989 (June 4): Selection of Ayatollah Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader
1989(July): Ratification of the Constitution amendment
1989 (July 28): The fifth presidential election; Hashemi elected as the fifth president
1989-94: First Five-Year Economic Development Plan
1989 (November 9): The fall of the Berlin Wall
1990 (January): Karbaschi selected as mayor of Tehran - until 1998
1990 (August): Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait
1991 (January): Desert Storm operation to liberate Kuwait
1991 (February): Opening of Salam newspaper as the main leftist voice
1991 (December 26): Dissolution of the Soviet Union
1992 (April 10): The fourth Majles election; Nategh Nouri elected as Speaker
1992-94: Deaths of three grand ayatollahs - Ayatollah Khoee (August 1992), Ayatollah
Golpayegani (December 1993), and Ayatollah Araki (November 1994)
1993 (March): First signs of the setback in the economic liberalization plan
1995-2000: Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan
1993 (June 11): The sixth presidential election; reelection of Hashemi as the sixth president
1994 (October): The emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan
1996 (February): Establishment of the Kargozaran Party as the political organization of
pragmatists
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1996 (March 8): The fifth Majles election; Nategh Nouri reelected as Speaker
1997 (May 23): The seventh presidential election and election of reformist president Khatami
1997 (November 19): Placement of Ayatollah Montazeri under house arrest, which lasts five
years
1998 (August 8): Nine Iranian diplomats killed by Taliban in Mazar-i Sharif, Afghanistan
1998 (September 21): Khatami introduced the idea of the ‘Dialogue between Civilizations’ in the
UN General Assembly
1998 (December): Disclosure of the chain murders of the Iranian intellectuals and writers
1999 (Feb): The first City Council election
1999 (July): The student protests of 18 Tir
2000 (February 18): The sixth Majles election; Mehdi Karoubi elected as Speaker
2000- 2005: Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan
2001 (June 8): The eighth presidential election and reelection of Khatami
2001 (September 11): Attacks on the World Trade Center towers
2001 (October 7): The invasion of Afghanistan by the US
2002 (August): The beginning of the Iran’s nuclear program crisis following the West’s claims
of the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak
2003 (February 28): The second City Council election; fundamentalists gain the majority and
appoint Ahmadinejad as the Meyer of Tehran in May of the same year
2003 (March 20): The invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies
2004 (February 20): The seventh Majles election; fundamentalists gained a majority and Haddad
Adel elected as Speaker
2005 (June 24): The ninth presidential election and election of Ahmadinejad
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2005–2010: Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan
2006 (December 15): The third City Council election
2008 (March 12): The eighth Majles election; Ali Larijani elected as Speaker
2009 (June 12): The tenth presidential election and reelection of Ahmadinejad
2009 (June-August): Disputation over the results of the presidential election under the leadership
of Mousavi and Karoubi
2009 (December 20): The demise of Ayatollah Montazeri
2010 (November): Enactment of the Subsidies Targeting Act by president Ahmadinejad
2011 (February 20): Placing of the Mousavi and his wife - Zahra Rahnavard - and Karoubi under
house arrest
2011-2016: Fifth Five-Year Economic Development Plan
2012 (January): The imposition of sanctions against Iran’s oil exports and its Central Bank
operations
2012 (February): Major drop in Iran's national currency as a result of sanctions
2012 (March 2): The ninth Majles election; Ali Larijani was reelected as Speaker
2013 (June 14): The eleventh presidential election and election of Rohani
2013 (June 14): The fourth City Council election
2016-2020: Sixth Five-Year Economic Development Plan
2016 (January 16): The implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
signed between Iran and five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany to
put an end on the Iranian nuclear program crisis
2016 (February 26): The tenth Majles election; Ali Larijani was reelected as Speaker
2017 (January 8): Death of Hashemi Rafsanjani
2017 (May 19): The twelfth presidential election, which led to reelection of incumbent Rohani
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